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Sub-Saharan Africa Report



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11 SEPTEMBER 1986

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

CONTENTS

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

USSR Training Figures Given, Cooperation Stressed (JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 24 May 86).....	1
Finida Funds Meteorological Services of SADCC Countries (NOTICIAS, 1 Jul 86).....	2

ANGOLA

Factors Affecting Possibility for Dialogue Discussed (Xavier de Figueiredo; SEMANARIO, 5 Jul 86).....	4
Factions Within MPLA, Popular Discontent Viewed (Carlos Da Matta; SEMANARIO, 5 Jul 86).....	7
Minorities, 'Racial Weapon' Discussed (Carlos da Malta; SEMANARIO, 12 Jul 86).....	9

LIBERIA

Loss of Press Freedom, Closing of Newspapers Deplored (DAILY STAR, 10 Jul 86).....	11
Statements by Two Veteran Journalists	11
International Body Expresses Concern	12
Telecommunication Corporation Investigating Paycheck Scandal (Ephraim Johns; DAILY STAR, 10 Jul 86).....	13
Compulsory Elementary, Primary Education Proposed (Gabriel S. Nyanfor; NEW LIBERIAN, 1 Jul 86).....	14

NIGERIA

Soviet Union Plans To Import Cocoa, Other Products (Victor Attai; NEW NIGERIAN, 4 Aug 86).....	16
National Seminar on Traditional Rulers Ends in Disagreement (NEW NIGERIAN, 7 Aug 86).....	17
Decrees on NLC Affiliations, Universities, Customs Issued (NEW NIGERIAN, 5 May 86).....	18
Tactics of Nigerian Labor Congress Discussed (Umoh James Omoh; DAILY TIMES, 6 Aug 86).....	20
Smuggling of Kerosene, Rice Causes Shortages (SUNDAY TIMES, 3 Aug 86).....	22
Kerosene to Benin	22
Rice Diverted, by Kunle Odufuwa	23
Alternative to Commodity Boards Advised (NEW NIGERIAN, 11 Aug 86).....	25
Government Reviewing Petroleum Legislation (NEW NIGERIAN, 8 Aug 86).....	26
Natural Gas Production Reported Higher in March (DAILY TIMES, 6 Aug 86).....	27
Agricultural Production Down in 1985 (NEW NIGERIAN, 7 Aug 86).....	28
Domestic Fish Production Declines, Demand Increasing (Jackson Imafidon; BUSINESS TIMES, 4 Aug 86).....	29
Badagry Telephone Exchange Inaugurated (DAILY TIMES, 5 Aug 86).....	30
Road Money Allocations Announced, Sokoto, Borno Lead (NEW NIGERIAN, 2 Aug 86).....	31
Anambra Phasing Out Almost All Teacher Training Schools (Gil Ugwu; DAILY STAR, 4 Aug 86).....	32
Statistics on Airports Passenger Traffic Issued (Roseline Umesi; BUSINESS TIMES, 4 Aug 86).....	33
Paper Praises Modification of Death Penalty (NEW NIGERIAN, 29 Jul 86).....	34

Alkai Courts Said To Discredit Sharia Law (Ibrahim Salihu; NEW NIGERIAN, 1 Aug 86).....	35
Muslim Women's Seminar Raises Issues (THE TRIUMPH, 28, 29 Jul 86).....	36
Religion in Schools, by Olu Ojewale	36
Babangida's Wife's Address	36
Islamic Conference Rejects Secularism (NEW NIGERIAN, 5 Aug 86).....	38
Archbishop Criticizes Religious Council Proposal (DAILY TIMES, 4 Aug 86).....	39

SENEGAL

LD/MPT Paper Criticizes Government Agricultural Policy (Editorial; FAGARU, Jun 86).....	40
LD/MPT Paper: Press Campaign Against Party Charged (FAGARU, Jul 86).....	42

SOUTH AFRICA

AFRIKANER/GOVERNMENT

Information Chief Defends Regime to Liberal German Weekly (Louis Nel Interview; DER SPIEGEL, 16 Jun 86).....	44
Author Talks to AWB Leader Eugene Terre' Blanche (Wessel Ebersohn; LEADERSHIP, No 3, 1986).....	54
Professor on Afrikaans Students' Challenges, Frustrations (Mike de Vries; LEADERSHIP, No 3, 1986).....	58
Black Sash Official Deplores Government's Regulatory Powers (Sheena Duncan; LEADERSHIP, No 3, 1986).....	61
Possibilities of Proposed National Statutory Council Weighed (David Welsh; LEADERSHIP, No 3, 1986).....	64
Ability To Cope With Guerrilla, Conventional War Assessed (Mike Hough; LEADERSHIP, No 3, 1986).....	67
SADF Short Service System Termed Helpful to Economy (Helmoed-Romer Heitman; PARATUS, Aug 86).....	71

SOCIOPOLITICAL/OTHER

Journalist Discusses Nation's 'Special' Ties With Israel (Dan Sagir; THE WEEKLY MAIL, 18-21 Jul 86).....	75
New Member of Transvaal Executive Committee Spells Out Views (Ismail Fakir Hassen Mayet Interview; POST NATAL, 6-9 Aug 86).....	77
Millenarian Theology Seen Inflaming Black, White Radicalism (Andreas Graf Razumovsky; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 14 Jun 86).	80
Local Families Opposed to New Township (Andrew Thomson; THE CITIZEN, 12 Aug 86).....	88
Farm Family on Northern Border Lives in State of Siege (Vivienne Walt; THE WEEKLY MAIL, 25-31 Jul 86).....	89

ECONOMIC

Views of Anglo-American's Deputy Chairman on National Issues (Julian Ogilvie Thompson Interview; LEADERSHIP, No 3, 1986).....	92
Employer Groups Submit Memo on Privatization (SAPA, 19 Aug 86).....	98
Briefs	
Floating Exchange Rates System	100
Funds to Israel Monitored	100
Energy Official Speaks on Sanctions	100
Business Professor: Nation Profitable Market	101
GST May Be Abolished	101
President's Economic Powers Amendment	101
Survey: Business Committed to Reform	102
De Kock: Loan Installment	102
Official: Country Self-Sufficient	102

INDUSTRIAL/S&T

Effect of Sanctions on Coal, Steel, Iron Ore Industries Noted (BUSINESS DAY, 6 Aug 86).....	103
Briefs	
Richards Bay Not To Close	105

/6539

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

USSR TRAINING FIGURES GIVEN, COOPERATION STRESSED

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 24 May 86 p 4

[Text] In its relations with Africa, the Soviet Union regards the African countries as its friends and equal partners, according to Aleksandr Dzassokhov, first vice president of the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with African and Asian Countries, speaking at a press conference dedicated to African liberation day.

At the press conference he emphasized that training local people was one of the most important parts of Soviet-African cooperation.

The USSR cooperates on the basis of intergovernmental agreements with 27 African countries, contributing to the development of the main branches of the nationalized sector.

About 50,000 specialists were trained at specialized institutions of middle-level and higher education in the Soviet Union under cooperative agreements with African countries.

During the same time, the USSR trained around 450,000 skilled workers and laborers for Africa, where it built over 100 middle- and higher-level schools. During the current 5-year period, about 50 technical and professional schools are scheduled to be built.

The Soviet Union has trained over 4,700 medical specialists for African countries. More than 2,500 physicians in various specialties are studying in the USSR at the present time.

The participants in the press conference pointed out that Soviet cooperation with African countries is based on an understanding of the basic development problems in these countries.

9805/12859

CSO: 3443/272

FINIDA FUNDS METEOROLOGICAL SERVICES OF SADCC COUNTRIES

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 1 Jul 86 p 1

[Text] The Finnish Development Agency (FINIDA) has earmarked \$4 million to finance the rehabilitation of and supply equipment to meteorological service networks in nine SADCC member countries. The funds will be used in the next 2 years, and may be increased depending on the needs of the countries in the region and additional agreements signed with FINIDA.

This information was disclosed to our reporter by Martti Makela, representing the Finnish Meteorological Institute, who recently visited some of the nine SADCC member countries.

Makela said that this initial financing, valued at \$4 million, would be formally committed at the next meeting of the Directors of Meteorology of the "Nine" South African Countries, to be held in Malawi in September of this year. This meeting will be held under the aegis of the Transportation and Communications Commission (SATCC), of which the meteorology group is a member on a regional plane.

The recent visit by the FINIDA representative to some of the SADCC member countries, including our country, was, according to Makela, scheduled to obtain data from the countries in the region on their needs in the fields of telecommunications, meteorology, and the processing, collection and exchange of information between the countries belonging to this regional organization.

Mozambique's Director of Meteorological Services Sergio Ferreira is already in Finland to discuss with FINIDA the details of the agency's financing of SATCC projects. Following negotiations with FINIDA, the SATCC representative will have further talks in Geneva with authorities of the World Meteorological Organization.

In making these contacts, the Mozambican director of meteorological services is representing the Transportation and Communications Commission (SATCC), of which our country is president. Our country is coordinator of meteorological services for the region.

The FINIDA representative told our reporter that his agency became involved in SADCC regional projects as a result of contacts initiated about a year ago by a joint FINIDA/WMO mission.

The same source said that negotiations would be held between SADCC member countries and potential project financing sources with a view to setting up a regional center to monitor the drought, also known as a large regional "weather bank."

This regional center would provide supplementary information every 10 days on various climatic factors such as the amount of humidity, atmospheric pressure and amount of rainfall in the countries of the region.

He added that this center is of particular importance in the area of agriculture, since it will facilitate a continuous exchange of information in this field among the countries belonging to this organization for regional cooperation.

Another area in which FINIDA is interested in providing financing is the rehabilitation of the Regional Telecommunications Center in Lusaka. Because of technical and maintenance problems, this center has not been operating at the level it was designed to.

Still in the field of meteorology, the FINIDA representative said that his agency would also help train meteorologists and weather observers in the countries of the region.

In this connection, FINIDA is prepared to finance courses and apprenticeships abroad, using for this purpose the regional training center in Nairobi, Kenya.

There is presently another regional center to train meteorological technicians in Luanda. However, this center has not yet been equipped to operate as a regional center. It was established to serve the Portuguese-speaking countries belonging to SADCC, i.e., Mozambique and Angola.

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FACTORS AFFECTING POSSIBILITY FOR DIALOGUE DISCUSSED

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 5 Jul 86 p 27

[Article by Xavier de Figueiredo]

[Text] An eventual agreement with UNITA will knock down the Soviet-Cuban protective shield guarding the MPLA. It is also for this reason that if a peaceful solution to the war in Angola depends on dialogue, the war is going to continue.

Is the MPLA regime going to decide at some point to hold talks with UNITA as a way of putting an end to a war which has mercilessly devastated one of the richest and most promising countries in Africa? The answer is pure conjecture, since it depends on factors which at this stage are imponderable.

More realistic is the view that, in current circumstances, the possibilities of a dialogue between the MPLA and UNITA are very remote. If a peaceful solution to the Angola problem depends on this step, then there is no doubt that the war will continue--especially since neither MPLA nor UNITA is in a position to win militarily over the other.

Whatever the solution is, it would be difficult to conceive of a peaceful solution to the Angola problem without some understanding between the MPLA and UNITA. But not between this MPLA and this UNITA. Besides, there are too many doubts as to the intentions and capacity of the two to coexist in a country where the national conscience is precarious and their causes are sharply divided.

The bridges that could lead to a dialogue between MPLA and UNITA are cut off at present. The meetings, many of them by chance or scheduled for personal reasons, which were reported between members of the two organizations in Lisbon, Paris or London do not have much meaning. In order for a dialogue of this sort to have the desired effect, the current situation would have to take a somewhat dramatic turn.

This could perhaps take the form of a coup d'etat, bringing about a change in the current balance of power within the MPLA and putting into power circles that favor dialogue with UNITA. At the present time, because of their isolation and their relative inability to wield political influence, these circles are very limited.

A second scenario, equally critical, would be to remove UNITA's current leadership, and especially its head, Jonas Savimbi. The MPLA's refusal to hold talks with UNITA is not so much influenced by the rebel movement itself as it is by the political and intellectual stature of its leader, who most certainly is the most charismatic figure in Angola.

Finally, a third situation that might lead to negotiations between the MPLA and UNITA is an arrangement between the superpowers, so that they (and especially the Soviet Union) would be involved in the affair and could exert influence in one sense or another in line with their strategic interests. The situation in South Africa must also be taken into account, because it is closely linked with the Angola problem.

Outside Influences

The Angola problem has in recent years been complicated by powerful outside influences, particularly the USSR and, by extension, Cuba. It is impossible to conjecture on how it will develop without considering the real weight and behavior of these influences. The commitments, especially the political and military ones, that these influences agree to affects to a great extent the behavior of the MPLA regime.

The USSR has always exploited any tension spots as quickly and effectively as possible as part of its strategy to penetrate Africa. Peace and stability do not justify the massive military supplies and advisors being sent to Angola--and they are an excellent way of ensuring the MPLA's dependency on it.

At the same time, the tension prevailing in Angola also makes the MPLA particularly vulnerable to a political and ideological shift that would push it towards a radical and orthodox stance to Moscow's liking.

Whatever peaceful solution is found to the problem of Angola among all the possibilities, none of them would leave the current Soviet influence intact, precisely because this is the objective of all those, including the United States and South Africa, that insist on a policy of dialogue and national reconciliation for Angola.

The USSR would always be the loser with a peaceful solution to the Angola problem. And if it has to lose, it prefers that its losses be confined to the enormous erosion that its image and reputation have suffered, creating a huge wave of anti-Soviet feeling among the Angolan people (Gorbachev recently told Jose Eduardo dos Santos of his concern over this phenomenon).

For the rest, with a people that is already by nature resigned and long-suffering, living by rules set in accordance with the unquestionable interests of a single party and controlled by a sophisticated, repressive apparatus, the complaints of Angolans will never give rise to demonstrations of protest capable of embarrassing the Soviets.

Internal Factors

Among the Angolan governing class, there are very few who could properly be regarded as structurally pro-Soviet. If they are it is out of pure convenience, associated with a concept of survival. Without the USSR's "protective wing," the power of the MPLA regime would rapidly decline.

The view is widely held that without Soviet and Cuban aid, the MPLA regime would not be able to stay in power for long. That is not exactly true--or it is with one qualification. The MPLA army has the means now to enable it to contain UNITA, with the provisos inherent in a guerrilla war.

What is uncertain is whether without the Cuban "protectors" and the "vigilance" of the USSR, there might not be divisiveness and chaos that would undermine the armed forces--and in this case it would be a matter of shifting over to the military the division and disputes already existing in the MPLA's political leadership, almost all of which are motivated by political and personal ambition, taking advantage of the regime's weak leadership.

What is now working to reduce this divisiveness is precisely the existence of a "Pretorian guard," mainly made up of Cubans. It is not by chance that at Futungo de Belas, where President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and his closest staff live and work, the security is completely provided by Cubans.

Aware that negotiations with UNITA under present circumstances would sooner or later erode this "protective shield," how can the MPLA possibly agree to negotiate? A move of this sort would involve risks of undermining its already fragile unity, completely opening the field to the "enemy."

It is also true that the current governing class in Angola, even at middle levels, is now one of the wealthiest in all of Africa--in shocking contrast to the regime's official ideology. Without speaking of corruption, the Angolan governing class lives surrounded with privileges and in a display of wealth that is shocking in the face of the hunger prevailing in the country.

The governing class is instinctively opposed to the idea of an understanding with UNITA also because it does not want to share with it its privileges and wealth. Despite the tremendous disorder in the country, the towers of the oil wells continue at night to illuminate Angolan seas and land....

Moreover, one must not lose sight of the fact that the MPLA is a Marxist-Leninist party, with the self-invested role of "force to govern the nation and the state." The MPLA's power is rooted in the nature of the party and in the order it establishes. Because of all this, negotiations with UNITA are doubtful.

In the tangled web the Angolan problem has become, there is a last thought to reflect on: If the Cubans or Soviets were to redefine their strategy in relation to Angola, to what extent might not they be the ones to precipitate (or cover for) events aimed at unblocking the current situation?

It is difficult to see them giving up their influence in Angola, as it is related to interests of political, economic and military strategy. But they could try to preserve this influence by encouraging a sort of "compromise solution" for Angola, on the basis of a dialogue between a different MPLA and a different UNITA.

It is not surprising that Savimbi is one of the best protected men in the world today and that increasing signs of friction between the USSR and the current MPLA leadership are being seen.

FACTIONS WITHIN MPLA, POPULAR DISCONTENT VIEWED

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 5 Jul 86 p 29

[Article by Carlos Da Matta]

[Text] If the military struggle in this country is continuing in a haphazard way, the internal struggle within the MPLA-PT leaves no room for doubt: The victorious participants at the 2nd Congress want to complete the victory, in this year of "renewed mandates," both in terms of intermediate party structures and the People's Assembly. Moreover, there has been some reshuffling of ministers, and quite a few changes at the level of commissars.

The problem right now is one of knowing who really are the ones who came out on top at the Congress, or in other words what forces make up the so-called president's group, since it is now clear that it is not homogeneous. Its defenders say that it is an alliance of patriots "ready to take energetic steps to ensure discipline in the country and move it forward," but those left out or demoted say that what came out of the Congress was "a mixture of former followers of Nita Alves and Zairians."

According to the Luandan "mujimbo," President Jose Eduardo learned of the Soviet's concern over "the reduced popular base of support for the government" during his recent trip to the USSR, a concern that was made clear to Afghan leaders not so long ago.

Reflecting the seriousness of the internal conflict is the continued imprisonment of dozens of agents and directors of the political police, defended by figures regarded as Stalinists. Also to be considered is the fact that some persons under arrest warrants are in hiding and being sought.

Another privileged area of dissension is the State entrepreneurial sector, where directors spar with each other or with their ministers. In some cases it is the consequence of the party struggle and an attempt not to be made "scapegoats," which is always a popular practice when public criticism mounts. In other cases the reason is financial austerity caused by the drop in oil prices, which results in reduced privileges, especially in less frequent trips abroad.

All this gives rise to a bitter struggle to gain posts in the party, administrative, military and economic apparatus, both among the president's followers and between them and others.

The Vicious Circle

But as far as major political and economic decisions are concerned, the country is really paralyzed, and with the announcement after the 2nd Congress that the president of the Republic now has the necessary power to act, he is in danger of being blamed for the lack of action. Slogans repeated incessantly, such as "Angola--the firm foothold of the revolution in Africa" lose their meaning in the face of the people's living conditions, while others such as "let's build the economy to support the war and build the war effort to defend the economy" reflect acceptance of a fatal vicious circle.

A well-known figure among the "winners" of the 2nd Congress told us that "the dominant group is going to camouflage their responsibilities and incompetence and accuse us of everything that is bad," while the president's backers accuse the others of "holding onto posts in the party and government as lifetime positions in which they perpetrate a practice that separates us from the masses." In the midst of this, Roberto de Almeida, who despite his support for the president continues to have his own designs, is watching over the ideological line, for which he is responsible in the BP, and Antonio Jacinto, another member of the BP, is in charge of maintaining internal discipline as the head of the strict control commission.

Despite rumors of contacts in London between leaders of the MPLA-PT and UNITA, the war goes on, and has reached an intensive level in Benguela following a UNITA initiative. The road from Lobita to Huambo, which has been very dangerous since 1975, has been the stage of serious confrontations and, according to "The Voice of the Black Rooster" (UNITA's radio station), its forces have taken the town of Monte Belo between Bocoio and Balombo, not far from where part of the provincial government of Benguela was captured last year. Tormented by food shortages, alarmed at the prospect of having their children drafted into the military, irritated by the despotism of those who have the weapons, afraid of being kidnapped, and fearing retaliation and stray bullets, the people for the most part react to the war in one of two ways: as a spectator or a fugitive, in both cases with an obvious desire to see this "suffering end." Conversations we have had or heard all run along these lines, and are turning into a clamor from the most remote parts of the country, one that both national leaders and foreign officials from big and small nations want to see taken more seriously.

If the London contact is confirmed, it will probably lead to better days, preventing a continued escalation of the war and probable sacrifices in the clandestine struggle of democratic forces needed to rebuild the country. But even so, is it good to be prepared for new military trials, even in the knowledge that they will not lead to anything that could resolve the situation and that sooner or later, through internal forces or as a result of the world situation, an accord is inevitable. Unfortunately, it appears that there will be many more wasted opportunities.

9805

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MINORITIES, 'RACIAL WEAPON' DISCUSSED

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 12 Jul 86 p 31

[Article by Carlos da Malta]

[Text] The ongoing series of party meetings--from assemblies of the basic organs to municipal and provincial conferences of the MPLA-PT--still do not make it possible to form a definitive view as to the new composition of the intermediate structures. But there is one point on which the forces supporting the president of the Republic agree: to get rid of the "Algerians," an expression used by some to refer to mestizo and white militants in general, and by others to refer to a group "that adopts incorrect positions and coincidentally includes many light-skinned compatriots," usually accused of radicalism.

In any case, it is obvious that the racial weapon will be increasingly used in the internal struggle, although in society in general the opposite trend has been noted, except for the so-called "Zarian" group and some subgroups in regions speaking Kikongo and Kimbundo. Despite this, outside the party structures, many people are afraid that at the next "People's Assembly," selected on the basis of the unification of forces into a single party, the situation will be ripe for an amendment to the Nationality Law in a discriminatory sense, as was attempted unsuccessfully 2 years ago.

The "Algerians" are a minority in the party, but they are even more so in their own community, in which they remove themselves with a series of demagogic positions. This community is visibly seeking an alternative. UNITA, with its slogan "socialism and negritude" inspires distrust not only among mestizo and white citizens, but also among those negros who have a non-racial concept of Angola.

At times, however, a virtual alliance among these three groups is seen, and their affinities seem to be reinforced. If the situation becomes radicalized, we will see an additional problem in Angola: the rights of minorities, which have almost always been attacked by repressive means in Africa, if not massacred. One leading advocate of democracy even told us that "a large part of the State bourgeoisie claims to follow the same path here."

As for the war effort, there has not been any spectacular offensive action on the part of FAPLA, but a communique from the Defense Ministry on 2 weeks in June said that 119 "armed bandits" had died in Moxico Province alone. Even discounting possible exaggeration, this reflects the military tension in the East, where the soldiers are mounting more patrols and ambushes, which have led to enormous increases in small but lethal battles, to which are added attacks by FALA (the armed branch of UNITA) on towns in Huambo, Benguela, Kuanza-Sul and Kuanza-Norte.

It does not seem, however, that FAPLA can attack Jamba, for various reasons.

Another major focus of conflict within the regime is the matter of "State Security." In practice, this agency is virtually powerless and a large number of its former directors and agents are still being held prisoner and have not been heard from for over 3 months. Now there is renewed talk of a merger with the Ministry of the Interior, as the Cubans have suggested. However, the Cuban proposal does not envisage keeping current Interior Minister Alexandre Rodrigues Kota at the head of this super-ministry, as he is regarded as "on the Americans' side."

The President's decision will give us an excellent idea of his margin to maneuver and of the direction he intends to give an agency that has many times been accused of fascist behavior.

Another concern of the government is the attitude of the people who, even outside areas supporting UNITA, are showing signs of discontent. They have not resigned themselves to the imposed conditions and they have become so critical that the authorities are unable to silence them, unless they seize whole regions.

9805

CSO: 3442/271

LOSS OF PRESS FREEDOM, CLOSING OF NEWSPAPERS DEPLORED

Statements by Two Veteran Journalists

Monrovia DAILY STAR in English 10 Jul 86 p 8

[Text]

Two veteran Liberia journalists, the Managing Director of the Liberia Observer Corporation, Mr. Kenneth Y. Best and the Managing Editor of the Sunrise Incorporated, Mr. Rufus M. Darpoh, have been explaining obstacles to press freedom in Liberia.

Speaking early yesterday morning on the BBC radio programme: "Network Africa", Mr. Best noted that those responsible for the closure of the Daily Observer are doing them "injustice and denying" them their basic human rights.

For his part, the Managing Editor of the Sunrise Incorporated, Mr. Rufus Darpoh, in-

formed "Focus On Africa" that they are not anti-government as is being speculated by authorities, rather, "we are here to serve the general public."

When contacted later by this paper for elaboration, Mr. Darpoh urged those wishing to enter the journalistic profession not to be discouraged by the many mounting problems Liberian journalists are currently facing.

Concerning the printing problem which his paper was struggling with, Mr. Darpoh said "very soon that will be dealt with".

One of the journalists, Mr. Best, told "Network

Africa" that "the Constitution of this country doesn't say that one should receive a letter from the Ministry of Information or any individual to print a legally recognized (newspaper)."

He said when the nation returned to constitutional rule this year, followed by the subsequent re-opening of his paper, he was informed by his printers (SABANON) that to

enable them print the paper, the Observer Management should obtain an official letter from the Ministry of Information authorizing them (SABANON) to do so. Since then, Mr. Best said, "we

have not been able to print, as SABANON fears that there would be action against them from the authorities."

The Daily Observer was closed down by police officers on January 16, 1986 on orders of Justice Minister Jenkins Scott. There was no official communication at the time to the effect of the closure.

However, when the nation returned to civilian rule this year, the late Albert Porte, Chairman of the Board of Directors, at a brief ceremony held at the headquarters of the paper, announced the re-opening of the paper.

International Body Expresses Concern

Monrovia DAILY STAR in English 10 Jul 86 pp 8, 7

[Text]

The Committee for the Protection of Journalists, based in New York, USA, has expressed its concern over the condition of the press in Liberia. apparently or deliberately set to the offices, causing several thousand dollars worth of damage, which prevented the paper from doing so.

In a letter to the Ministry of Information, copy of which was released to this newspaper, the committee referred specifically to the DAILY OBSERVER and FOOTPRINTS TODAY newspapers which have not been able to publish, the former since January last year and the latter for more than two months. The letter noted that FOOTPRINTS was forced to cease publication after it was alleged that its printers had received threats warning them against printing the paper.

The Committee revealed that it had cabled its concern to the Ministry of Information about both the fire at the DAILY OBSERVER and the alleged threats against FOOTPRINTS.

The Committee noted, however, that the Ministry of Information had re-

mained "silent".

As an organization working to uphold the rights of our colleagues worldwide...we were very much heartened by the promulgation of a new Constitution in January 1986 that specifically provides guarantees of press freedom", the letter said.

It therefore, called on the ministry to take steps towards the resumption of publication by the papers. This would do much to signify both domestically

and internationally, that Liberia's real commitment to press freedom, the letter went.

The letter signed by Mr. Michael Massing, a member of the Board of Directors of the Committee, had carbon copies sent to several international press organizations, including the Newspaper Guild, the World Press Freedom Committee, the Society of Professional Journalists and the International Federation of Journalists, among many.

/9274

CSO: 3400/421

TELECOMMUNICATION CORPORATION INVESTIGATING PAYCHECK SCANDAL

Monrovia DAILY STAR in English 10 Jul 86 pp 8, 5

[Article by Ephraim Johns]

[Text]

There are reports that several persons at the Liberia Telecommunication Corporation (LTC) are undergoing investigation following the disappearance of an unspecified number of salary checks owned by personnel of the Corporation's out-station department.

According to the reports, the scandal was unearthed when employees of the out-station departments complained that they had not been paid for the months of February and April, 1986.

In an interview with the DAILY STAR, some of the affected employees who asked not to be named, said in May, this year, it was learnt that the Corporation had paid all of its Monrovia based employees for the months of February and April but did not pay those in the rural areas.

The employees said because of the "global financial constraints of which the Corporation is no exception, there was no need to approach the management since they had the belief that their salaries would be paid at a later date.

It was not until it was learnt by them that their salaries were paid that they had to approach the out-station boss to ascertain the truth surrounding their pay.

The employees who appeared disappointed, further added that after it was confirmed

that their checks were sent to the various counties, they informed the Managing Director, Hon. Samuel Richlieu Watkins, who ordered an immediate investigation in the racket.

When contacted, Mr. Watkins, confirmed the check scandal and said that an investigation is being conducted but no report on the findings have been submitted to his office for scrutiny and action.

Meanwhile, the employees are appealing to the LTC authorities for an immediate redress.

COMPULSORY ELEMENTARY, PRIMARY EDUCATION PROPOSED

Monrovia NEW LIBERIAN in English 1 Jul 86 pp 1, 6

[Article by Gabriel S. Nyanfor]

[Text]

Deputy Information Minister for administration, G. Moses K. Washington, has appealed to authorities to make elementary and primary education compulsory in order to reduce the high illiteracy rate which has reached an alarming proportion in the country.

Minister Washington made the appeal at the Monrovia College on Camp Johnson Road at the week-end when he delivered the keynote address during the congraduation exercises of the Hilton Van Elementary School.

He observed that when the scheme is introduced throughout the nation, parents would be encouraged to send their children to school rather than using them as farmers in the early stages.

Stressing the importance of Education in the second Republic

he also urged the authorities to strive for achieving better quality education by involving other curriculum activities within the system such as competitions in many fields including English, Social Studies among others.

He added that social organizations must again take their roots in the schools like the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), Young Women's [Christian] Association (YWCA), as well as the Boy Scouts and the Girl Guides Movement and other charitable organizations geared towards encouraging students to be better citizens.

He said, to achieve sound and quality education, authorities must invest more money into education to enhance the scheme. He then urged authorities to restore subsidies

to private schools to assist them prepare youth for the future.

Minister Washington used the occasion to call on authorities to also reconsider their decision and restore the scholarship program to assist deserving students who want to learn but have no means to do so.

He lauded the school system for preparing Liberian youth for tasks ahead of them and admonished school authorities to do everything possible to bring sound education to the nation rather than engaging in political activities that could retard the efforts of the students.

He then told the congraduates to impress upon their parents the need for higher education. He pointed out that elementary education is only the beginning of

the struggle and cautioned parents to send their children forward, noting that Liberians need to pursue those things that will bring about sound education, social progress, economic advancement and moral reawakening.

At the end of the program about 56 students were awarded certificates for the successful completion of prescribed courses in the sixth grade.

/9274

CSO: 3400/421

SOVIET UNION PLANS TO IMPORT COCOA, OTHER PRODUCTS

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 4 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by Victor Attai]

[Text]

About 20,000 tonnes of cocoa beans worth over 69 million

Naira to be imported from Nigeria by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1986, the head of the Department of Foreign Trade, West Africa, Mr. Sergeu Lototsvy has said.

Mr. Lototsvy who disclosed this in an interview with the *New Nigerian* at the Business Information Exhibition of Soviet Foreign Trade Association in Lagos recently said Nigeria's cocoa beans product has a very high quality which attracted his country's interest.

He said his country will also import goods worth 200 million

Naira into the country especially machineries, spare parts for the Ajaokuta Steel Rolling Mill.

Mr. Lototsvy also said over 300 million Naira worth of trade was recorded between Nigeria and the USSR in 1984. Bulk of their export from Nigeria was cocoa beans. In 1985 the trade dropped to about 270 million dollars but with cocoa as the major article of trade from Nigeria.

In his speech while delcar- ing open the exhibition the president of the Nigerian Association of Chambers of

Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA) Chief J. Akin-George said despite the growing relationship between Nigeria and the USSR the volume of trade between the two countries has regreably been on the decline since 1975.

The NACCIMA president called for the improvement of more trade relations between the two countries. He also invited the Soviet businessmen and companies to come and participate in this year's Lagos International Trade Fair due to take place from November 8 to 16.

/9274

CSO: 3400/156

NATIONAL SEMINAR ON TRADITIONAL RULERS ENDS IN DISAGREEMENT

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 7 Aug 86 pp 1, 3

[Text]

THE national seminar on traditional rulers and politics organised by the University of Sokoto ended on Tuesday on a note of disagreement resulting in two communiques.

One was issued by the chairman and the secretary of the organising committee, Dr. Hussaini and Malam Ahmed Bako respectively and the other by 29 lecturers who claimed to be the majority. The participants disagreed on the resolutions of the seminar and they split.

The communique signed by the chairman and secretary of the organising committee called for the reorganisation of the structure of traditional leadership with a view to making it more effective by specifying their roles and functions now and in the future.

It also observed the need to retain the traditional leadership and its insulation from partisan politics to maintain the ethics which in the past had made them effective and efficient.

The communique further said traditional rulers should not remain mute whenever government deviated from its respon-

sibilities to its citizens, adding that a national council of traditional rulers be created to advise government on issues of interest both at state and federal levels.

It also observed that traditional rulers had remained key figures of government from pre-colonial Nigeria, adding that the rulers were only used by successive governments in getting to the grassroots but were subsequently relegated to the background and rendered powerless.

The communique by the 29 lecturers said the other communique by the organising committee neither reflected the views of the majority of the papers presented nor the content of the discussion which took place.

They called for either the abolition of the traditional institution in its entirety or its democratization to reflect the tradition of the people.

The lecturers felt that traditional institutions had no relevance to the need of our society now and in the future.

They noted that since traditional rulers derived their legitimacy from tradition not from Islam or the mandate of the people through open elections, traditional institution was an anachronism that the people had been forced to accept, nurture and sustain.

The lecturers said while there were some calls for the retention of the institution of traditional rulers during the seminar, they were only by a few participants.

/9274

CSO: 3400/156

DECREES ON NLC AFFILIATIONS, UNIVERSITIES, CUSTOMS ISSUED

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 5 May 86 pp 1, 9

[Text]

THE Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and 35 other unions and associations are not to be affiliated to the central labour organisation, the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC).

This was contained in Decree No. 17, Trade Unions (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree 1986 which appeared along with nine other decrees in the official gazette No. 34 volume 73 released yesterday in Lagos.

The decree amends the list of trade unions recognised and registered by the registrar of trade unions whose members are taken from workers as defined and those whose members are drawn from the senior staff and employers association.

The decree also forbids deductions, except on voluntary basis, from wages and salaries of senior employees as contributions to trade unions.

Under the decree 43, industrial unions are recognised as workers union in Part A, while 18 senior staff unions are listed under Part B which cannot be affiliated to the NLC.

They include, the National Association of Aircraft Pilots and

Engineers, Electricity and Gas Senior Staff Association, Nigerian Union of Pharmacists, Medical Technologists and Professions Allied to Medicine, Academic Staff Union of Universities, Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria, Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions and Food, Beverages and Tobacco Senior Staff Association.

Others are Shop and Distributive Trade Senior Staff Association, Construction and Civil Engineering Senior Staff Association, Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association, Chemical and Non-Metallic Products Senior Staff Association, Footwear, Leather and Rubber Products Senior Staff Association, Senior Staff Association of Shipping, Clearing and Forwarding Agencies, Textile, Garments and Tailoring Senior Staff Association, Automobile, Boatyard, Transport Equipment and Allied Senior Staff Association, Metallic and Non-Metallic Mines, Corporations and Government owned Companies.

Also included are Senior Staff Association of Universities, Teaching Hospitals, Research Institutes and Associated Institutions, Metal Products Senior Staff Association of Nigeria, Precision, Electrical and Related Equipment Senior Staff Association, Hotel and Personal Services Senior Staff Association, Paper and Paper Products Senior Staff Association, Agricultural and Allied Senior Staff Association, National Union of Agricultural

and Allied Employers; National Union of Dock Labour Employers; Nigeria Employers' Association of Banks, Insurance and Allied Institutions.

Others are Association of Food, Beverage and Tobacco Employers, Hotel and Personal Services Employer's Association; Construction and Civil Engineering Employers' Association of Nigeria; Road Transport Employer's Association; National Association of Conservancy Employers; Nigeria Mining Employers' Association; Precision, Electrical and Related Equipment Employers' Association; Water Transport Senior Staff Association and any other unions of senior staff registered after the commencement of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 22 of 1978.

The other decrees are Federal Universities of Technology Decree No. 13; Customs, Immigration and Prisons Services Board Decree No. 14; Motor Vehicles (Third Party Liability Insurance (ECOWAS) Brown Card Scheme) Decree No. 15; Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (Amendment) Decree No. 16 and Trade Unions (Miscellaneous) Provisions Decree No. 17.

Others are Instruments Constituting the Visitation Panels into the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, S.I. No. 16; The Univer-

sity of Lagos S.I. No. 17; University of Ife, S.I. No. 18 and the University of Benin S.I. No. 19.

The Federal Universities of Technology Decree provides for the establishment of the three federal universities of technology.

Apart from its orientation to science and technology, each of the universities has largely the same configuration as any other federal universities.

The decree, which now dissolved the provisional councils set up in 1980 envisages the appointment of more than one deputy vice-chancellor to enable the vice-chancellor concentrate more on policy, rather than routine matters.

The Customs, Immigration and Prisons Services Board Decree establishes a joint board to administer the Customs and Excise, Immigration and Prison laws, while the motor vehicle, ECOWAS brown card scheme enacts a municipal laws to bring into effect in Nigeria the provisions of a protocol signed between all member states of the ECOWAS.

The protocol seeks to provide third party liability insurance cover for victims of road accidents occurring within territories of member states.

It also provides penalty for any person using or driving a motor vehicle on a Nigerian road without the possession of valid ECOWAS brown card.

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CSO: 3400/156

TACTICS OF NIGERIAN LABOR CONGRESS DISCUSSED

Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 6 Aug 86 p 9

[Article by Umoh James Omoh]

[Text]

SOME Nigerian Labour leaders are weeping — privately, perhaps — because the Federal Government has kicked the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) out of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC).

But many labour leaders have been jubila-

ting and laughing openly and praising the Federal Government for rescuing the NLC from ASUU and regaining the Congress for the real Nigerian workers.

If the Federal Ministry of Labour had been alive to its responsibilities, the ASUU and senior staff association in the distributive trade, would not

have been admitted into the NLC, in the first instance.

On December, 1975, the then Federal Commissioner for Labour, Major-General Henry Adefope, announced a new national labour policy which the administration he served intended to adopt.

He said this policy would be based on

"Limited Government Intervention" and "Guided Democracy" in labour matter.

In his statement of December 4, 1975, General Adefope said the policy would involve ban on international affiliation; restructuring of trade unions; trade union education; trade union finance; labour inspection and the enforcement of labour laws.

On the basis of this policy statement of 1975, the following laws emerged:

--A decree restructuring 1,000 house unions into 42 industrial unions.

--A decree inaugurating and registering the Nigeria Labour Congress as the only central labour organisation in the country and the 42 industrial unions, the founding membership of the NLC.

--A decree making payment of check-off dues by workers automatic and compulsory.

--A decree for the establishment of National Institute for Labour Studies.

No law was enacted on international affiliation. The 42 industrial unions registered legally as founding affiliates of the NLC were clearly named and

gazetted. The Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) was listed as one of the senior staff associations. That was how the trade union structure took off in 1978.

Then came the ideological interest of the Marxists in the Nigeria Labour Congress.

The Marxist doctrine proclaims that, in preparing for a socialist revolution, the workers who should be in the vanguard of this revolution, must be led by what they term as the "progressive intelligentsia."

In practice, this will mean that the progressive intelligentsia will provide theoretical guidelines and the ideological leadership for the revolution and wrap those

guidelines around the necks of innocent Nigerian workers and then push the workers into a revolutionary bloodbath with the ruling power.

If the revolution succeeds, then the progressive intellectuals will emerge to lead the government — after all it was they who provided the theoretical guidelines and ideological leadership. The workers will then remain still workers with no improvement in their welfare. But this time, the workers will not complain about anything — after all, it was they who made the revolution.

If, on the other hand, the revolution fails, the workers will face the wrath and might of the ruling power. The progressive intellectuals will sneak out of the country and become lecturers in foreign countries.

The Marxists in the Nigeria Labour Congress recruited ASUU into the

Congress to provide theoretical guidelines and ideological leadership within the Nigerian labour movement in preparation for a socialist revolution.

It was not surprising that soon after admission of ASUU, the NLC began to shed its original purpose as the umbrella of Nigerian workers and wore the garment of a broad based revolutionary movement. Soon students, farmers and market women became associate members of the NLC.

The real Nigerian workers no longer had a say in the affairs of the Congress.

Frustrated and disappointed, three-quarter of industrial unions withdrew their support and loyalty from the NLC and stopped paying dues to the Congress.

That made matters worse. The tiny minority of Marxists took full control of all organs of the NLC and began the rapid

drift to the ideological left and disaster.

The performance of the NLC between May and June, 1986 gave the impression that some leaders of the Congress were up to something dreadful.

On May 10, 1986, the NLC pressurised the Ministry of Labour to ban an African transport workers seminar and conference which five industrial unions in the transport industry had intended to host.

The Congress had hoped that the five transport unions would react bitterly to the ban on their conference and would sponsor industrial action to show their strong resentment and create confusion in the country. But leaders of the five transport unions, as believers in democratic trade unionism, took the matter calmly.

The transport unions did not organise any strike because they had no dispute with the government and none with their employers. So the NLC had no opportunity to use

the transport workers to cause trouble.

Shortly after the NLC had secured the ban on transport workers seminar, we heard the NLC publicly supporting a strike action by petrol tankers drivers — despite the fact that it is workers who would be the most hurt when commercial vehicles could not find fuel and when kerosene could not be found for domestic use at their homes.

Before the end of the petrol tankers strike, came the student crisis and the involvement of NLC leaders as alleged by the Federal Government. It was the student crisis which made the government take a deeper look into the affairs of the NLC.

If, in the past, the ministry had been active, the NLC could not have been allowed to admit ASUU and senior staff associations. Managers and workers cannot belong to the same union because discipline will not be maintained in the office.

SMUGGLING OF KEROSENE, RICE CAUSES SHORTAGES

Kerosene to Benin

Lagos SUNDAY TIMES in English 3 Aug 86 pp 1, 3

[Text] The reported scarcity of kerosene in parts of Nigerian may not improve unless the Federal Government takes immediate steps to curb the smuggling of the product into neighbouring republic of Benin.

Investigations have revealed that Kerosene has become a major stock in trade by Beninoise citizens.

Seven out of every ten Beninoise passing through the Seme Border on foot carry jerry cans containing kerosene on their onward march to Benin Republic.

The rush for kerosene is not limited to adults alone, children have also been mobilised in the procurement of kerosene which although sells for about 50 kobo a litre in Nigeria, sells for higher than that in Benin Republic. A ten litre jerry can sells for as much as 700 francs or over N7 according to the black market rate.

They were seen dodging through footpaths with basins of kerosene loaded jerry cans making their way across the border.

Some women and young girls were also seen strapping jerry cans with kerosene on their back disguised as babies in order to beat security checks.

Our investigations who revealed that most of the kerosene smugglers work as agents for influential Beninoise-based businessmen and women who [word indistinct] crossing the border to the Beninoise side with their cans, empty them in drums from where they are carted to Cotonou and other major towns.

The kerosene traffic, investigations revealed, are usually very high at dawn and dusk.

Although they don't buy from nearby petrol stations at the border post, investigations revealed that various kerosene depots had emerged in neighbouring villages on

the Nigerian end from where they get their stock.

The trend is not limited to Kerosene alone, the smuggling of Nigerian Petroleum fuel has also resumed in full scale.

The method used is that vehicles plying the international route fill their tanks at the Nigerian end before crossing over only to empty them at Benin leaving them with sufficient fuel to return to Nigeria for another round of purchase.

At the Dantokpa motor park, petroleum purchased from Nigeria is openly sold

in jerry cans while rubber hoses are also openly used to siphon fuel from vehicle tanks.

A ten-litre jerry can of fuel sells for 1,100 French Francs at the Dantokpa Motor Park which converts to almost N15 according to black market rate.

This infact leaves the illegal dealers with a high maginal profit.

The illegal kerosene and petroleum traffick is actively supported by some Nigerians in neighbouring villages who serve as contactmen for the Beninoise couriers.

Rice Diverted

Lagos SUNDAY TIMES in English 3 Aug 86 pp 1, 3

[Article by Kunle Odufuwa]

[Text]

WITH importation of rice into the country banned, and its cost skyrocketing, thousands of bags of rice meant for the Federal Government of Nigeria are daily being offloaded at various markets in the Republic of Benin.

Investigations conducted by SUNDAY TIMES at Dantokpa and Boghamu markets in Cotonou and the popular Ifonyin market all in the Republic of Benin revealed that bags of rice marked "Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources

and Rural Development", and "Federal Government of Nigeria" are daily being offloaded from lorries into various warehouses in Benin Republic.

The bags of rice, were offloaded at the Beninoise port from where they found their ways into the various markets.

The 50 kilogram bags, are sold for 5,000 French Francs which according to

the black market rate converts to about (N70) Seventy naira.

As at the weekend the naira was converting at 1,500ff to N20 in the black market a phenomenon which reflects a terrible fall in the value of the naira which was about 400ff to the naira two years back.

In some cases the traders who refused to accept the naira from some prospective Nigerian rice buyers, insisted on accepting the Francs.

Apart from the "Federal Government Rice" investigations revealed that some Nigerian businessmen have for some time now been making use of the Republic of Benin ports in the offloading of their imported rice since it had been banned from entering Nigeria.

A reliable source close to one of the clearing agents who handled the clearing of some of the privately owned rice revealed that they belonged to some released

their destinations.

wealthy politicians who could not effect their importation before they were clamped into detention by the ousted Buhari/Idiagbon regime.

Some of the rice ships already heading for Nigeria with rice then, were said to have been asked to return on the advice of their importers.

To conceal the identity of the Federal Government-owned rice some of the retail traders have formed the habit of rebagging them in sacks with no visible identity.

Some of them would not reveal the source of their stock but only said "they were bought from our customers"

Investigations also revealed that after offloading privately owned rice at Benin Ports, the businessmen cleverly smuggled them into the country and sold at very exorbitant costs to the Nigerian traders who must make their own profits.

The question on the lips of most Nigerians who daily visit the Benin Republic was how consignments of rice meant for the Federal Government of Nigeria managed to get to foreign market without reaching

Already some Nigerian businessmen are known to have opened offices in Cotonou and Port Novo to facilitate the easy clearing of their consignment of rice according to very reliable sources.

BEN DURU reports in Lagos: Investigation show that at Daleko Retail Market, Isolo a 50kg bag of rice was at the week-end sold for N150, while the 100

kilogram bag for between N260 to N275.

It was learnt that the rice was among those that had come into the country sometime this year by both private importers and the stock of the Nigeria National Supply Company which will have to be disposed of before the proposed winding up of their operation by the end of the year.

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CSO: 3400/156

ALTERNATIVE TO COMMODITY BOARDS ADVISED

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 11 Aug 86 pp 1, 9

[Text]

AN alternative body to the scrapped commodity boards should be set up to grade and fix "minimum prices" for agricultural products, the seminar of the Nigerian Institute of Bankers held in Kaduna has recommended.

A communique released at the weekend said the proposed body would ensure quality of our exports.

It also recommended that the Standard Organisation of Nigeria (SON) be "properly equipped" to grade and fix prices of manufactured export products.

The communique suggested that exporters of invisible exports be allowed to keep 25 per cent of their foreign exchange proceeds. At present only exporters of visible exports enjoy that concession.

It implored the government not to neglect the promotion of invisible exports like tourism, insurance and banking as well

as shipping.

The seminar believed that since exports would now receive special attention, loans to that subsector should be excluded from the credit ceiling.

It called on the government to publish without any further delay the decree on export procedures and incentives, adding that an export credit guarantee and insurance scheme should be established urgently and managed by an independent body other than Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN).

The Nigerian Export Promotion Council (NEPC) should be strengthened and made to function independently with defined guidelines, the seminar also recommended.

Its other recommendations were an intelligence unit within the NEPC to collect and collate data which would guide exporters and financial institutions as well as the involvement of all those institutions in the provision of finance for export trade.

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CSO: 3400/156

GOVERNMENT REVIEWING PETROLEUM LEGISLATION

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 8 Aug 86 pp 1, 9

[Text]

FEDERAL Government is reviewing its petroleum-related legislations to ensure increased oil exploration activity. Minister of Petroleum Resources, Alhaji Rilwanu Lukman, has said in Lagos.

In an address he sent to the opening of the 10th annual conference of the Nigerian section of the Society of Petroleum Engineers, on Wednesday, Alhaji Rilwanu said the review would enable the government to "see where appropriate changes are needed".

The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), he said, was currently taking steps to maintain the interest of its

joint venture partners, adding that the country's petroleum tax profit scheme was also being reviewed to enable producing companies to have funds which could be ploughed back into the country's oil industry.

The minister, who is the current OPEC President, urged the producing companies, which had been guaranteed a two-dollar margin per every barrel of crude produced, to maintain a "healthy" exploration programme in order to find new oil

wells and to beef up the country's oil reserves, estimated at 16 billion barrels.

He said because of the current collapse in oil prices, producers had embarked on a "soul searching experience" of finding new crude buyers, and noted that a diversification of the oil industry was necessary in order to maintain current level of oil earnings.

Alhaji Rilwanu advised the conference to work out strategies that would help the country in evolving an aggressive marketing policy for the future, pointing out that the first phase of the petro-chemical project would soon come onstream, while the government would still go ahead with the liquefied natural gas project.

The minister further called on the oil companies to evaluate how some government policies, such as the second-tier foreign exchange market and commercialisation would affect the oil industry.

In an address, the guest of honour, Governor Gbolahan Mudasiru of Lagos, said the petroleum engineers should maintain a sustained growth in the industry to enable it to maximise its economic development benefits.

/9274

CSO: 3400/156

NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION REPORTED HIGHER IN MARCH

Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 6 Aug 86 pp 1, 13

[Text]

NIGERIA's production of natural gas, mainly associated gas, increased from 47.77 million standard cubic feet (MSCF)—about 1.35 million cubic metres — in January to 60.4 MSCF—about 1.7 million cubic metres — in March, the Nigerian Petroleum News has reported.

The journal states in its August edition that

natural gas production, which totalled about 50 million MSCF in February, had continued to increase along with crude oil production during the quarter.

It reports that although the utilisation of the associated gas showed an upward trend

in March, a considerable amount of gas was still being flared daily.

"In each of the three months, more than 70 per cent of the gas produced was flared. The percentage actually topped 75 per cent in March, the publication notes.

Petroleum News also reports that the NNPC and the country's oil producing companies

produced a total of 36.9 million barrels in January or an average of 1.2 million barrels per day (MBD), 39.3 million barrels in February or an average of 1.4 MBD and 51.76 million barrels in March or an average of about 1.67 MBD.

It states that although the figures for April to June have not been published by the NNPC, production of crude must have been maintained at the March level or above it in spite of the current slump in oil prices.

The journal notes that the falling oil prices might, however, dissuade the producing companies which had earlier signed an incentive agreement with the NNPC, guaranteeing them a two-dollar margin for every barrel of crude produced.

/9274

CSO, 3400/156

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION DOWN IN 1985

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 7 Aug 86 pp 1, 3

[Text]

AGRICULTURAL production in Nigeria rose by 2.5 per cent last year compared with a more favourable growth rate of 4.2 per cent in 1984, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria annual report for 1985 just released.

The report attributed the lower rate of growth to the sharp decline of about 40 per cent in fish production which, it explained, helped to offset the significant rates of growth in the other component items.

The report said output of staple food crops rose by 9.1 per cent, compared with 12.3 per cent in the preceding year, while rice and beans production rose by 24.8 per cent and 28.1 per cent, compared with an increase of 8.3 and a decline of 28.2 per cent respectively in 1984.

It said cash crop production also rose last year by a reduced rate of 3.2 per cent, compared with 6.9 per cent in 1984, with the deceleration in the growth rate attributed to a decline of 36.4 per cent in cocoa production.

In the manufacturing sub-sector, the report said the value of output rose by 6.8 per

cent to 2,604.7 million Naira in 1985.

The increase, it said, was mostly reflected in grain milling, sugar confectionery, baking products, printing and publishing, paper and paper products, vehicle assembly and chemicals.

The report indicated, however, that the value of production of certain sectoral groups declined from their levels in the preceding year, stating that the brewery, leather products and textiles declined by 10.5 per cent, 26.1 per cent and 1.5 per cent respectively.

The value of imported goods rose sharply last year by 754.6 million Naira or 10.5 per cent to 7,932.9 million Naira according to the report.

This, it said, was a reversal of the downward trend recorded in the previous years.

It noted however, that receipts from exports rose by 2,126.2 million Naira or 23.4 per cent to 11,214.8 million Naira thereby generating a trade surplus of 3,281.9 million Naira in 1985 as against a surplus of 1,909.7 million Naira in 1984.

/9274

CSO: 3400/156

DOMESTIC FISH PRODUCTION DECLINES, DEMAND INCREASING

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 4 Aug 86 p 1

[Article by Jackson Imafidon]

[Text]

NIGERIA'S domestic fish production dropped from 373,755 tonnes in 1984 to 240,220 in 1985 according to sources from Federal Department of Fisheries.

Projected domestic fish demand for 1985 was 1,018,000 metric tonnes. To make for the short fall in 1984, 137,713 metric tonnes. Even though, the figures for imported fish for 1985 were not available, it is strongly believed that the wide gap between the domestic fish production and fish importation still exists.

Sectoral production for 1984 shows that fishermen using canoes caught 349,223 metric tonnes of fish as against 214,977 tonnes caught last year. Fishing Companies using fish trawlers caught 24,532 metric tonnes of fish 1984 as against 25,253 tonnes in 1985.

Projected per capita consumption of fish in Nigeria is 10.59 kilogramme in 1985 and this has risen to 10.85 kilogramme this year. A

census of artisanal fishermen is approximately 470,000 with about 320,000 of them engaged in full time fishing, the rest being on part time.

Fish get to the market in different forms—fresh chilled for frozen, crustacea salted or dried crustacea or sunded. Growth rate of fish supply is about 1.5 per cent as against an annual growth supply rate of 9.5 per cent.

At a recent workshop on taxation and economy, it was disclosed that about 50 per cent of the fish produced in the remote coastal centres and in the hinterland perish as a result of poor processing and packaging facilities available to the fish farmers. The low rate of fish caught by artisanal fishermen was traced to the inadequacies of fishing equipment and techniques. It has been noticed that there have been increased rate of shift of fishermen from remote fish settlements to urban areas for more paying jobs. Continuity in the fish farming particularly, the artisanal fishermen, is being interrupted as young persons shun the industry, obviously because of poor earnings.

Fishermen are also known to be at a disadvantage in return for their

efforts because of the wide difference between the price at which they sell to traders and what the traders in turn sell to the final consumers.

Fishermen, it was disclosed at the workshop, are not willing to invest and procure modern equipment for their operations because of the high risk associated with sea fishing. Fishermen and fishing companies have persistently protested against the high cost of fishing equipment such as out board engines, canoes and nets. Cost of maintenance of fishing vessels, are also prohibitive and the same is true fuel for vessel operation.

Access to funds from commercial and agricultural banks are also very tight making almost impossible for fishermen to obtain loans to modernise their operations. Deep sea fishing, so far has remained an exclusive reserve for the few shipping companies with modern fishing trawlers. It has been suggested that Nigeria enters into agreement with some African countries for fishing rights in their coastal territories and some royalties in return. This has been seen as a more viable alternative to the direct importation of fish from European and Scandinavian countries.

BADAGRY TELEPHONE EXCHANGE INAUGURATED

Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 5 Aug 86 p 3

[Text]

THE Badagry Telephone Exchange built at the cost of N2.21 million was yesterday commissioned by the Chief of Naval Staff, Rear-Admiral Augustine Aikhomu.

The naval chief said that the exchange would serve for a long time the purpose for which it was built.

Minister of Communications, Tanko Ayuba in his address said the exchange "is 1,000 lines mobile exchange with 400 subscribers now connected".

Col. Ayuba explained that contract for the provision of the exchange was awarded to Messrs. Marubeni West African Limited in 1977 while Messrs. Siemens/Eltec Nigeria Limited were responsible for the provision of the associated "external line plant".

He said similar commissioning of exchange in other states of the federation would also take place during the year.

The Badagry Exchange commissioning, he said, "is a fulfilment of this administration's efforts to extend

telecommunication services to all local government headquarters in the country".

Col. Ayuba expressed awareness that the existing cable distribution did not provide for service at Ajara and Ibereko since the areas were not developed when the exchange was planned.

"However a comprehensive survey and design of external line plant network have been undertaken to cater for the areas he said.

The minister disclosed that his ministry, to combat NITEL delays in sending bills regularly would soon instal two large computers in Kaduna and Lagos for prompt processing of bills and other information matters.

He added that similar computers would be installed in zonal headquarters at Bauchi, Enugu and Ibadan.

Earlier, the sole administrator of Badagry Local Government, Mr. O. L. Odunaiya had requested "extension of telephone facilities to Mowo, Iworo, Ajido, Ibereko and Ajara..

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CSO: 3400/156

ROAD MONEY ALLOCATIONS ANNOUNCED, SOKOTO, BORNO LEAD

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 2 Aug 86 p 8

[Text]

SOKOTO and Borno states clinched the lion share of the N200 million allocated to all the 19 states of the federation for the construction, maintenance and utilisation of nation-wide rural feeder roads by the Federal Government.

Borno State got N11,500,000 and Sokoto N11,200,000 followed by Gongola with N10,500,000.

Oyo and Bauchi states got N9,800,000 and N9,600,000 each closely followed by Kaduna, N9,400,000 and Kano N9,400,000.

Others are Anambra, N8,900,000; Bendel, N8,900,000; Benue N8,400,000; Cross Rivers, N8,400,000; Imo

N8,500,000; Kwara, N8,900,000; Lagos, N5,200,000; Niger, N8,400,000; Ogun, N6,900,000; Ondo, N8,100,000; Plateau, N8,900,000 and Rivers, N7,100,000.

According to guidelines for the construction, maintenance and utilisation of nation-wide rural feeder roads released in Lagos yesterday, all the states got N4,900,000 each out of the N98,280,000 on equality of states.

About N45,720,000 was also distributed on a 22.86 per cent basis on the number of local government

areas in each state while N30,720,000 was distributed on a 15.36 per cent land area and N25,280,000 on ecological and special problems of each state.

GUIDELINES for the construction, maintenance and utilisation of nation-wide rural feeder roads were released in Lagos yesterday.

"About N200 million was earmarked for the first phase of 30,000 kilometres roads to be constructed or rehabilitated throughout the country.

The concept of operation,

according to the guideline showed that the criteria for allocating funds to each state and Abuja included equality of states (49.14 per cent) number of local government areas (22.86 per cent) land mass (15.36 per cent), and ecological and special problems (12.64 per cent).

It stated that selection of roads for construction was based on the two overriding guidelines that each local government area should benefit from the exercise and that priority should be given to roads that would open up food-producing areas.

On the method of construction/rehabilitation, the states were advised to use direct labour for the project.

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CSO: 3400/156

ANAMBRA PHASING OUT ALMOST ALL TEACHER TRAINING SCHOOLS

Enugu DAILY STAR in English 4 Aug 86 p 16

[Article by Gil Ugwu]

[Text]

NINETEEN teacher training colleges in Anambra State have been phased out, and the colleges converted to senior and junior secondary schools.

Disclosing this in an interview with the DAILY STAR, the state commissioner for education, Mrs Grace Obayi, said that only two of the 21 teacher training colleges were to be left to operate, but to be restructured to produce the desired stuff of teachers.

She however declined to disclose the two colleges.

According to Mrs Obayi, the colleges were phased out because studies conducted by her ministry revealed that in the next ten years, the state would be suffering from surplus trained, but unemployable teachers.

"About 11,000 candidates sat for the last TC II examination in the state, and at least 6,000 would pass out successfully added to about 5,000 qualified ones waiting to be employed", she declared.

Furthermore, she said, the National Certificate of Education (NCE), would soon be the minimum qualification for teachers in primary schools.

Commissioner Obayi said that five of the colleges have

been selected to run as special science schools, while a competitive examination would be conducted for admission into them.

Others would be converted to vocational schools to be called "community skilled centres" which would be used in training the people in various skills while still others would be used as remedial schools designed to improve on the difficulties of students seeking admission into higher institutions.

Commissioner Obayi said that emphasis was now on science education, and predicted that in the next three years complaints of not filling vacancies for science students in universities would be over.

She announced that the state ministry of education had introduced adult literacy programme for illiterate civil servants to commence next month.

Successful candidates would be awarded proficiency certificate at the end of the course, while the programme would be extended to other ministries in due course.

Mrs Obayi disclosed that students presently in teacher training colleges would be allowed to graduate, after which the schools would phase out.

She also disclosed that

rationalisation of secondary schools in the state has been completed and a number of schools pegged down to junior and senior secondary schools, or merely junior secondary schools.

On the implication of the adoption of the new policy on education, Mrs Obayi conceded that students of Anambra State like other 11 states which are currently operating the new system would not seat for JAMB examination till 1989, except private candidates because the students would not be allowed to seat for the GCE examination, "since their syllabuses are miles apart".

STATISTICS ON AIRPORTS PASSENGER TRAFFIC ISSUED

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 4 Aug 86 p 24

[Article by Roseline Umesì]

[Text]

A TOTAL of 7.2 million passengers were handled by all the airports in the country in 1985.

According to statistics from the research department of the Nigeria Airport Authority, the figure of passenger traffic in 1985 represented an increase of 1.3 million people when compared with that of 1984 when a total of 5.9 million passengers were handled by all the 15 airports at that time.

Both the domestic and international wings of the Murtala Muhammed airport Lagos handled the highest number of passengers of 3.6 million passengers. For arrival, 3.5 million passengers were handled, while for departure 3.7 million passengers were handled.

Port Harcourt Airport

was the next airport which handled the highest number of 690,410 passengers and of these number 342,484 passengers were handled on arrival, while 347,926 were handled on departure.

Kano Airport was the next, it handled 592,079 passengers and out of these 266,517, passengers were handled on arrival, while 325,562 were handled on departure. Kaduna airport followed with 580,798 passengers and out of these 290,900 passengers were handled on arrival, while 289,892 on departure.

Benin Airport handled a total of 368,841 passengers, and of these 183,554 were handled on departure while 185,287 were handled on arrival. Enugu Airport handled a total of 286,928 passengers, out of these 142,191 were handled on arrival while 144,737 were handled on departure.

Jos Airport handled 211,700 passengers and out of these 109,019 were handled on arrival while 102,681 passengers were handled on departure.

Maiduguri Airport handled a total of 233,300 passengers and out of these

114,540 were handled on arrival while 118,769 passengers were handled on departure. Ilorin airport handled a total of 178,011, and of these number 88,922 were handled on arrival, while 89,089 passengers were handled on departure.

Calabar Airport handled, 172,742 passengers, and of these number, arrivals accounted for 85,737 passengers while 87,005 passengers were handled on departure.

Sokoto Airport handled a total of 105,360 passengers. And out of these numbers arrivals accounted for 52,534 passengers while departure accounted for 52,826 passengers.

Other airports which handled passengers in the review were Abuja which started operation in 1983 and handled a total of 27,820 in 1985, and out of these 14,687 passengers were handled on arrival, while 13,133 were handled on departure.

Ibadan Airport also started operation in 1983 and handled a total of 21,765 passengers in 1985. Makurdi Airport handled 57,022, and out of these 29,327 passengers were handled on arrival, while 27,695 passengers were handled on departure.

Yola airport handled a total of 59,782 passengers, and out of these 29,374 were handled on arrival

while 30,408 passengers were handled on departure.

Although the analysis did not give the breakdown of the group of passengers traffic on international routes, in 1985, however, previous statistics indicated a steady growth of passenger traffic handled for international routes.

For example according to statistics a total of 1.5 million passengers were handled by the three international airports in 1983. The airports are Lagos, Kano, and Port Harcourt. And in 1984 international passengers handled were 2.3 million. The total number of passengers handled by all the airports in 1983 were 6 million people. And in 1982 and 1981 they were 5.2 million and 5.3 million passengers respectively.

Passengers carried by unscheduled flights were included in the analysis.

There was a slight reduction in the number of passengers handled which were 77,401 in 1984 when compared with 1983. And this was associated with the temporary closure of the borders in 1984. The reduction in the number of passengers handled in 1984 could not be associated with the N100 special airport levy because passenger traffic rather increased as has been indicated.

PAPER PRAISES MODIFICATION OF DEATH PENALTY

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 29 Jul 86 p 1

[Text]

AMONG the decrees recently reviewed by the Armed Forces Ruling Council, (AFRC) the (Miscellaneous Offences) Decree No. 20, 1984 easily stands out. Under the decree the death penalty (by firing squad) was prescribed for such offences as arson, drug pushing, unlawful dealing in petroleum products and unlawful tampering with public electrical, telecommunications cables.

Many Nigerians agreed that the offences were heinous enough to warrant stiff penalties. But certainly not the death sentence. That aspect of the decree elicited strident public opposition. However, the Buhari regime did not see any sense in the public appeals.

In April 1985 therefore, before a bewildered nation Bartholomew Owoh, Benard Ojedengbe and Lawal Ojulope became the first victims of public execution for drug pushing. It says a lot for the Babangida administration's commitment to human rights and a willingness to heed public opinion that the table has now been turned. With the review, all those convicted under its provisions would now serve life jail sentences. It has been the consistent opinion of the *New Nigerian* that the death sentence for the offences was too harsh. Capital punishment

should in our view be reserved only for those offences that involve the life of another person.

Equally significant was the reamendment to the state Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2. An amendment to the 1984 decree last May had extended the initial detention period from three to six months. Besides, detention powers were given to two persons: the Chief of General Staff and the Inspector-General of Police. With the reamendment the power to detain can only be exercised by the Chief of General Staff, while initial detention period has been restored to three months. No matter how much it tried, the administration's argument that the amendments did not make the decree more draconian simply did not wash. Happily the authorities have heeded the public criticism of the decree's drastic nature.

There are indeed those who would want the decree abrogated entirely. But as we said in our editorial of 16-5-86 that would not be wise; there is no country which has faced certain drastic problems or drastic times that has not resorted to drastic solutions. And no one can deny that these are extra-ordinary times.

The important thing is that such decrees are not abused and on the record of the Babangida administration, we are confident that the decree will be applied only sparingly.

/9274

CSO: 3400/156

ALKAI COURTS SAID TO DISCREDIT SHARIA LAW

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 1 Aug 86 pp 1, 13

[Article by Ibrahim Salihu]

[Text]

THE first vice-chancellor of the University of Sokoto, Professor Shehu Ahmed Saidu Galadanci, has said many Nigerians, including a few "Muslims" detest sharia simply because of the bad conduct of the Alkali courts.

He said many of the alkalis, now renamed area court judges, were not properly trained in either the Sharia or the common law and were therefore "incompetent". He said "it is also alleged that corruption is very rampant in some of these courts, this should have nothing to do with the Sharia.

Professor Shehu, now of the Bayero University Kano (BUK), was delivering a paper titled "The role and relevance of Sharia in Nigeria's future political order" at a national seminar on the plurality of law and future political order in Nigeria at the University of Sokoto.

He said it was the retained colonial conspiracy still undermining the sharia which made it possible for people who knew very little about sharia to recruit, promote and supervise the area court judges.

He said the incompetence which resulted from this arrangement should not therefore be ascribed to sharia.

The don said other factors were the neglect of the alkalis for many years, such that they were not being given training opportunities in the same way as magistrates.

He said the sharia had evidently been "persistently misinterpreted and misunderstood by many Nigerians, including muslims," which resulted in the call for the retention of the common law system.

He said contrary to such ignorant views, the sharia surpassed all existing legal systems and was capable of solving our present legal problems and curing our society of its evils.

In another paper, Dr. Auwalu H. Yadudu of the Faculty of Law, BUK said it was a misnomer to claim there was anything as a Nigerian legal system. He said there were but plural legal systems in the country.

He wondered why the validity and application of Islamic laws and many customary laws in the country were being determined by the Englishman's notion of what was wrong or right.

He said a law could not apply now if by the Englishman's view, "it is repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience or it is contrary to public policy."

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CSO: 3400/156

MUSLIM WOMEN'S SEMINAR RAISES ISSUES

Religion in Schools

Kano THE TRIUMPH in English 28 Jul 86 pp 1, 12

[Article by Olu Ojewale]

[Text]

THE Federal Military Government has been called upon to stop all educational institutions from forcing muslim students to observe Christian devotional prayers.

The Federation of Muslim Women's Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN) made this call in Lagos at the weekend at the end of its three-day seminar on Family and Society.

The association said

the practice should step in line with Section 35 of the Nigerian Constitution which provided for freedom of worship and therefore appealed to the government to make provision for the teaching of Islamic religious knowledge in institutions.

It further appealed to the government to allow schools to close at 12 noon on Fridays while offices should close at 1 p.m. to allow muslims to

observe Friday prayers.

The association viewed with concern the grave consequences arising from child marriage in some parts of the country and therefore reminded parents that educating their children was obligatory.

It also appealed to Islamic scholars to educate parents about the undesirability of child marriage which it said was not in the interest of the minors.

Babangida's Wife's Address

Kano THE TRIUMPH in English 29 Jul 86 p 12

[Text]

THE negligence of women's education has been described as an anti-thesis to the Islamic culture and its traditions.

This observation was made by the First Lady, Mrs. Maryam Babangida, in her address at the opening of the international seminar on Family and Society organised by the Federation of Muslim Women's Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN) in Lagos.

Mrs Babangida said "no parent should

therefore assume that it is Islamic to withdraw daughters from schools and conscript them into early marriages".

The first lady reminded all muslims that the search for knowledge irrespective of sex was mandatory. She therefore urged the FOMWAN members to continue to propagate the teachings of Islam because "it is the religion of the informed and it is also the basis of good upbringing of the family in particular and the society in general".

In her key-note address the President of the association, Hajiya Aisha Lemu, observed that until recently the voice of muslim women speaking on an Islamic platform had been almost unheard of in the country.

The president attributed this to the dearth of knowledgeable and outspoken muslim women.

Hajiya Aisha disclosed that the FOMWAN literacy scheme has successfully taken off in different parts of the country.

Hajiya Aisha disclosed that the FOMWAN literacy scheme has successfully taken off in different parts of the country.

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CSO: 3400/156

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE REJECTS SECULARISM

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 5 Aug 86 pp 1, 3

[Text]

THE national conference on Nigeria's political future, has rejected secularism because it believed that it was only intended to blackmail muslims and stifle Islam.

The conference organised by the Muslim Forum of ABU, Zaria, said it was gravely disturbed by attempts of successive governments to undermine the Islamic educational system, in particular, attempts by a number of state governments to curtail the operation of Koranic schools.

The conference expressed the belief that the similarity between the various legislations by some state governments and those in French speaking countries was not a mere coincidence, but might be a global strategy to undermine Islam.

The conference affirmed that Koranic schools formed the basis of Islamic education, and regarded government's policy to destroy this system as an assault on the integrity of Islam.

It enjoined muslims not to relent until a relevant system of education which satisfied the requirements of Islam and the yearnings of muslims came into effect.

The conference also affirmed that living by and submitting totally to the Shari'a was the right and an obligation of every muslim in Nigeria, adding that all restrictions on the application of Shari'a and its observance by all muslims be removed.

The conference also expressed its disgust on the existence and

perpetuation of an unjust economic system, the escalating scale of poverty, the dispossession of the poor of their land on a scale unacceptable to any decent society, and the continued operation of the economy on the basis of 'riba', monopoly and hoarding.

It called for the evolution of the Islamic economic system which guaranteed the security of all and enjoined the introduction of the system and welfare-oriented Islamic banks.

The conference also noted that the military was an alien institution, 'whose roots lie elsewhere and represents a continuity of colonialism', adding that in 'Nigeria, the military constitutes only a problem, a heavy and unbearable burden. A new moral and ideological basis is therefore needed to build a military force worthy of Nigeria.'

It affirmed that the muslim umma was one and indivisible, umma was one and indivisible, the parochial nation the exclusion of Islam as a factor in foreign policy, and the hostile posture of the Nigerian state against Islam and therefore rejected all calls for a normalisation of relations with Israel.

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CSO: 3400/156

ARCHBISHOP CRITICIZES RELIGIOUS COUNCIL PROPOSAL

Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 4 Aug 86 p 1

[Text]

NO government should control religion, Catholic Archbishop Anthony Olu-bunmi Okogie said yesterday.

Speaking on a Radio Lagos current affairs programme, "The Newsmaker", he said "I for one do not see the reason why a government should try to control religion and I think it is very wrong for anybody to control religion".

Airing his views on the proposed establishment of the national council on religious affairs by the Federal Government, Archbishop Okogie said the council was not what the panel on OIC recommended.

Rather, he stated, what was suggested was a forum whereby moslems and christians would sit at a round-table and argue out issues.

He said that cases like the cross at the University of Ibadan could be tabled before such a forum and everybody would be free to give his own views.

On means of solving the present crisis at Unibadan, the Archbishop observed that unless the moslem fanatics at the university were curbed a similar issue might

emerge at the University of Lagos where a cross is also facing the mosque.

He said the whole issue may have emanated from those who suddenly found themselves in the corridors of power and felt they could move mountains and anything they say must come through.

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CSO: 3400/156

LD/MPT PAPER CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURAL POLICY

Dakar FAGARU in French Jun 86 p 1

[Editorial: "Political News: Check and Mate!"]

[Text] The CREA-sponsored seminar on the new agricultural policy met and confirmed what everybody already knew about this latest dagger Abou Diouf and the "Socialist" party has plunged into the heart of the nation's peasant farmers. The researchers, the university gurus, and the decision-makers have just discovered that the agricultural policy pursued hitherto by this government is a complete and utter disaster.

They also came up with a grim and incontrovertible diagnosis of the New Agricultural Policy: it is doomed, beyond the shadow of a reasonable doubt, to abysmal failure. Actually, it is transparent euphemism to say, as LE SOLEIL did, writing about the NPA, that "the risks and costs at the political and social level are very high, and could very well bring about the collapse of the entire undertaking."

Even so, Abdou Diouf and his "socialist" party, citing the State's withdrawal and its shifting all responsibility onto the farmers is still going on, and the evidence is telling: they refuse to provide the peasant farmers with seed-grain. That is tantamount to saying that they have decided to sentence the rural population to famine and beggary. The NPA's real goal is to privatize the farmland and turn it over to foreign capitalists. The NPA means that Senegal's peasant farmers are doomed at best to become simple farmhands and, in the short or the long run, homeless ones.

Under NPA, the Senegalese peasant farmer, driven off his land, not to mention his village, exploited, oppressed, and despised, will be relegated to no more than alien status, an outcast in his own country. But that is not all. The minor bureaucrat who was already rubbing his hands at the notion of becoming a petty rural overlord with the government's promise to let him buy seed-grain on credit, has been pitilessly weaned away from his illusions. For Diouf's government, there is no intention of encouraging the unfair competition threatened by these frugal farmers at the expense of big capital. The government, though, is determined above all to withhold seed grain from the peasant farmers and to give it to the petty officials, themselves of peasant stock, means giving the

peasant farmers exactly nothing, and there can be no question as to that. When you want to batten on somebody else's slavery, you do not offer freedom to his children, unless you are determined to commit suicide, and that is certainly not the preference of the IMF and the World Bank, which imposes its policies on Abdou Diouf's government.

And that is why the Democratic League/Labor Party movement calls on the government to give the peasant-farmers seed-grain, fertilizers, and the other things they need for production.

6182

CS0: 3419/290

SENEGAL

LD/MPT PAPER: PRESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST PARTY CHARGED

Dakar FAGARU in French Jul 86 p 2

[Article signed "Political Bureau," 24 Jun 86, Dakar]

[Text] For some time now, secretly funded and defamatory attacks from a certain sector of the kept press have been leveled at our Party and at some of our leaders, including Abdoulaye Bathily, our Secretary General, and Mamadou Ndoeye, Secretary to the Central Committee in charge of Foreign Relations.

This campaign of calumny and lies, which clearly the output of an invasion by POLITICIEN as of 13 June 1986, was a nuisance we should have simply ignored had it not been clearly evident that it was part of an obvious attempt at destabilization and mounting discredit against the democratic opposition, and, currently centered almost exclusively on our Party, the LD/MPT.

The facts are there for any observer endowed with a modicum of curiosity and good faith to see. The Socialist Party and its government have been crying from the rooftops that the Senegalese communists cannot possibly become a significant force on the national scene. Our Party, LD/MPT, has come up with hard evidence that the communist movement has become an active force in our country, and a force that must be reckoned with from now on, as an irreversible reality.

Abdou Diouf and his regime have opted, in obedience to the orders of those who pump in their funds, to sacrifice the vital interests of the Senegalese people on the altar of international capital by deciding to implement the medium- and long-term restructuring sponsored by the IMF and the World Bank.

Contemplating this situation, our Party, LD/MPT, has deployed its people across the land in concert with other democratic forces to put an end to the Macchiavellian plot to sell off the people's assets. The consequence of all this is that the consensus the Socialist Party and its government were counting on to restore "Labor peace," that would smoothe implementation of its anti-social

policy of liquidating public enterprise, lead to layoffs, to an assault on workers' purchasing power, and on freedom of organized labor, has been temporarily aborted and is now in imminent danger of permanent dismissal as a misshapen freak.

There you really see the unforgivable sin the socialist party and its government cannot and will never be able to forgive the democratic forces in general—let alone our Party, LD/MPT.

Against this background, the lies and slanderous smears flung at our organization amount to only a particular phase in a vast operations aimed at challenging and destroying democratic achievements. History teaches us that whenever somebody tries to discredit the communists, in the end it is democracy that suffers. Whenever the communists are weakened, it is democracy that pales, shrivels, and ultimately withers away. That is why it is of the utmost importance for all Senegalese democrats to understand that the stakes in the war between the LD/MPT and the neocolonial government are nothing less than the destiny of democracy and freedom in our country.

That is why this campaign of lies and slander cannot in any way disturb the serene confidence of our Party's leaders and members.

Accordingly, the LD/MPT remains more than ever firmly determined to organize and lead, along with all our country's democratic and patriotic forces, a many-sided, all-encompassing offensive to put an end at last to the socialist Party's policy of national ruin and poverty.

In these grim and menacing times that threaten the survival of democracy in our country, the Political Bureau calls upon all Party activists to double and redouble, as well as further to diversify their action and their initiative in the struggle against the neocolonial government.

The Political Bureau calls upon all comrades, its sympathizers, and all sincere democrats to maintain constant vigilance, and thus to respond immediately to any provocation from the regime and its agents, be they avowed or "camouflaged,"

The LD/MPT Political Bureau calls on all the democratic forces in our country to take a long look at the imminent perils that threaten democracy in Senegal, and conjures them to work with our Party on a broad unitarian basis, for the triumph of the National Democratic Revolution.

In closing, the Political Bureau of the LD/MPT would remind all of you that history, in Senegal as everywhere else in the world, invariably keeps scrupulous track of events.

Long Live the LD/MPT!

6182

CSO: 3419/290

INFORMATION CHIEF DEFENDS REGIME TO LIBERAL GERMAN WEEKLY

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German. 16 Jun 86 pp 110-115

[Interview with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Nel, conducted by SPIEGEL editors Dieter Wild and Paul M. Schuhmacher in Cape Town, date not given: "There Is No Country We Could Go To."]

[Text] Louis Nel belongs in his capacity of chief of information with the title of deputy minister of foreign affairs to the inner circle of advisors to South Africa's State President Willem Botha. Like Botha, Nel, age 48, belongs to the liberal ("verligte") wing of the National Party of the Boers which has ruled since 1948. His career was arrested in the mid-seventies by the conservative ("verkrampfte") party majority. His rise did not take place until Botha attempted a cautious liberalization of apartheid after 1978. This reform resulted in a sharp confrontation between the liberals and the ultra-conservative Boers who seceded from the party. However, the reform was half-hearted and too late to prevent the black revolt which broke loose in the fall of 1984 and has since had almost daily victims.

SPIEGEL: Mr Nel, when will a black person occupy your office of deputy minister of foreign affairs?

Nel: Even now, it would be possible for a Colored or Indian person to hold my office, but for a black person to do so would require a new constitution. Such a constitution must be negotiated—but the revolutionary assault of today against the government delays this process. It also depends on whether or not this revolutionary assault can be put down.

SPIEGEL: Do you really believe you can strike down this revolutionary assault?

Nel: Yes, we are motivated and determined.

SPIEGEL: When will South Africa have a black president?

Nel: A Colored or Indian could be president even today, but I cannot venture to guess about a black. Right now this is an academic question which I do not care to discuss any further.

SPIEGEL: In February when Minister of Foreign Affairs Roelof Botha speculated about such prospects, he was chastised personally by the state president. Does that mean that the president excludes such a possibility?

Nel: If you read what the state president has said, you will see that he has not excluded a single possibility. He has simply said that as far as this question goes, the National Party--as a party--has not yet taken any positions.

SPIEGEL: With or without a black president--as long as you refuse to grant an appreciable governmental participation to the black majority of South Africa, the country-wide unrest of the last twenty months will continue. More than 1,700 people have been killed, and the revolution has taken over the black townships. How can you check the revolt and at the same time promote reform?

Nel: The present revolt has nothing to do with political reform; that is why your observation is incorrect. We feel it is our obligation to negotiate a process which will lead to a sharing of power with the black population. The revolutionary assault comes from people who simply do not want political reform--they want revolution.

SPIEGEL: They just simply are no longer interested in your reform.

Nel: The revolutionaries are afraid that we, together with reasonable black leaders of this country, will negotiate a constitutional order acceptable to most black people. They are afraid that those leaders would be recognized as the real leaders of the black majority in this country by both the Western World and the blacks of South Africa. In order to keep that from happening, they try everything to sabotage the reform.

SPIEGEL: But is it not understandable that the black majority does not want to wait for the day when your reform may or may not come?

Nel: That is the nature of revolutionaries. They do not want reform, they want total, violent overthrow. Should that happen, this country will face great difficulties. This will affect all South Africans as well as the Western world also, because the party which pushes for revolution in South Africa--the ANC--is allied with the Communist Party of South Africa.

SPIEGEL: Why do you still believe you can accelerate reform by fighting the revolutionaries with arms?

Nel: It is the only way to reach a peace which will accelerate the reform. That is how simple it is. We have to check the efforts of these people by using police and security forces. They have no support among the black majority for their violent acts--for their intimidation, their house burnings, their "necklace" methods (radical blacks punish real or assumed collaborators by hanging fuel-filled tires around their necks which they then ignite), and for all those means with which they are trying to bring black people under their control.

SPIEGEL: Some parts of the country are already under their control--namely the black townships.

Nel: That can be argued. Propagandistic accounts have claimed that law and order have completely collapsed, as for example in the Alexandra township which revolutionaries had apparently taken over. But when police and security forces moved in they found not a bit of resistance, and law and order were restored.

SPIEGEL: At the opening of parliament, the president made the amazing statement that apartheid is "an outdated concept." What exactly does your government mean by that?

Nel: I believe that apartheid is dead, but we still need some time to bury it.

SPIEGEL: You want to mitigate apartheid, but you want to stay in power. Is that not so?

Nel: Nonsense

SPIEGEL: A few pillars of apartheid have fallen, such as the pass laws and obscenity laws; yet other laws, such as the Group Areas Act (which determines where a certain population group can live based on skin color), are declared non-negotiable.

Nel: That is not entirely true. The government has taken two steps. First, it has referred the Group Areas Act to the president's council to be examined and reported on. That is exactly what we did with the pass laws. Second, the president has categorically declared before parliament that he does not view the Group Areas Act as a holy cow. It is important that all groups in South Africa feel secure. That is what we have to negotiate with black leaders.

SPIEGEL: But the Population Registration Act (used to officially determine each citizen's race), for example, is not open for negotiation and it is certainly an apartheid law.

Nel: Maybe to you it sounds like apartheid, but it is not discriminatory.

SPIEGEL: It is not discriminatory to categorize people according to the color of their skin?

Nel: The Population Registration Act simply recognizes the fact that different population groups exist in this country. We have ethnic distinctions. You people in Germany cannot imagine what goes on in this country because you have only one language, namely German. The South African radio network, for example, broadcasts in eleven languages. We have different communities as well as different black communities: Zulu, Xhosa, Shangaan, Shota and Tswana. Each is as different from the other as Germans are from the French. Nobody can ignore that fact and the Population Registration Acts confirms it.

SPIEGEL: But black communities do not want to be classified by whites. True, changes in apartheid are not without importance, but most blacks are not impressed that they are now to be permitted to have sexual relations with whites or to acquire property in urban regions--something they cannot afford anyway. They are interested in knowing when a black person will finally be equal to a white person.

Nel: The government desires immediate equality between black and white. The government pursues a policy which encourages the progress of blacks in South Africa in every respect.

SPIEGEL: And the black man is such a fool that he simply cannot see that? These days, people of different race are allowed to marry in South Africa and to have children of mixed race, but where are these children supposed to live and where will they go to school, since living areas and educational institutions continue to be segregated?

Nel: Naturally the situation is in flux, the scenery in South Africa is changing and society is in a state of transition. We are no longer the rigid society of the past; however, we are basically still an ethnically-oriented society with many recognized cultures. Even a man like Bishop Tutu speaks neither Afrikaans nor English with his wife; he speaks his own language—Tswana.

SPIEGEL: It is true that the level of prosperity between black and white is noticeably different. A black miner who previously earned an average of only an eighteenth of the pay of a white miner now received a quarter. But doesn't this black miner expect to earn just as much according to the principle of equal pay for equal work?

Nel: The principle of equal pay for equal work is a government policy and is already in effect in South Africa for civil servants and educators. The private sector shows a very fast development in the same direction. The different average pay for blacks and whites is not due to a legal obstacle related to color, but to different qualifications. This is the same as in a country like the United States of America. There, the average income of blacks equals only 56 percent of average white income. Even if our government were to be removed overnight, the situation would not change.

SPIEGEL: But then power would reside in other hands, and you are obviously trying to prevent that. Can you imagine a day when the election of an entire parliament is based on the principle of one man, one vote, provided minority rights are protected?

Nel: It is very important to protect the rights of minorities. But how to protect the minorities is a practical question which needs to be decided. There are various ways in the West to do just that. You Germans have the federal system and the Swiss the cantonal system. It is official policy in South Africa for each person to have one vote.

SPIEGEL: With each vote counting equally?

Nel: The vote has to be used to secure the interests and rights of the minorities. This principle has been disregarded in the rest of Africa. Democracy has failed in each African multinational state; there are either one-party states or military dictatorships.

SPIEGEL: Have we understood you correctly to say, then, that you do not exclude the principle of one man, one vote in a single parliament?

Nel: I cannot comment on any point of a future constitution. We have not yet published a draft. We want to discuss the constitutional order of South Africa in an open way.

SPIEGEL: How would you assess the following evaluation of the situation: After twenty years of violence, South Africa has reached a kind of stalemate. The black revolt cannot bring down the white-dominated power structures, and the system cannot stamp out the revolutionary fire despite its tremendous power. How long is the stalemate likely to last?

Nel: I do not believe that there is a stalemate. The ANC has declared the year 1986 to be the year of "Umkhonto we sizwe" (spear of the nation). That is the name of the military wing of the ANC. In 1986, they want to help the revolution succeed in the entire country. Right now, the government is requesting parliament to extend additional authorization to the police so they can master the situation.

SPIEGEL: Do you believe further police authorizations will help in the present dramatic situation?

Nel: Yes, they can change a lot. We have got to check violence. We owe it to the black majority of this country and also to the interests of the Western world, even though the West has a different view on the subject.

SPIEGEL: Indeed, the last thing the West wants are further police authorizations, especially when one remembers the protests against the state of emergency declared last year.

Nel: The state has to take measures which work, and we ourselves have to decide on those measures. These days, no country in the West has to fight off a revolutionary assault of the kind which takes place in South Africa. That is why Western countries are in no position to pass judgment.

SPIEGEL: During the first months of 1984, it looked as if real progress were taking place in South Africa. You started a very limited power participation for colored South Africans. There also seemed to be progress in your relations with neighboring states, especially after the ratification of the treaty of Nkomati with Mozambique. What went wrong since?

Nel: Because of the very fact of our progress, the revolutionaries stepped up their struggle.

SPIEGEL: Did you not expect that to happen?

Nel: Yes, we had anticipated it and during the last twenty months we have learned a lot. Today we are in a better position to cope with the situation that we were, let us say, a year ago.

SPIEGEL: But even at the time of the ratification of the Nkomati agreement, people wondered if you had not put the cart before the horse. You wanted to reach an understanding with independent black neighboring states instead of coming to terms with the black majority within your own borders.

Nel: That is not correct. The government has been negotiating for quite some time with the black population in our own country. Reform, even constitutional reform, must evolve if it is to have any permanence. Reform is a painful process even for whites, because they have to accept it as well. You cannot do such a thing over night. The process is in motion and we won't let ourselves be distracted.

SPIEGEL: Did you have an ulterior motive in mind when you closed your agreement with the neighboring states? You surely hoped blacks within your borders would be forced to approve of your reform movement.

Nel: I cannot follow your reasoning. Bilateral relations have nothing to do with internal relations. The black majority approves of our reform efforts.

SPIEGEL: Are you sure?

Nel: Believe me, it is only a minority that conducts itself as a noisy mob and uses radical methods. This minority turns against the reforms so that it can foment a revolution. Remember that more than 500 blacks have been killed by black radicals.

SPIEGEL: But more than double that number have been killed by security forces.

Nel: Security forces have to take action against violence to protect life and property. It is unfortunate that people get killed in the process. This year, however, more blacks have been killed by blacks and through black violence than through the actions of security forces. More than 4,400 black residences and 1,400 black stores have been burned down by blacks. Up to now, violence has been mostly directed against blacks. The West simply does not understand that fact, or does not seem to appreciate it. Recently, black violence directed against blacks has once again increased terribly; it has grown out of bounds.

SPIEGEL: Since the time you attacked Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana all in one night, whites in South Africa have had to face even stronger hostility from Africans inside and outside of the country's borders. Those attacks have been the most serious incursions into foreign countries in years. How can you even hope to regain the trust of your neighbors?

Nel: The economic existence of our neighbors depends on us. They know it and we know it. The day South Africa goes under, they will collapse and the know-it-alls in the West won't save them. Millions of blacks have perished in Africa without the West having been able to do anything about it. As we are sitting here today, blacks are starving all over Africa.

SPIEGEL: But that can never justify aggression against your neighboring states.

Nel: We are not guilty of aggression against our neighbors. We have warned our neighbors that they must not tolerate ANC operations originating in their respective territories. Also, they must not permit the ANC to pass through their countries in order to commit violent acts in South Africa. We have not

attacked Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana. We have attacked ANC headquarters and transit camps, and we have made that clear. We had no conflict with the governments or the people of those countries.

SPIEGEL: Now you do have a conflict. Did South Africa consider that the world would react with indignation?

Nel: We are aware at all times of the negative reaction of the West. But we are above all responsible to the people of South Africa. What we have done, we did to deter the ANC from attacks against South Africa. To be precise, it was an operation to protect orderly people in South Africa.

SPIEGEL: In what way have your incursions protected people in South Africa? They have destroyed a handful of buildings in far-away countries.

Nel: We have destroyed installations that were the property of the ANC. The ANC is after all a terrorist organization that kills indiscriminately in South Africa--it kills blacks as well as whites. With our action we have sent a message to the ANC, namely that we know where they are and that we are not afraid to confront them.

SPIEGEL: You claim you are opposed to violence, but you commit violent acts even outside your borders. Are you not afraid you will have to pay dearly for such news?

Nel: We have acted in self-defense according to article 51 of the United Nations charter. The ANC must realize that this government does not lack energy to act against the ANC or anyone else's revolutionary assault.

SPIEGEL: Since your incursions, you have been threatened more than ever with economic sanctions, even by friendly countries like the United States.

Nel: The United States has threatened us often with sanctions. President Reagan has even applied limited sanctions against South Africa in the past.

SPIEGEL: Your incursions have wrecked the peace efforts of the "Eminent Persons Group" (a group formed by politicians of seven Commonwealth states which was supposed to find possibilities for a compromise in South Africa). This is why you are threatened for the first time with world-wide economic sanctions. If South Africa still had the healthy economy of 3 years ago, you could perhaps laugh at it, but meanwhile your currency has lost two-thirds of its value against the most important Western currencies. Doesn't the prospect of an economic boycott give you the shivers?

Nel: The currency exchange losses have also brought advantages, because our products are now more competitive internationally. Sanctions can possibly hit the economy of South Africa, but they mostly affect the human and personal sector. It is first and foremost the population of South Africa which suffers. The ones to suffer first when sanctions succeed are workers who lose their jobs.

SPIEGEL: Yet the situation has now come to such a climax that many blacks desire sanctions.

Nel: Those blacks who advocate sanctions, such as Bishop Tutu, do not lose their income in case sanctions are ordered. Only those people who won't lose their job are ready to live with the bitter results of sanctions. I have not heard one single black person say, "I favor sanctions even if I cannot feed my children anymore."

SPIEGEL: Nevertheless, even leaders of influential black labor unions support the call for sanctions.

Nel: They won't lose their jobs in case of sanctions either.

SPIEGEL: Another argument by whites against sanctions says that even enlightened Boers would be driven back to their "Laager." But maybe this historical "Laager mentality" does not even exist anymore, because many Boers have become wealthy members of industrial society.

Nel: That is true to a certain degree. Yet sanctions would not only lead to greater unity among the Afrikaners, but among all whites. Apart from that, many influential black leaders such as the Zulu chief Gatsha Buthelezi are radically opposed to sanctions.

SPIEGEL: Your government is not only facing a black revolution, but it is also severely attacked by white ultra-rightists. They accuse President Botha of having betrayed the white man. Do you expect these extremists to gain increasing strength?

Nel: It is not unlikely that they will gain a bit in influence, but I must say that the government has made its policy toward allowing other groups to share power very clear, and the country's white population has already made up its mind whether they are for or against sharing power.

SPIEGEL: Eugene Terreblanche, the leader of the right-wing "Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging" [Afrikaner Resistance Movement] (AWB), has reportedly said: "If necessary, we will regain our country by force if Botha hands it over to the blacks." Is that not a clear announcement of white violence?

Nel: No, it is not. He was referring to a complete collapse of law and order. In such a revolutionary situation, as I understand him, the Boers would stand united to fight the revolutionaries. This is not a military threat against the government.

SPIEGEL: It almost sounds as if you were groping for an excuse for Terreblanche.

Nel: I am simply trying to remain fair and reasonable. Recently, as we were preparing a booklet with the title "Communicating with the ANC", I insisted that we must also be fair and reasonable towards the ANC. We must be fair towards all our adversaries.

SPIEGEL: Your police and your security forces, however, shoot their black adversaries exclusively. There was even the charge that the security forces are secretly sympathetic to the white ultras, while they show much less patience with black extremists.

Nel: Our security forces have moved against those who have committed violent acts whether they are black or white. And in Pietersburg we have used tear gas against the AWB. We have a large police force consisting of blacks and whites. Naturally, it is not impossible that a few individuals harbor certain sympathies for a particular political cause, but as a whole, the police will execute the policy and the orders of the government. The force is loyal to the government.

SPIEGEL: Yes, there is actually little doubt about that.

Nel: I think that one cannot compare black and white radicals on the same level. Black radicals have pledged themselves openly to violence and revolution.

SPIEGEL: But white extremists have been found guilty in court of having planned terrorist acts.

Nel: Well, okay! But there is absolutely no evidence that this occurred because of a political program or because of some obligations towards the AWB. By comparison however, violence is a part of the political program of the ANC. That is the reason why I would like to repeat that one cannot compare the two in this respect.

SPIEGEL: Mr Nel, your country is in a state of revolution....

Nel: No, no—only in a few parts.

SPIEGEL: Revolution is a fact. Even people as well-meaning toward you as the American president have advised you to free the ANC leader Nelson Mandela after more than 20 years in prison, to lift the ban against the ANC, and to start talks with the nationalists of the ANC. Why is it so difficult to follow that advice?

Nel: First, Mandela can be free today if he is prepared to abandon violence. He has got to submit to traditional values.

SPIEGEL: He must submit to your value system.

Nel: Our point of view is not out of the ordinary and is quite justified. The West should support us in this respect. And second; yes, we will lift the ban against the ANC. But it also has to renounce violence. Here, we are on firm ground too. What would you have thought if I had told you that the German chancellor should negotiate with the Baader-Meinhof gang?

SPIEGEL: There is at least one major difference. The ANC is an organization which represents a broad political movement in your country, while the

Baader-Meinhof people never were an organization representing such a movement in our country.

Nel: Terrorists have been locked up in Germany, Italy and France. I insist that in South Africa too there be no support for the violence of the ANC. Why should we give in to the ANC, and by so doing legitimize its actions?

SPIEGEL: South Africa is approaching a fateful date, namely 16 June when blacks commemorate the 10th anniversary of the great uprising in Soweto. Back then, the police killed more than 500 blacks. With an eye to this anniversary, the Minister of Police Louis le Grange has forbidden all public assembly. Are you afraid of a new outburst of violence of historic proportions?

Nel: Many protest events and marches have been planned with the intent to trigger further violence. Hence, we fear indeed that new violence might erupt on 16 June. We have taken the necessary measures in anticipation thereof.

SPIEGEL: The Boers call themselves the white tribe of Africa. Has it ever crossed their minds that one day their only choice might be to submit to the blacks or to leave Africa altogether?

Nel: We are Africans. We have been here for more than 300 years. There is no country we could go to. Our future is with South Africa. Black and white have to work together. The issue is not submission, but sharing.

SPIEGEL: Mr Nel, we thank you for this interview.

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AUTHOR TALKS TO AWB LEADER EUGENE TERRE' BLANCHE

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[Article by Wessel Ebersohn]

[Text]

"I am a son of this people, a product of the generation before my father. I am precisely what the Fatherland expects of me. I am a realist, a product of this earth as a place where the farmers must struggle and survive. I understand survival well. I am a pure Afrikaner nationalist."

The leader of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging was answering my question: "Who is Eugene Terre' Blanche?"

Since their success in preventing a cabinet minister from addressing a gathering in Pietersburg, the AWB has been receiving more attention from the media than at any other time since they tarred and feathered Professor Floors van Jaarsveld six years ago. At this moment the public perception is probably overwhelmed by colour photographs of swastika-like banners, storm trooper uniforms and the television coverage of the Pietersburg brawl.

But the key to the AWB does not lie in the colourful regalia or the quasi-military appearance of its members. It lies in the personality of its leader.

I believe Terre'Blanche's answer to my question was as honest as he was capable of making it. He sees himself not primarily as a citizen of earth, a human being, a husband, a lover or even a farmer. Essentially he sees himself as a son, a child of his people, an Afrikaner nationalist first; all else is secondary.

Terre'Blanche is a charming host, friendly and eager to please, answering questions slowly and reasonably, seemingly determined to show that his position is fair and devoid of extremism. He is short of stature, a fact that seems to cause him some dismay and he often wears built-up shoes to disguise it. During our interview he interrupted himself at one point to tell me how he wished that he was as tall as I am.

What he might lose in height he more than compensates for with a magnificent bass/baritone voice of almost operatic dimensions. The sound of his voice, especially when speaking slowly and with restraint, might in part be the reason for his success. It has a rich and resonant quality that holds the attention the moment he starts speaking.

Despite his fine speaking voice Terre'Blanche is not a good orator. His opening remarks, pitched in a low key and spoken in a dignified and measured manner, are undeniably impressive. The effect is always spoiled a little deeper into the speech when the emotion of the subject matter becomes too much for him to bear and the rest of the oration pours out in an ear-splitting cacophony. There are no pauses, no restrained passages, no contrasts of any sort, only a protracted assault on the hearing faculties that has many of the outward appearances of hysteria.

While he is quick to discount the effect of heroes on his development, Eugene Terre'Blanche's childhood seems to have been freely sown with them. The legendary figures of the Anglo/Boer war, President Kruger, General de Wet and General Koos de la Rey, who he is quick to tell you is buried just a few kilometres from his home, have places of honour, while the world's great men of power, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler have all been sources of inspiration to him.

The young Terre'Blanche grew to adulthood in a home that he remembers today with great fondness. He speaks warmly of his parents and grandparents. It was his father particularly who had the ability to create in him the emotional intensity through which he views Afrikaner history today.

But the true heroes of the Terre'Blanche mythology are not the generals or commandos. The women and

children of the nineteenth century who suffered and often died in the search for freedom have affected him most deeply of all. "Imagine," he says, "a lurching ox wagon, passing through a sea of savages, and under these circumstances the boer wife must lie down and give birth . . ." His speeches are laced with boer women and children, dying in British concentration camps or at the hands of savages, their spilt blood sanctifying the African earth, and all of it described in startlingly sentimental terms. His preoccupation with suffering children becomes all the more interesting when he tells you of his regret that he has none of his own.

It is the African earth itself that Terre'Blanche sees as his main source of inspiration and the shed blood of Afrikaners that gives him the right to it. "I am jealous of the rights of this people," he says. The impression is created that it is a small and lonely people to whom he is referring, a suffering and struggling minority. His Afrikaner is to a far greater extent that of the nineteenth century than the powerful twentieth century figure of black perceptions. "I am jealous of the rights of this people, the only white nation indigenous to Africa, the possessors of the world's youngest language."

The extent of his reading is surprising. You are as likely to have Albert Schweitzer quoted to you as Marshall Ney of Napoleon's army. But it is his knowledge of Afrikaner history that is particularly formidable. And, perhaps predictably, the historical incident to which he attaches greatest significance is the battle of Blood River.

Every aspect of this battle seems to be familiar to Terre'Blanche. He can take the listener through every moment, describing the action in reverent detail, he knows the names of the Zulu generals, he can tell you how many blacks were within the laager and he can support his views with what appears to the layman to be comprehensive historical documentation. At Blood River lies the core to the religious aspect of his politics. "The relationship of a people with their God must be right," he tells you. "The people bowed themselves down in prayer for seven days and God gave us the victory." He recounts that during the battle the animals in the laager were immobile, showing no fear, a sure sign that God was in their midst. When he refers to God it is often to "the God who gave us Blood River".

It was this reverence for Blood River that brought his anger down on the introspective head of Pretoria University's Professor Floors van Jaarsveld. The professor's sin was that he dared to suggest that the Day of the Covenant, at which Blood River is remembered, is nothing more than a man made holiday. The professor went so far as to produce his own comprehensive historical documentation. I doubt that there could be any greater heresy in Eugene Terre'Blanche's eyes than the suggestion that the Day of the Covenant is not a holy day. The error was compounded by the fact that it came from within the heart of Afrikanerdom.

At a historical seminar being held in Pretoria in the presence of a number of overseas guests, Terre'Blanche and about 30 of his supporters tarred and feathered Van Jaarsveld.

In the prosecution that followed he and some of his friends paid fines of a few hundred rands each. Outside the court a group of supporters sang, "Lord, let your blessings fall upon them".

While in private he makes no excuses for his action, he is at pains to explain that the minimum amount of violence was used to demonstrate the maximum displeasure at an act of aggression far more reprehensible than his. By means of blatant lies and coldblooded omissions Van Jaarsveld had made light of a people's promise to God, Eugene's own people and his own God.

In public his defence of the tarring and feathering takes a somewhat different line. "Thirty-six men, a small group, stood firm like an iron rod in the wind . . ." In his retelling, the incident achieves an heroic status that is a little difficult for the dispassionate mind to comprehend. The fines that were paid are elevated to part of the legacy of Afrikaner suffering. A point that seems to escape him, when he identifies his fine with their truly immense sacrifices, is the degree to which he insults the Afrikaners who really did suffer for their freedom.

The religious aspect of Terre'Blanche's thinking also provides the rationale for excluding Jews and Indians from all forms of government. "If you do not believe in Christ you are anti-Christ. There will be no place for Jews in an AWB government." To the best of my knowledge he has never explained publicly whether or not those of us who do not subscribe to his religious beliefs will enjoy civil rights, or what else might be in store for Jewish South Africans and other non-Christians.

One of the liberal myths of the Fifties and Sixties was the belief that Afrikaner nationalism was closely related to National Socialism. There were certainly areas of similarity. The National Party's insistence on rigid racial segregation, especially the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts, their fondness for detaining political opponents without the nuisance of legal proceedings and a tendency to want every aspect of life categorised, catalogued and covered by suitable legislation: all seemed to indicate a certain family relationship with National Socialism.

There were however a number of important differences. Afrikanerdom had never been unusually enthusiastic about flags and uniforms. The only exclusively Afrikaner armies of our history, those of the old Boer republics, were the least formal and regimented fighting forces imaginable. Contrary to the thinking of most of their political opponents it is not easy to get all of Afrikanerdom standing in line and saluting in unison. The current discontent on the right of nationalist politics is an indication of this.

Until the emergence of Eugene Terre'Blanche and the AWB the revolt on the right had been led by men

who were nothing more than old-style Nationalists, Verwoerd and Strydom men. Terre'Blanche's appearance has added a new and, although he will deny this, alien element to what up to this time has had the appearance of a family revolt. One wonders what went through the minds of Dr Andries Treurnicht, Jaap Marais and Professor Carel Boshoff when they arrived at the recent Voortrekker Monument Republic Day meeting to share the platform with Terre'Blanche, and were left waiting, for him to arrive late, surrounded by uniformed storm troopers, banners waving, and himself looking sternly ahead, his right arm outstretched in salute, playing his adopted role to perfection.

This is perhaps the major difference between traditional Afrikaner nationalism, on the one hand, and National Socialism and the AWB on the other. The National Party has always been a movement of the *volk*. Leaders were revered, but only because they were the leaders of the people. When the time came for one to go there was always more than one candidate, all equally suitable, to fill the top spot.

The AWB, like the National Socialist German Workers Party, is run on the *führerprinzip*. There is only one leader, one main speaker at political rallies, one source of wisdom. Without Terre'Blanche there can be no AWB. He is the cog around which the entire movement revolves. No matter who holds the rank of deputy leader there is no replacement if he should go. And should he ever unite with the other forces of the extreme right there will still be only one leader. Treurnicht, Marais and Boshoff will have to learn to salute.

A quality that Terre'Blanche shares with the leaders of the extreme left is the idea that the will of the people, that indefinable conglomerate of conflicting views, somehow coincides with his own. When speaking of the future under an AWB government he describes a land of peace and tranquility in which the divisiveness of party politics will be outlawed, whites will be in charge and blacks will seek their own salvation in the homelands.

And as with the extreme left, there seems to be no room in this perfect state for the dissident. Questioned about his attitude to detention without trial, Terre'Blanche says that it should never be used against one's own people or to subvert the will of the *volk*.

On many occasions in public meetings he has said that anyone who wants to turn this country into a Zimbabwe or a Mozambique will be flattened with the earth. Questioned as to whether this was meant literally he answered with disarming simplicity. "Yes. We are going to hit them hard, physically, violently. They will be levelled with the earth."

The future scenario by which he is going to accede to power is romantic beyond belief. When the present government, by its misguided liberal actions, has finally reduced the country to chaos, the AWB will step

in and restore order and heaven help the black man who has other ideas.

Terre'Blanche's view of life is not dominated by ideas of freedom, justice or even power. Central to his every thought and action seems to be his overwhelming preoccupation with survival, not the simple matter of suburban survival where the main problem lies in bringing home the monthly pay packet and trying to get by on it. To Terre'Blanche all of life is a struggle for survival. The wild creatures of the veld struggle against nature. The fate of people hangs in the balance as they struggle with each other. His is a strong elemental creed that, when applied to his own people, has the black man as the threat to their survival. I have no doubt that he believes that if the Afrikaner loses power in South Africa he will find himself facing genocide. He says that the battle that is going to come will not be about the composition of a government. It will be about the total elimination of the white man. It is a matter of simple survival. If we lose the last battle, we will not be going into bondage, we will be on the brink of obliteration.

At work here is a sort of primitive Darwinism strongly reminiscent of the National Socialist idea that it is the natural order for the strong to survive and the weak to die. So strong was Hitler's belief in might and right being synonymous that in the last days of his life he felt that it was right that Germany should be destroyed. They had shown that they were not strong enough to meet the challenge of survival.

When questioned directly about his attitude to Hitler, Terre'Blanche says that the German dictator was an unusually adept statesman. He accepts unreservedly the popular myth that it was Hitler who saved the German economy in the Thirties. He says that Hitler changed a dying people into a fighting people. This is what is important: not that they should have been a contented people, an industrious people or a free people. They were a fighting people.

The three-legged swastika emblem on his movement's flag is in fact three sevens, we are told, the Biblical number for perfection, which stands in opposition to the Book of Revelations' three sixes, the mark of the beast. The black on the flag stands for the black race, the white for the white race, in sharp juxtaposition to each other (no grey areas here) and the red for the blood of Christ. But whatever Terre'Blanche's explanations, his flag is all but identical to that of National Socialism, the only difference being that his swastika has three legs.

The AWB's imitation of National Socialism extends beyond the flags, banners, uniforms, salutes, the love of pageants, to their well-known enthusiasm for breaking up other people's meetings. In this respect it is the National Party members who are their enemies. It is they who have betrayed Afrikanerdom. At the battle of Pietersburg Terre'Blanche employed the undeniable

force of his personality, the force that comes from the complete conviction that what he is doing is right in every respect and in the interest of his people, even to persuade the policeman in charge to escort him into the hall. The officer's will, even reinforced by his rank and uniform and the knowledge that he was protecting a cabinet minister, was no match for that of the AWB leader.

He shows little concern for his own personal comfort and sometimes seems to be trying to provoke the government. The importance to Hitler of the time spent in Landsberg prison would not have escaped him. It could be that a part of Terre'Blanche is seeking martyrdom in the form of his own Landsberg, anticipating that this might be an alternative route to power. I am sure that the parallels between Germany's ravaged economy of the Twenties and our own current problems have also not escaped him.

But the overriding impression is one of unreality. It is not just Hitler's methods or doctrines that have been adopted. It is almost every outward aspect and symbol, right down to the way of saluting. There is reason to wonder if what we are seeing is not simply an imitation. That the emotions are real there can be no doubt, but it is possible that beyond the emotion and the facade, there is no substance to the AWB.

One December the 16th, the anniversary of the very battle that so affects Terre'Blanche's thinking, I stood on the pavement in Paul Kruger Street in Pretoria and watched the AWB march from Church Square to the city hall. I have rarely been more disappointed. The much-publicised motor cycle storm troops seemed to be made up of pimply youths and paunchy prematurely ageing blue collar workers. Many of the motor cycles were of the 50cc variety used by high school boys. They spluttered and whined their way up Paul Kruger Street while their unprepossessing riders did their best to look grim faced and determined, their leader, in Voortrekker dress and mounted on a horse, galloped ahead. I had expected something a little more menacing.

On another night at a gathering of his people in the Fountains picnic spot just outside Pretoria, I watched them staging simple, almost childish one act plays about important moments in Afrikaner history. The treaty of Vereeniging, the concentration camps and other similar subjects were depicted in little sketches, each no more than five or 10 minutes in length. And there was Eugene himself, surrounded by his adoring followers, playing the lead in each of the plays. It is the picture that stays most vividly in my mind, an actor playing a part, a cardboard imitation of reality.

It could be that when the final analysis of this complex man is undertaken there is found to be more of Hitler's flamboyant ally, Benito Mussolini, in his make-up than there is of the German dictator himself.

PROFESSOR ON AFRIKAANS STUDENTS' CHALLENGES, FRUSTRATIONS

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[Article by Professor Mike de Vries, director and vice-chancellor at Stellenbosch University]

[Text]

In the peaceful complacency of the Sixties, the South African community – and its student community – hopelessly misjudged events on campuses in Europe and the United States. More than 80% of the demonstrations of those years were against the inefficient administration of universities; only 20% were in protest against the Vietnam war, or genuinely Communist inspired. The realities of Africa, of which we in SA are an inseparable part, also largely passed us by because of the buffer formed by Angola, the then Rhodesia and Mozambique. The Verwoerd era generated a feeling of political assurance and moral peace of mind, and the structures of this era were accepted, largely uncritically, by students on Afrikaans-language campuses. Most of them had no doubts about the road ahead.

The early and middle Seventies brought a dramatic swing away from the peaceful self-assurance of the Sixties. The collapse of the "right-wing" regimes on our borders (Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia), the Soweto riots of 1976, the Information Scandal (which seriously shook the confidence of many young people in their leaders and figures of authority) had a shock effect which undermined many certainties and especially forced young people to reconsider our situation and the direction which we were taking. One could call this a transitional period.

These events eventually brought about an important shift among many Afrikaans students. Until then, the governing party was supported because of ideological considerations, traditional affiliations and the authority exercised by the politicians. Since the Seventies, this is often no longer true. Like other voters, many students now only support the National Party because they regard

it as the only available instrument for practical constitutional reform.

In contrast to the fiery actions of students in the US and Europe in the late Sixties and early Seventies, students at Stellenbosch remained relatively calm. There were signs of a greater critical involvement, but a constructive rather than a destructive one – in sharp contrast to the effects of student unrest elsewhere in the Western world. The severing of ties with the ASB (Afrikaanse Studentebond) after this organisation was hijacked by followers of S E D Brown, was an important development further strengthening the tradition of moderate thought and action for which Stellenbosch was known. Petitions calling on the authorities to open the Nico Malan opera and theatre complex to all races did elicit a strong counter-reaction and created the image of Stellenbosch as a liberal university among Afrikaners. Even though this cannot be ascribed solely to student pressure, the later opening of the Nico Malan confirmed that Stellenbosch students often played a pioneering role in the Afrikaner community.

In the Seventies, student organisations offered speakers of other races and divergent beliefs the opportunity to address enthusiastic audiences on the Stellenbosch campus. Many other Afrikaners found this strange and unusual, and the fundamentalists of apartheid thought saw this as an undermining action from within their own ranks. When, in 1978, the first students of other races were admitted to undergraduate courses – even though this was on a very small scale – it occurred with the enthusiastic co-operation of student leaders, and this swiftly led to further representations for the complete opening, not only of the university, but also of student residences.

Student influence was being felt on a level other than protest and demonstration, and perhaps precisely because of this, their contribution was constructive and effective. Now, many years later, the divisions, arguments and actions are often different. The average student of today on the Stellenbosch campus is still opposed to violence as a solution for social and political problems. He is also everything but anti-government – in fact, the reform measures are strongly supported.

Nevertheless, there has been a change in attitude since the Seventies. The insistence on peaceful change has become more intense, and students' calls for political and social reform are characterised by a sense of urgency.

This difference in attitude should not be interpreted as a rebellious protest against the institutions and policies of the authorities. For example, the students who wanted to travel to Lusaka for discussions with the youth wing of the ANC were not expressing a spirit of defiance. Rather, they were motivated by a serious concern for the coming years, and by the conviction that the current pace and priorities of reform would not ensure a relatively peaceful and stable future. In the Seventies, there was a reasonably widespread confidence among students in the ability of the authorities to solve the political problems. This confidence has reduced markedly. Students feel increasingly that they should undertake initiatives themselves, in areas where they alone can make a contribution. As a student put it: "It is *our* future which is at stake. If we have to fight for our future on the borders, we also want to fight for it on other fronts."

The young student of today – and I refer specifically to the Afrikaner student at Stellenbosch – has an acute awareness that we, in a changing SA, are irrevocably on our way to a post-apartheid era and that we are involved in a strenuous process of adaption and reorientation. The outcome of this process of change – the social, economic and political structures of the future in terms of which they will have to live their lives – is of the utmost importance to them.

For them, it is a case of a ship, which has been on a certain course for 300 years, having to take a new bearing. The Stellenbosch student of today justly asks how he can help change the ship's direction, because he knows he is a fellow traveller. This new direction is seen as no longer having any room for discrimination on the grounds of race or colour. Discriminatory practices which were statutorily entrenched and regulated will have to disappear completely, and an ideological framework which tries to justify such practices will be out of place. For the vast majority of students, group privilege or group domination based on the presupposition of group superiority is simply out of the question in the new SA. What, in contrast, is of the utmost importance to them is how they can proceed towards a common destiny in which different groups can live and work in peace with one another, mutually respecting each others' human dignity.

That there are centrifugal forces such as group fears, group aspirations, group loyalties and group prejudices is well and truly realised. In fact, there is a strong awareness of the potential contained by these centrifugal forces to further divide and polarise our already fragmented society, and eventually plunge it into the chaos of total conflict. The emphasis on uniting forces, the promotion of a common loyalty and an awareness of a broad South African solidarity, these are the urgent priorities for the Stellenbosch student of today. It is for this reason that they are increasingly involving themselves in dialogue and contact across traditional boundaries.

It is true that many young people, students included, still take their stand along traditional political dividing lines which contributes to the further entrenchment of prejudices and grievances. But there are also increasing numbers of students who are in fact attempting to transcend these traditional political divisions, to propose alternative alignments and to strive in their thought, actions and attitudes for a society in which the harm and hurt caused by apartheid will be left behind for good.

As regards current developments among Afrikaans students, it may be useful to look at what happened at Kent State University in the US. In his book on events there in 1970 when 13 students were shot by the National Guard, James Michener found that only about 3% of the whole student community could be classified as being on the radical and revolutionary left or the reactionary right. The great majority of liberal and conservative thinkers were leaderless. The results were catastrophic. The leftist radical groups and rightist reactionary groups could hardly be distinguished in their attempts to destroy all order – only their philosophical points of departure differed drastically.

Sometimes I get the impression that the majority in the political middle on the Stellenbosch campus fear that they may be hijacked by left-wing radicals or right-wing reactionaries. It sometimes appears as if clear guidance for this middle group is still lacking – from the church, political movements as well as its own ranks. In this regard it will be important to ensure that the guidance provided will be in the right style.

Authoritarian and prescriptive leadership imposed from above has little chance of impressing students. What is needed is the kind of leadership which will not seek to conceal the problems of the transitional period, but in fact combine a realistic assessment of these problems with an inspiring and imaginative vision of the future and with creative, innovative thinking.

The leadership students are seeking, especially from within their own ranks, is that which will recognise the rich but unexploited potential of the values which SA's people share with one another, despite their differences and the alienation between them. We cannot really talk of self-assured "student power" on an Afrikaans campus – at any rate, not to the extent that this is found in

Europe and the US. What prevails is rather a deep uncertainty about the future. This uncertainty can, however, become the source of a new social dynamism. Students concerned about the future can be mobilised to constructive action. At the same time one must bear in mind that, if the concern and uncertainty about the future is not met with purposeful and visionary leadership, many students will seek their certainty elsewhere. Any political or cultural organisation which seeks to maintain the support of our students will only be able to do this if it offers ideas and initiatives which will capture their imagination.

Compared with their predecessors of a decade or two ago, the students of today find themselves in a totally new situation of which they cannot always make sense. They no longer perceive their most urgent and fundamental problem of existence as a crisis of survival, a struggle to cope with the new forces unleashed in SA as a result of the politicisation of the black youth, and the challenge this presents to find a viable basis for co-operation and co-existence.

At the height of the apartheid era, Afrikaans students were still, in many respects, peripheral figures – self-assured, spoilt and convinced of the academic merits of the course the ship was taking, but without a clearly articulated realisation of their stake in the political events of the day. Today, however, they are at the centre of the boiling pot of the new realities, realising that they are on the threshold of the new SA, the shape of which is their own concern and responsibility. One should have an

understanding of the unusual and sometimes confusing situation they find themselves in, and of the experiments they will be inclined to embark on as a result, no matter how disturbing these experiments may be to an older generation. It should also be expected that they will question many beliefs previously regarded as self-evident certainties, and will occasionally even come forward with shocking “innovations”.

At times, student actions may seem to many outsiders as a form of student rebellion. However, in most instances it reflects rather an honest search for solutions and a new course for the ship. Instead of condemnation, attempts should rather be made to guide along constructive channels the concern and youthful energy to which these actions attest. Students should be encouraged and assisted to make this kind of contribution which can be expected from an academic milieu, namely, the exercise of critical analyses and the promotion of rational choices between alternative solutions.

There are, of course, also some Afrikaner students who are being dragged along by right-wing reactionary convictions and movements. This should not be surprising. In times of change and uncertainty, those who defend the bastions of the past with conviction are not without appeal. Young people are also susceptible to them. However, I believe this group is in the minority. The majority are still those who do not allow themselves to be misled by either reactionary or revolutionary talk. They are interested in justice and fairness. Unlike many of the older generation, they may be the people who will build bridges over the traditional schisms.

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CSO: 3400/430

BLACK SASH OFFICIAL DEPLORES GOVERNMENT'S REGULATORY POWERS

Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Vol 5 No 3, 1986 pp 68, 70

[Article by Sheena Duncan, immediate past president of the Black Sash]

[Text]

On January 31, 1986 President PW Botha opened this year's session of Parliament with a speech in which he affirmed the government's faith in the sovereignty of law as the basis for the protection of fundamental rights. He said that peace, freedom and democracy could not exist without law and that any future system had to conform to the requirements of civilised legal order and ensure access to the courts. The dignity, life, liberty and property of all had to be protected, regardless of colour, race, creed or religion.

As he spoke, 335 people were being detained in police and prison cells without access to the courts. They were being held in terms of regulations governing this year's first state of emergency which was declared on July 20, 1985 and lifted on March 7, 1986. Between July 22, 1985 and January 31, 1986, 7 618 people had been detained in terms of those regulations.

As he spoke, a further 294 people were being held without access to the courts in terms of the security laws. During 1985, 3 637 people were detained under security legislation, 1 848 of them in the Transkei.

In February, the Minister of Law and Order told Parliament that more than 2 000 youngsters under the age of 16-years had been detained since the start of the emergency. Reports have been received that children as young as seven-years have been, and are being, held.

The State President expressed values and principles which are fundamental to just government and basic requirements if people are to live in security and peace. They are principles widely accepted in civilised societies. They are not accepted in South Africa. In the President's speech there was no declaration of intent to change South Africa's security legislation or to lift the state of emergency.

That was only to be lifted on March 7, 1986, by which time 7 992 had been detained.

On June 12, 1986 a state of emergency was once again declared, this time over the whole country. It was accompanied by regulations prohibiting news reports on police conduct without official permission.

During the next few days hundreds of people were detained country wide. And to disclose, without the written consent of the Minister, the name or identity of a detained person became an offence carrying a possible penalty of imprisonment or a R20 000 fine.

White South Africans no longer respond to arguments about the rule of law and principles of justice. Most of us have forgotten what it meant for citizens to be safe from arbitrary arrest. Most of us do not feel threatened because we are not black and we feel sure that the State will not act against us.

It has been a long time since South Africa observed the rule of law. We let it go bit by bit without sufficient protest. We used to shout loudly about detention without trial. We no longer do so. As an issue it no longer pricks many consciences. We have gone on voting into power a government which has consistently introduced increasingly restrictive legislation granting uncontrolled powers to the State.

During the five month state of emergency in 1960, 11 727 people were detained. When it was lifted, South Africa returned for a few short months to the rule of law, observing the principle of access to the courts for arrested people.

In 1961 the rot set in. An amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act allowed detention for 12 days on the direction of the attorney-general. This breached the requirement that any arrested person had to be charged or released within 48 hours. A fragile protection was lost.

From then on the decline was rapid. The General Laws Amendment Act of 1963 contained the "Sobukwe

clause" for certain political offences. This allowed for the continued detention of people even after they had completed sentences imposed on them by the courts. The same Act introduced 90-day detention. However, the 90 days could become indefinite because the law stipulated that once the previous period expired a detainee could be redetained for a further 90 days. No court of law could order the release of a detainee.

Two years later a provision was introduced allowing for the detention of state witnesses for 180 days. This replaced "12-day" detention and gave an attorney general the power to deny bail – which had previously been a court decision.

In 1966 the General Laws Amendment Act introduced 14-day detention for those suspected of terrorism.

In 1967 the government dropped all time limits and controls over arbitrary police action when the Terrorism Act was passed, allowing indefinite detention for interrogation. Then in 1976 the Minister of Law and Order was given powers of "preventive detention", whereby people could be detained, supposedly at whim, without access to the courts.

All these provisions were consolidated in the Internal Security Act of 1982. People can now be held in detention as State witnesses if the Minister of Law and Order suspects their activities, and in indefinite detention for interrogation.

Nowhere does the law prevent the authorities from detaining someone for a lifetime. A detainee no longer has even the protection of public knowledge about who he is, where he is being held, and what his condition is. Every bit of information about detainees is hard won and publication of the facts is hedged with prohibitions. There may be many more detainees than those who have been publicly acknowledged. It is impossible to know whether official figures are complete.

Since 1961 there has been no civilised legal order which ensures detainees access to the courts. For 25 years we have lived without the rule of law.

In 1983 the Science Committee of the President's Council reported that 43% of South Africa's African population was under the age of 15 years. Which means that much more than half of South Africa's population was born after 1961 and has never known what it means to live under the protection of the law and the courts.

For them the law is predator and punisher rather than protector. The consequences of such an understanding of legal order are incalculable.

A few years ago in the Johannesburg Advice Office we learnt that a friend had been indefinitely detained for interrogation. Our immediate response was anger because a fundamental principle of human rights that we had been brought up to respect had been violated. A young black colleague, who had herself been detained in 1976, said: "Let them wait 'till we have the power to put them in detention".

Since Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980, whites in South Africa have criticised detentions there without any recognition that Mr Mugabe's government is using powers inherited from the previous white administration. This does not make detentions in Zimbabwe any less reprehensible. But it does make one wonder how these vocal white critics dare expect sympathy when they introduced measures which years ago destroyed the rule of law in that country and were responsible for the long detention of members of the present government.

White South Africans have a lesson to learn. We will have little moral right to complain when other people wield the power in the laws we created to detain our friends and acquaintances. It is amazing how a realisation of personal danger and a total lack of protection for ourselves, concentrates the mind on the principles of a civilised legal order.

It is absolutely essential that we now, without delay, take the State President's words and insist that they are given real meaning. There is no time to be lost. Government money (our money) would be well spent if all legislation allowing detention without trial were abolished. Simultaneously, an advertising campaign should be embarked upon to teach the principles of a "civilised legal order" to those who have been deprived of such an understanding by our government's actions over the last 25 years.

From time to time allegations of brutal physical torture and unimaginable cruelty meted out to detainees, by their interrogators and by others who have uncontrolled power over them, are made in inquest courts and during political trials. Such brutality is the inevitable result of laws which deny detainees the right of access to the courts, to legal assistance, to their families, to ministers of religion. The allegations have led to calls for greater protection of detainees and for safeguards which will prevent the abuses.

These attempts to alleviate conditions for detainees must be made in absence of any likelihood that the legislation will be repealed.

Too many people abdicate their concern when the Minister of Law and Order announces new procedures for the holding of detainees. It is detention without access to the courts which is abhorrent. Torture and physical abuse make it worse, but there should *never* be provision for the arbitrary detention of persons in any system of law.

Ironically, at a time when Bophuthatswana was still pretending its constitutional Bill of Rights meant something, a political opponent of the government was detained in one of those well-known luxury hotels which flourish in that country. He was not beaten or tortured or physically abused but he was held against his will and without access to the courts. He could have been held there for the rest of his life. That he had a

comfortable bed and a bathroom attached was small consolation in the circumstances.

South Africa has an independent judiciary but that judiciary has been excluded by Parliament from exercising its authority, in many instances, over the executive arm of the State. Independence is not enough. The power of the Courts must be restored. This should be a legislative priority for the current session of Parliament. Unfortunately there are no indications that the State President intends to translate his fine words into action.

Far from it. Two new security bills have become law. The Internal Security Amendment Act allows for the preventive detention of people for 180 days.

The Public Safety Amendment Act allows the Minister of Law and Order to impose a state of emergency in any area without calling it such. He will have a free hand to make any regulation he pleases, including a regulation of detention without trial. The bill completely excludes the jurisdiction of the courts.

The State President is correct when he says that peace, freedom and democracy cannot exist without law. The rule of law is fundamental to the maintenance of good order. Disorder has grown in South Africa as laws have destroyed law. If we want law to be the foundation of South African society in the future, we had better begin to recreate it now. There is no time to be lost and words about justice and the protection of individual freedom by the courts mean nothing whatsoever to those who have never experienced that protection.

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CSO: 3400/429

POSSIBILITIES OF PROPOSED NATIONAL STATUTORY COUNCIL WEICHERD

Cape Town **LEADERSHIP in English** Vol 5 No 3 1986 pp 43, 44, 46

[Article by David Welsh]

[Text]

Over the past 18 months the era of negotiation politics has often seemed tantalisingly close. Indeed, with the recent endeavours of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG), it seemed as if the real breakthrough was possible, even imminent, and that South Africans might at last have been persuaded to seek to resolve their divisions around a negotiating table, rather than continuing to tear the country apart.

In his speech to Parliament in January it seemed as if the State President had taken his courage in both hands, and was preparing to lead his country away from the abyss of disaster into what could at least have been a hopeful new departure. The speech struck a new note.

Gone was the emphasis on separation; completely banished was any reference to domination or inequality. Botha, in some respects, sounded like a born-again liberal.

Thus, he spoke of: "an undivided Republic"; "one citizenship . . . implying equal treatment and opportunities"; "the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals as well as groups"; "peace, freedom and democracy"; "equality before the law"; "human dignity, life, liberty and property must be protected, regardless of race, creed or religion"; "a democratic system of government, which must accommodate all legitimate political aspirations of all the South African communities, must be negotiated". To round it off Botha urged the abolition of "the outdated colonial system of paternalism as well as the outdated concept of apartheid".

In the same speech he promised legislation to restore citizenship to blacks who reside permanently in the Republic, but lost their South African citizenship when Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda received independence. He undertook to re-introduce freehold property rights for black communities; to introduce a

uniform identity document for all races; to change the discriminatory aspects of the immigration selection policy; and to remove the unnecessary restrictions on entrepreneurship, particularly in the informal sector. Notice was served on influx control, one of the entrenched, historic pillars of white supremacy and the single biggest source of vexation and anger for blacks.

Six months later even those who are professional straw-clutchers and had had their hopes buoyed by Botha's sentiments are wondering just what went wrong. With the apparent failure of the EPG, the run-up to Soweto Day on June 16 and the declaration of a state of emergency, SA tragically, seems as far from an accommodation as it ever was.

Government spokesmen, including the State President, have spoken in tough terms, which imply very strongly that they have no intention of negotiating with the African National Congress ("we have no intention of handing over power to a bunch of Marxists," said P. W. Botha) and no intention of yielding to Western demands for more rapid change. It seems that the government has assessed the likelihood of more comprehensive sanctions being imposed, and believes that a siege economy can be rendered tolerable.

A critical factor inside the National Party and in the wider circles of the Afrikaner community has been the perception that the government has lost its way and is unable to contain the violence. There was talk of the "headless chicken syndrome", a wounding taunt. The apparent incapacities of the government damaged it among the parties of the ultra-right, who have persistently bayed for even tougher action; and it seemed also to heighten beliefs in the more radical movements of the left that the government was on the run, and that a few more heaves would topple it. Such beliefs are clearly

illusory: the fundamental core of State power is formidably strong and has barely been extended even by the endemic violence of the past 20 months.

No government can afford to be perceived as weakening or incapable of managing crises. That is why the government has decided to crack the whip and try not only to overcome the violence but also to neutralize the ANC and what it believes to be its internal surrogate, the United Democratic Front. It believes that at all costs it has to demonstrate that it has not lost its capacity for tough, decisive action.

Where does this leave the other crucial component of Botha's reform programme, namely, "the involvement of black communities in decision-making", to quote him? Ministers have given assurances that reform will continue, despite conditions in the country and the likelihood of tightening sanctions. Everything suggests, however, that reform will be on the government's own terms and that it will negotiate the key political changes only with those black leaders whom it deems acceptable.

In May the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning published the National Council Bill, and invited individuals, organisations or interest groups to submit comments to it before June 30, 1986. Clearly, the government wishes to be seen to be a potentially willing negotiating partner, and not the high-handed imposer of fiat.

The bill proposes to establish a National Council to "provide for participation in the planning and preparation of a new constitutional dispensation; the granting to black South Africans of a voice in the processes of government, in the interim period; and the furtherance of sound relations among, and the human dignity, rights and freedoms of all South Africans . . ."

The intention appears to be that some black leaders (probably no more than two or three) will be grafted on to the existing executive as an interim measure, while the Council itself deliberates on the longer-run constitutional questions. The Council is to consist of the State President and the following categories of persons appointed by him:

- ☐ the Chief Minister of each self-governing territory or a member of its cabinet designated by the Chief Minister;
- ☐ 10 persons selected from persons nominated by organisations, institutions and interest groups who in their opinion are "representative of black persons permanently resident in the Republic (excluding the self-governing territories," i.e. the non-independent homelands);
- ☐ not more than 10 persons who, in the opinion of the State President, "are able to make a substantial contribution to the furthering of the functions of the Council"; and
- ☐ any other member or members of the Cabinet who the State President may wish to appoint.

There are provisions enabling the State President to act should the bodies referred to in the second condition fail to nominate persons or nominate an insufficient number; and he is empowered to remove from the Council any one of their nominees should the body which nominated him request this. Members under category four can be removed at any time by the State President if he believes that there are sufficient grounds for doing so. The Bill gives the Council the function of considering all matters, including existing and proposed legislation and steps taken or proposed by the government which it considers to be "of national interest". It can also make recommendations to the government on any matter which it has considered.

The significance of the proposed Council must be considerable, in the government's mind at any rate, because the Bill provides that in the normal course of events the State President will be the chairman.

The Bill gives no indication of the envisaged *modus operandi* of the Council, but it is reasonably safe to assume that the idea is that it will reach its conclusions on the basis of consensus, as was hoped for in the working of the tri-cameral Parliament. In any case, the Council has no real powers: it is a purely deliberative and advisory body.

The first important question to ask, assuming (which, of course, one cannot) that the Bill is enacted in more or less its existing form, is: which black bodies will come forward and submit nominations, and how representative will they be?

Informal speculation has it that in the government's thinking the big catch is Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the Chief Minister of KwaZulu. He, of course, may be a member *ex officio* by virtue of his status, but this is no guarantee that he will actually be prepared to serve. Buthelezi has been quoted as saying that without the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela the Council would not get off the ground. Similarly, the articulate and capable Chief Minister of KaNgwane, Enos Mabuza, has expressed misgivings along the same lines. Neither, however, has flatly and finally rejected the proposed Council.

Representatives of urban black communities pose even greater problems. Predictably, the more radical black organisations have rejected the Council out of hand as a "sham". Their hostility makes it difficult for any but the most pliable bodies to offer co-operation. The fate of so many blacks who served in local authorities is a grim reminder of what may lie in store for those who are perceived (however unjustly) as "sell-outs".

Black suspicions about the Council should not necessarily be dismissed as merely mindless opposition. There is an unfortunate history of what have been called "talk shops" or "toy telephones", the derisory names given to previous advisory, but powerless bodies on which blacks were invited to serve. The most prominent

of these was the Natives' Representative Council, which was established in 1936 at the same time as legislation was enacted to remove from Cape blacks the right to vote on the common voters' roll.

That common roll vote was probably the most dearly cherished black right, and its abolition caused a great deal of anger. The Natives' Representatives Council, a partially elected and partially nominated body, was intended as a *quid pro quo* for the loss of the franchise, as well as a sounding board whereby the government could gauge black opinion. It could comment on proposed legislation, it could consider the budget in so far as it affected spending on black affairs, but it had no real powers. All it could do was to make representations and offer advice to the government.

In the light of today's circumstances it is extraordinary to recall that many of South Africa's most distinguished and capable blacks were prepared to serve on the Council, in spite of their bitter opposition to the abolition of the Cape vote. Even leading members of the ANC tried to use the Council as a vehicle of change, but within less than a decade they, moderates though they were, despaired and adjourned in frustration at the government's failure to listen to what they were saying. (The Natives' Representative Council was finally abolished in 1951, after having been dormant for several years.)

Many Blacks, indeed a substantial majority, would prefer a negotiated accommodation to the escalation and protraction of violence (which, apart from its devastation, would by no means inevitably lead to a "successful" seizure of power). The problem is that they have yet to be convinced of the government's *bona fides* that they are not about to be inveigled into yet another powerless and useless body or, even worse, a body that contributes to the self-enforcement of the legislation and structures that oppress them.

For the government this is more than a problem of public relations or communication. Majority black opinion simply does not find credible the claim that apartheid is dead.

Ordinary citizens are not privy to the processes that generated the National Council Bill; they do not know whether the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning has some master plan up its sleeve for South Africa's constitutional salvation. They see, instead, a Bill (admittedly gazetted for public comment) which bears all the hallmarks of a scheme cooked up in the inner recesses of government, and published more for information than with any real expectation that its provisions will be fundamentally altered in the light of representations.

Perhaps this comment is unfair and untrue; perhaps the government does have a genuinely open-ended approach to future constitution-making; and perhaps there are, waiting in the wings, black leaders with

authentic roots of legitimacy in their communities who are prepared to come forward and serve on the Council.

All of this may be so, and it may be the case that the Council will not necessarily be the only forum for negotiating – Chris Heunis, the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, has been quoted as saying that talks with the ANC could be pursued simultaneously on other levels, provided that it renounces violence as a political strategy.

This raises the fundamental question of South African politics: is any viable constitutional planning, indeed any negotiated accommodation, conceivable without the ANC as a party? Those observers who closely watch black politics have little doubt about the influence of the ANC. Even cautious analysts have suggested that support for the ANC in an open election would exceed the already substantial support reported by survey data and might go as high as 70% of the black population.

This figure may astound those many South Africans who have been falsely reassured by the blandly anodyne words of various government spokesmen and other propaganda organs. Rare indeed is the ruling group with the ability accurately to gauge the strength and durability of its opponents: even rarer is the ruling group whose leaders have the courage and statesmanship to tell their constituencies these unpalatable truths. Let them rather subsist on misleading booklets (like the recent one on the ANC) and misplaced optimism as the more common response.

I do not approve of all the ANC says and does; I like even less its ties with the South African Communist Party, arguably one of the most Stalinist of all communist parties; but I recognize that for millions of blacks the ANC is as authentic a vehicle of their national and symbolic aspirations, as historically the National Party was for the majority of Afrikaners.

No-one can talk glibly about how negotiations that included the ANC could be initiated, undoubtedly there would be monumental difficulties; but if what is at stake is the devastation of the country and the death of millions of people, then there is an obligation, to try to circumvent those difficulties. It is unfortunate for South Africa that it declined in the end to use the good offices of the EPG. This was potentially a golden opportunity to bring about a cessation of violence and at least to initiate a process of talks with the ANC and to explore whether any common ground exists. It may not; and that might prove a tragedy for all of us.

This wider context makes the projected National Council seem a rather piddling affair. As its draft provisions currently stand it seems inherently incapable of providing a forum in which a bargain for a durable constitutional accommodation could be struck. Yet, it would be unfortunate to dismiss it out of hand as being of no consequence or to view it simply as another time-buying (and hence stalling) device. Its publication bespeaks a commitment to bring blacks into the central government and to do so by a process of negotiation. Reality has an uncanny way of catching up with rhetoric. That is admittedly a slender straw to clutch at: but in the meantime it's all we've got.

ABILITY TO COPE WITH GUERRILLA, CONVENTIONAL WAR ASSESSED

Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Vol 5 No 3, 1986, pp 24, 26, 28

[Article by Professor Mike Hough, director of the Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria]

[Text]

The effectiveness of a state's military forces or capabilities depends on their size, composition, equipment, logistical reach and availability for new applications. Related to the size, equipment and reach of a state's military forces is its military potential, that is its ability to increase these forces in a crisis or in war, and its willingness to employ these forces in disputes.

Three broad categories determine a state's military potential: economic and technological capacity; administrative skill; and the political foundations of military power. Foreign inputs are, of course, also an important factor.

Military potential is therefore a comprehensive concept, and not as limited as the concept of war potential, which primarily concerns economic resources available for mobilization in time of war.

Threat perception and the relative military potential of hostile neighbours and other adversaries, are factors that will obviously also determine the state of a nation's military preparedness.

How the South African government perceives any threat to its sovereignty can be seen in the 1986 White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply which divides the source of hostility into external and internal situations. Externally, the threat is seen to be directed and co-ordinated by the Soviet Union as chief planner and initiator in such a way as to further Soviet interests in Southern Africa.

The Soviet supply of sophisticated arms such as MiG-23 aircraft, MI-25 attack helicopters, T-62 tanks, radar systems and surface-to-air missiles, especially to Angola, is perceived to ensure the dependence of the recipient countries on the Soviet Union and creates a "protective" umbrella which allows SWAPO and the ANC more freedom of movement.

Direct Soviet troop involvement in Angola (although still on a very limited scale) and the 40 000-odd troops from surrogate countries, are also perceived by South Africa as a disturbing development, especially in view of the MPLA conventional offensive against UNITA.

As far as the African states themselves are concerned, increased activities against SA still remains a common objective, but due to internal conflict, deteriorating economic conditions and leadership conflicts in these countries, the threat emanating from them only gains substance if accompanied by the large-scale involvement of the Soviet Union and its satellites.

Internally, the current unrest situation in SA, and especially the role of the ANC, the SACP and the UDF in promoting unrest, revolution and terrorism, is identified as the main threat.

Considering the South African threat perception as well as developments such as a global war into which Southern Africa could be drawn, there are some possibilities for a conventional threat against SA.

For instance, were SA convulsed by civil war, it could lead to a combined Soviet-proxy conventional offensive against the country, thus dividing SA's defence between internal and external protection. The ANC revolutionary model developed during the Sixties, was seen to eventually culminate in conventional war.

From a strategic point of view, the fact that the sophisticated SA economy would provide a vulnerable target; the fact that white manpower sources could become over-stretched as the ANC campaign develops; and the vast size of the country which is seen to favour ANC military activity, was stressed. At this stage the transition from "guerrilla warfare" to eventual "mobile warfare" was also envisaged.

This model, culminating in conventional warfare, was

elaborated on in the early Eighties. It would comprise a stage of guerrilla warfare, of equilibrium, and of "general offensive". During the first stage, "hit-and-run" tactics and "armed propaganda" would play an important role, while a "reduction" of "enemy" personnel and material, *inter alia* by means of a sabotage campaign, would complement "armed propaganda".

During the equilibrium stage, guerrilla warfare evolves into mobile warfare where bigger "guerrilla units", armed with advanced weapons are formed, while "lightning attacks" against the "enemy" are to be launched.

The last stage, that of the general offensive, is supposed to see the transition of mobile warfare into positional warfare. At this stage it is envisaged that SA will be internationally isolated; the economy exhausted; and the security forces demoralised. "Liberated zones" will then be established in the rural areas and the cities will be encircled.

Although a warning is issued that the "forces of reaction" may at this point come to the SA government's assistance and that ANC gains will have to be "defended", external military intervention on behalf of the ANC is not mentioned. However, during the Rivonia trial of 1963/1964, it became clear that the ANC envisaged direct external military assistance at this stage.

In the Eighties, especially, it has been stressed that the ANC military campaign should not be waged by "professional" guerrilla units, but that the main force should be the "political army" of the masses supported by organized *Umkhonto We Sizwe* units which would handle "hard" military targets. A "protracted" campaign would provide time to "arm" the masses politically and militarily.

Simultaneously, the role of workers and trade unions in "bringing the economy to a halt", is emphasized, as well as the need for the creation of white "anti-apartheid" movements. These movements should vigorously oppose compulsory military service, and protest against the war in Namibia. This is seen as "part of the struggle for the armed forces" which is believed to be crucial in SA.

The necessity of civil war in this model (the insurrectionary overthrow of the state) is emphasized, as well as direct damage to SA's economic infrastructure.

Current unrest in SA is viewed as being important in the process of creating a "people's army". The ANC should therefore "march in the vanguard of semi-spontaneous mass upsurges" and help them to form "revolutionary organs of self-government". The arming of the masses at this stage would imply the concept of "part-time guerrillas" receiving "weekend" training, also in SA.

Although talk of an Iranian-style "take-over" and a "popular uprising" surfaced in the wake of the emphasis on the people's war model and the current cycle of unrest in the country, it seems to be supplementary

to, and not an alternative to, the conventional war model. The people's war model, however, seems to put more emphasis on paralyzing the economy and on undermining the security forces, than is the case with the conventional war model.

SWAPO has a "conventional brigade", but at times the movement seems to argue that SA will withdraw from Namibia as a result of external and internal pressures, thereby eliminating the necessity for a final conventional phase in its military campaign. And although SWAPO has supported the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 for a negotiated settlement in Namibia on the one hand, it has also made it clear that the "armed struggle" plays an important role in its campaign.

Against this background, the ANC and SWAPO would pose only a limited threat to the South African Defence Force (SADF). If they concentrate prematurely for a conventional war it would be a completely one-sided conflict. Civil war in SA could provide certain favourable circumstances for the ANC, but the movement would still be no match for the SADF. There is no sign of demoralisation of the Security Forces either. Only massive outside intervention on behalf of the ANC could conceivably tilt the balance, and Western reaction to Soviet intervention in such a situation would have to be taken into account, even though there is, at this stage, no guarantee of direct Western military counter-intervention.

During 1965, it was calculated in a US-based study, that a successful direct invasion of South Africa would require at least 90 000 highly trained men with the most modern armaments, 700 aircraft and 100 ships and transports. The cost of each month of operations would be about \$95m, and casualties on the attacking side would run from 19 000 to 38 000 killed and wounded. Since this calculation was made, the vast increase in SA's military potential would obviously greatly increase the size and cost of such an invasion.

In this context, the Soviet supply of arms to neighbouring states has also been perceived by SA as a form of "stockpiling", disturbing the military balance in Southern Africa, and creating a situation which the Soviet Union could exploit, should it decide on direct action against SA.

As far as counter-insurgency against smaller groups of ANC insurgents is concerned, it is also clear that the SADF has a well-balanced capability, although SA's long borders do create certain problems.

To some extent, SA is involved in a mini-arms race with the Soviet Union in a regional context. Although there are limits to what the Soviet Union may be willing to supply to Angola, for instance, SA does have technological, financial and also manpower constraints adversely affecting the country's capability to maintain a credible deterrent. In this sense, SA has to rely increasingly on

war potential, (that is a superior ability to actually wage war if necessary) rather than on quantitative military potential, (the numerical balance of forces and types of weapon systems). In future this may not be entirely dissimilar to Israel's position.

The limitation on SA's freedom of action to carry out cross-border operations, and the possibility of increased losses of military equipment and manpower during such operations, is an important component of the conventional threat against the country. So far, world opinion rather than the military capabilities of neighbouring states has played a role in deterring SA from cross-border operations.

Recently, the OAU Defence Commission met in Harare for its 9th ordinary session where problems in creating a Pan African Peace Keeping force and the "destabilisation" of "Frontline" states by SA, were discussed. A combination of surprise, quick withdrawal and avoidance of direct large-scale conflict with the defence forces of neighbouring states during cross-border operations, has however still given SA a clear edge. Direct and large-scale clashes with MPLA and Cuban troops, should SA act in defence of UNITA, do entail some risk of escalation.

Finally, although SA has officially adopted a policy of "qualified neutrality", an East-West conflict of global dimensions could make it difficult for SA to remain uninvolved, given the strategic importance of the Southern African region.

According to *The Military Balance 1985-86*, published by the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, quantitative SA military strength in 1985 was:

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 106 400 (64 000 conscripts).

Terms of service: 24 months. Reservists: eight camps totalling up to 240 days, then commitment to age 65.

Reserves: 317 000. Army 140 000; Navy 2 000; Air 25 000. After National Service, active reservists serve in the Citizen Force for 12 years, in which they spend 720 days in uniform. They then serve five years in the Citizen Force Reserve (150 000) and may be allocated to the Commando Force, where they serve 12 days a year up to age 55.

ARMY: 76 400. Regulars: 18 400 (12 000 white, 5 400 black and Coloured, 1 000 women). National Service: 58 000. Part-time Citizen Force and Commando.

11 territorial commands.

2 div HQ (1 armcd, 1 mech inf bns).†

1 armcd bde (2 tk, 1 mech inf bns).†

1 mech bde (1 armcd car, 2 mot inf bns).†

3 mot bdes (each 3 inf bns, 1 armcd car bn).†

1 para bde (3 para bns).†

1 special recce regt.

9 fd, 3 med, 6 lt AA arty regts.†

1 AA missile regt (3 *Crotale*, 3 *Tigercat* brs).

15 fd engr sqns.†

3 sigs regts, 3 sigs sqns.

Tks: some 250 *Centurion/Olifiant*. **AFV:** *recce:* 1,600 *F/land* (90mm

gun, 60mm mor); **MICV:** 1,500 *Ratel* (20mm/60mm/90mm gun);

APC: 1,500 incl *Buffalo*, *Hippo*, *Rhino*, *Lynx* (wheeled). **Arty:** how:

30 25-pdr (88mm), 75 5.5-in. (140mm), 40 G-5 towed, (?10) G-6 SP.

15mm, 20 *Valkiri* 127mm SP; **mor:** 81mm, 120 120mm. **ATK:** RCL:

84mm, 106mm; **guns:** 6-pdr (57mm), 17-pdr (76mm), M-67 90mm; **ATGW:** SS-11, 120 *ENTAC*. **AD:** **guns:** 20mm, 55 K-63 twin 35mm, 25 L/70 40mm, 15 3.7-in. (94mm); **SAM:** 20 *Cactus* (*Crotale*), 54 *Tigercat*.

NAVY: 9 000, incl 900 marines, 4 000 conscripts.

Bases: Simonstown, Durban.

Subs: 3 *Daphne*.

Frigates: 1 *President* (Br Type-12) ASW with 1 *Wasp* hel (trg).

FAC(G): 9 *MOD* (*Minister of Defence*) (*Reshef* (Saar-4)-type) with 6 *Skorpion* (Gabriel-type) SSM.

Patrol craft: 4 Br *Ford*, 4 mod *Ton*, 1 other large; 30 *Namacurra* armed harbour.

MCMV: 6: 3 Br *Ton* minesweepers, 3 *Ton* minehunters.

1 fleet replenishment ship (with hel deck; 2 hel).

1 ocean (2 hel), 1 inshore hydrographic ships.

(On order: 3 *MOD*, 3 *Duora*-type FAC(G).)

MARINES: (900; 600 conscripts); 9 local harbour defence units.

AIR FORCE: 13 000 (2 000 conscripts); 356 combat ac (incl 93 with Citizen Force), some 16 armed hel.

3 Territorial Area Commands: Trg, Tactical Spt, Logistics Commands.

Bbns: 2 sqns: 1 with 5 *Canberra* B(I)12⁺, 3 T-4; 1 with 6 *Buccaneer* S-50.

FGA: 4 sqns with 20 *Mirage* F-1AZ, 82 MB-326M/K *Impala* I/II.

Interceptor/FGA/recce: 2 sqns: 1 AD with 20 *Mirage* IICZ/EZ; 1 with 12 F-1CZ; 1 ft with 6 RZ/RZZ.

Hel: 7 sqns with 12 *Super Frelon*, 50 *Puma*, 80 *Alouette* III.

Tpt: 3 sqns: 1 with 7 C-130B, 9 Transall C-160Z; 1 with 4 HS-125 *Mercurius*, 1 *Viscount* 781; 1 with 12 C-47.

Liaison: 3 sqns with 15 AM-3C *Bosbok*, 25 C-4M *Kudu*, 20 Cessna 185.

Recce/MR: 2 sqns: 1 with some 8 C-47; 1 with 12 Piaggio P-166S-DL3MAR *Albatross*. Some C-130 have a MR role.

Trg: 1 sqn with C-47 and *Albatross*.

Attack/trg: 1 sqn with 24 *Impala* I/II.

ASW: 1 hel sqn with 10 *Wasp* HAS-1, 6 *Alouette* III.

Training Command (incl OCU):

6 schools: ac: 80 T-6G *Harvard* II/III, 40 *Impala* I/II, 25 *Mirage* III (some 10 EZ, some RZZ, some 10 D2Z), 12 C-47; hel: 30 *Alouette* II/III.

Reserves: 93 *Impala* COIN ac 15 L-100 (*Hercules*; civil freight ac).

AAM: R-530, R-550 *Magic*, *Sidewinder*, *Kukri* V-3 (*Sidewinder*-type).

ASM: AS-20/30.

(On order: 4 Pateravia: 3 *Spartacus* (liaison/tpt), 1 *Observer* (patrol) ac.)

Medical Corps: 8,000.

Source: IISS, London, *The Military Balance 1985 - 1986*. Reproduced with permission.

Compared to SA's total regular armed forces of 106 400 the "Frontline" states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania) have a total of 166 850 men. Both these figures exclude reserves and although Angola and Tanzania have 50 000

† Cadre formations completing the 2 divs when brought to full strength on mobilization of Citizen Force.

reserves each, only SA has a well-organized reserve capability of 317 000 men. In Angola especially, the Cuban and other surrogate forces must also be taken into account.

As far as arms are concerned, SA has 356 combat aircraft as against the 290 of the "Frontline" states, and 250 main battle tanks as against the 871 of the "Frontline" states. When making comparisons, it is also important to remember that different types of aircraft and tanks have different capabilities under different cir-

cumstances. Also, the serviceability of some weapon systems in some African states is uncertain.

In pure quantitative terms, the combined "Frontline" military strength, especially if surrogate forces are included, outweighs that of SA in a number of respects. Moreover, SA does not have the access to equipment and replacements that the "Frontline" states have, (although it is seemingly only in Angola that the Soviets have been willing to supply large quantities of more sophisticated equipment), and is largely dependent on producing its own requirements. Ingenuity has compensated for obsolescence and insufficient quantities, but problem areas do exist.

But it is in the qualitative sphere, the economic, technological, administrative, and strategic foundations of military power, that SA has formidable military potential. It is not a colonial situation, and the issue at stake is of vital importance to SA. Manpower and equipment may be stretched in a war of long duration, but such a conflict will also have a devastating effect on the much more fragile economies of the "Frontline" states, many of which are, at least economically, dependent on SA. In addition, logistical problems, the problem of integrating varied forces within the "Frontline grouping", and internal conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, make it unlikely that SA will face a conventional threat from these quarters if massive and direct Soviet involvement is excluded. Speculation about a SA nuclear capability is also a deterrent, even though the country's possession of nuclear arms has not been verified and it is not presently SA's intention to become a nuclear power.

Internal stability and the maintenance of a well-balanced conventional military deterrent, probably remain SA's best investment in avoiding conventional conflict. It is probably only an increase in internal instability that will, at this stage, increase the possibility of external intervention. Even then, any invading power will still face a formidable opponent, raising the cost of invasion to a point where only the overriding importance of the issue at stake, and extensive international freedom of action, could possibly justify the action.

It is also clear that in unrest and revolutionary situations, it is largely the contribution of non-military efforts, the political and socio-economic dimensions, that will ultimately determine stability and contribute towards overall strength and legitimacy. Military strength is only one component of national power, and not a panacea for all problems.

/9274
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SADF SHORT SERVICE SYSTEM TERMED HELPFUL TO ECONOMY

Pretoria PARATUS in English Aug 86 pp 52, 53, 55

[Article by Helmoed-Romer Heitman]

[Text]

WE are gradually beginning to realise that South Africa is in fact not a First World country but rather a Third World country which has a small but powerful First World component. Once we have fully accepted this reality, we will be able to tailor our economic and development policies to best harness the First World sector of the economy to draw the rest of the country towards it. The alternative will be that the larger Third World sector will pull the First World sector down towards it instead.

Once we have found our way to this acceptance, we can also accept that the SADF can play an important and valuable role in building the economy and, indeed, the nation. While the SADF is already involved in various civic action projects and programmes, we can go much further in utilising the SADF towards addressing some of the very basic problems besetting our development.

Two typical Third World problems which are particularly acute at present, are unemployment — including underemployment — and a serious shortage of skilled and semi-skilled people. While the present high level of unemployment is in large measure due to the slump in the economy, the shortage of skilled people has always meant that a large proportion of our potentially economically active population was un- or underemployed for want of sufficient people able and willing to initiate something which would generate employment.

The answer to this problem does not lie with the large corporations but in the initiation and growth of small and even very small business enterprises. It is these small businesses of all types which can absorb unskilled and semi-skilled persons effectively and efficiently and which can show the highest growth rates. It is unfortunately also these small businesses whose formation is restricted by the lack of skilled people. This aspect is already being addressed in various ways. Examples include the Small Business Development Corporation and the present training schemes for the unemployed.

SADF POTENTIAL — A SHORT SERVICE SCHEME

THE SADF COULD PLAY A VALUABLE ROLE in this area while simultaneously enhancing our defence preparedness. The means to this end would be a system of "short service" in the SADF coupled with vocational training. This approach has been used successfully in a number of countries with similar, albeit often far more acute, problems.

The basic workings of such a scheme would combine providing a turbulence-free pool of personnel for the SADF with uplifting the economic potential of the personnel concerned.

Service Period

A SYSTEM OF THIS NATURE MIGHT, for instance, see personnel taken into the SADF for a basic service period of five years, after which they could be offered extended service or be honourably discharged to enter the economy. The basic service period could be allotted as follows:

- First Year — Military training coupled with basic literacy and numeracy training as required.
- Second Year — Full-time military service;
- Third Year — Full-time military service and specialist or promotion training.
- Fourth Year — Full-time military service;

- **Fifth Year** — Full-time vocational training in or near a military base while remaining on call for military service as dictated by operational considerations.

Additional time for vocational training could also be made available during the second, third and fourth years, depending on the individual member's mustering and posting, and on the nature of the training which he has requested. All members should in any event be encouraged to further their education or training throughout this period, be it by attendance at courses arranged for them or by means of correspondence courses.

Vocational Training

WHILE STUDYING FOR A MATRIC should be an available option in this programme, the emphasis should be on practical skills and trades which the graduate can apply in beginning his own business or in employment after completing his period of service. The relevant government departments and the Small Business Development Corporation could give valuable support in establishing the most viable and useful areas in which members should seek training and in the development of suitable curricula. Universities could also be of enormous assistance in carrying out basic research towards making a programme of this nature both effective and efficient. Government departments and some of the larger corporations might also be asked to predict their personnel requirements in various suitable categories four or five years hence.

Some vocational training programmes might well require time to be spent on them during the first four years of service — after completion of initial military training — the fifth year building on this work. Given the relatively low-intensity nature of the present threat, this should not present insurmountable difficulties and would allow a far wider scope of vocational training. Members wishing to enter trades for which an apprenticeship is required might, where there is an existing demand for this trade within the SADF, be employed in their future trade. Arrangements would then have to be made for this service to be credited towards their apprenticeship. Similar arrangements already apply for some artisans, although these programmes are specifically tailored to meet the SADF requirement in those trades and thus require longer service.

It is important to remember that this programme would not be aimed at producing "high tech" graduates but, rather, people with the basic skills needed in an underdeveloped community to assist that community to uplift itself. Examples could include bricklayers, plasterers, car-

penters, cabinet makers, electricians, plumbers, mechanics, sheet metal workers, tailors, cobblers, etc. etc. In some of these areas their skills might still be very basic indeed and not up to the standards demanded in the First World sector of the economy. They would, however, represent a vast improvement in the Third World sector where they are all too often not present at all. Steps would have to be taken to accommodate graduates of this programme within the systems governing various trades despite the fact that they may only have abbreviated training and not have served full apprenticeships. It is essential that the First World requirements governing entrance to some trades are not allowed to negate a programme of this nature which is, after all, aimed at the Third World sector of our economy.

Another possibility would lie in training some members specifically for posts in development work with the civil authorities. The Medical Services might thus take in recruits to train as para-medics. These would be employed as medics during their military service and would then be transferred to the Department of Health for posting as para-medics to underdeveloped areas. Some might even show such aptitude that bursaries could be arranged for their further training as nurses, medical technologists or even as doctors. Similarly, some members might be given a basic level of training in teaching so that they can pass on their particular skills within their community — one might call them "para-teachers". This could, for example, prove particularly beneficial in the case of members interested in agricultural training. It might well also prove possible to come to an arrangement with teacher training colleges to provide initial teacher training as a part of this programme. These students would then attend a teacher training college for, say, a further two years before graduating.

Post-Service Support

ON COMPLETION OF THEIR FIVE YEARS SERVICE, personnel could be given a cash gratuity and assistance in finding employment or starting out on their own in, for instance, small-scale farming or beginning a small workshop or business in an area which is not well served in that particular trade. Such assistance could take the form of a long-term low interest loan, assistance in selecting the right area and in actually setting the business up. This phase of the programme would be carried out in close co-operation with or, indeed, by the relevant government departments and the Small Business Development Corporation to ensure the most efficient application and employment of the graduates. There should also be a follow-up programme to ease their way through the dangerous early stages.

Most of this phase of the programme will fall within the ambit of other government departments, the SADF should, however, form a small organisation to watch over the interests of the short service graduates. The simplest approach to this would be to suitably expand the role of the present structure for watching over veterans' affairs.

While the aim of the programme would be to provide basic skills in the under-developed sector of the economy, there is, of course, nothing to prevent graduates using their gratuity to finance further training which would accommodate them to the First World sector or allow them to expand their horizons within the Third World sector. In some cases, graduates might be granted bursaries or be given other support towards this end. This aspect would have to be handled by the Department of Education, although the SADF agency tasked with watching over the interests of graduates would maintain a watching brief.

Costs

THE COSTS OF THE VOCATIONAL TRAINING could be funded from the education budget or from a development budget rather than the defence budget. Similarly, a proportion of the personnel costs of the fifth year could also quite reasonably be funded under such a heading, with the SADF perhaps only responsible for the member's salary while accommodation and related costs would be defrayed under the other heading. Any costs incurred in the course of a member's operational employment during the fifth year would naturally again accrue to the defence budget.

Economic Impact

THE APPLICATION OF A SHORT SERVICE SYSTEM to the SADF could thus bring considerable benefits for economic development. It would have the additional advantage of drawing the untrained and unemployed out of the economy and returning them to the economy five years later equipped to survive in the economy and, indeed, to generate a measure of growth themselves. This would be particularly important in the present situation of high unemployment. Another advantage at the present time would be that such a system would reduce the need to draw skilled personnel out of their economic activity at this critical time to render operational service. Both aspects would be of considerable value should sanctions be imposed.

THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

HAVING discussed some potential benefits to the economy, what would such a system offer the SADF?

The primary benefit would lie in giving the SADF a turbulence-free pool of well trained full-time soldiers. This would, in turn:

1. Provide an additional force which can be deployed without the "advance notice" involved in calling up CF and Commando members;

2. Allow the more flexible, efficient and rapid deployment of forces to deal with short-term, low-intensity or low-level threats and problems;

3. Reduce the need to call on CF and Commando members for operational duties or to provide a standing force, thereby:

- a. Allowing a higher proportion of CF and Commando service time to be devoted to training in their primary war time roles, enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of our primary fighting force;

- b. Reducing the economic disruption attaching to the employment of CF and Commando members for extended operational service and thereby reducing resistance to CF membership among the business community;

- c. Enhancing the morale of CF and Commando members by facilitating a more stable system of call-up, which will allow individual members to better plan their affairs.

A system of this nature would also provide an additional pool of highly trained and experienced reserve personnel. Their CF or Commando commitment should, however, be structured to allow them to establish themselves in their new civilian careers before they are called upon to render lengthy periods of service.

A short service system would have the additional advantage of providing a very flexible full-time component — allowing the creation and maintenance of a full-time force while it is needed, without building up a large body of career soldiers who become an economic and financial problem when force levels can be reduced. Where a force of PF personnel is difficult to reduce in size or change in composition, a short-service component would only have a five year cycle, allowing a much readier matching of training, employment and force levels to changing requirements. A short service component has the further advantage of allowing the maintenance of a full-time force without the normal financial penalties of family allowances and welfare, housing and pensions.

Finally, a short service system would tie in excellently with military civic action programmes and civil/military economic development and upliftment programmes. On the more general level, the SADF would naturally also benefit directly and indirectly from the benefits which such a system could bring to the economy.

Applying The Scheme

THE BASICS OF A SHORT SERVICE SYSTEM already exist within the SADF in several areas such as the various apprenticeship schemes and the voluntary National Service system of the SACC. It should not prove difficult to adapt some of these existing systems to allow the incorporation of a short service scheme such as has been discussed here.

The SACC would be almost ideally suited to such a programme, which could be initiated with the minimum of disruption. Having both infantry battalions, a training element and a maintenance unit, the SACC has the advantage of quite a wide skill requirement within itself in addition to already being a short service volunteer unit. All that would be needed would be to make provision for an extension of the voluntary National Service period to a short service period for those choosing that option. Members who initially opt for the two year period, could at the end of that period be allowed to extend their service to take advantage of the short service scheme's benefits.

Another unit that would seem to be an ideal application of a short service scheme and which again already has many of the characteristics of such a system, is 21 Battalion. Applying a short service scheme to 21 Bn would allow a comprehensive system to be built up incorporating the units which it feeds, many of which lie in just those areas most in need of the skills which the scheme would provide. Some members might well even spend much of their service engaged in practicing their particular skill in the course of civic action programmes, before either entering the economy or taking employment with a development body

or other government department.

While the SACC and 21 Bn offer particular advantages, a short service scheme should take in the entire SADF. The Army and the Medical Service would, however, tend to be the services most involved — the Army because of its manpower requirement, and the SAMS because of the special skills available there.

CONCLUSION

THE imaginative application of a short service system coupled to vocational training could thus bring benefits for both the economy and the SADF. It would have the further advantage of allowing the SADF to realise its very considerable potential to assist national development without the danger of becoming politicised or finding itself being sucked into politics. The economic and military benefits of such a scheme would also — directly and indirectly — have a positive impact on the political climate. Every Rand spent on funding a scheme of this nature would thus bring multiple returns.

In our present situation of economic difficulty and continued attempts by the ANC and PAC to initiate revolutionary warfare, a scheme of this nature would seem to merit serious study. It would address all three key areas: economic development in the underdeveloped Third World sector; effective and relevant assistance, support and administration by the state to that sector; and military manpower needs. The creation of a stable and positive political climate in which solutions to the ills besetting South Africa can be intelligently developed, would be rendered a little easier. At the same time, it would go a little way towards expanding the economic base essential to a healthy, advancing society.

/9274

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JOURNALIST DISCUSSES NATION'S 'SPECIAL' TIES WITH ISRAEL

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 18-21 Jul 86 p 6

[Article by Dan Sagir]

[Text]

AS an Israeli journalist who was deported from South Africa (sorry, Pretoria just did not renew my work permit ...), I am puzzled by one issue: Is my deportation proof that the relationship between white South Africa and Israel is not as good and "special" as has been argued? Or is it actually so good that I was deported because my writing from Johannesburg started to disrupt the harmony between these two countries?

Personally, I would like to think the first possibility is closer to reality. However, I am not so certain about this.

The present level of relations dates back to 1976, after the visit of Prime Minister John Vorster to Israel. In 1978 Israel raised its diplomatic representation to ambassadorial level.

Jerusalem's willingness to strengthen its relations with Pretoria came after the mass break-off of diplomatic relations by black African states in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. The feeling in Israel at the time was one of deep insult and betrayal, leading later to the warming of relations with South Africa.

However, even though Israel is now restoring its trade links with black Africa and renewing diplomatic relations with some countries, it is not seriously considering a revision of its relations with Pretoria.

South Africa's interest in having a close relationship with Israel is obvious. In the light of its increasing diplomatic isolation, it is important for the South African regime to have a close relationship with any country.

And Israel's interest? After all, Israel is vehemently opposed to apartheid.

But at the same time, it maintains "normal" relations with South Africa. The basis for this is a belief in the value of relations between countries, regardless of how much they may disagree.

This is why Israel is trying to establish contact with Soviet Russia, other communist states, and Third World countries.

But the projected image of the Israeli relationship with South Africa is different; it is being called "special".

Who coined this term? Two interested parties: Pretoria and the South African Jewish establishment — not Israel and not Israelis.

In recent months, many Israelis have been acting against the "close" relations between these two countries. There are signs: a new group called "Israelis Against Apartheid"; proposals in the Israeli parliament and declarations by government ministers opposing these relations. And there have been positive actions, such as the organisation of a seminar for black

trade union activists at the Afro-Asian Institute of the Histadrut, the umbrella body of Israeli trade unions.

Dr Naomi Chazan of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem some time ago published in "African Affairs" a critical and comprehensive analysis of the relations between these two countries.

Arguing that the present level of relations was not justified, she examined various aspects, in turn, often put forward to support the "special relationship":

- The future of the South African Jewish community: The argument is because the Jewish community in South Africa is white, its fate is linked to that of other whites in the country. Israel should take this into consideration.

Chazan believes this argument is merely an excuse for the "special relationship".

- Economic interest: Exports to South Africa amount to less than one percent of the total Israeli export market.

"The economic advantages that Israel receives from the contact with South Africa are more problematic than they are presented (as being)," she writes. "When taking into consideration the economic damage that is caused by this contact, it becomes difficult to understand the rationality of the Israeli economic interest in South Africa."

- Political interest: There are those who maintain, writes Chazan, that because Israel and South Africa are

both states under siege, with limited international options, it is natural that they form a combined political axis.

But from Israel's point of view, this axis is counter-productive. "Realpolitik" makes it necessary to continue the efforts to win back black Africa, and support the struggle against apartheid.

- Co-operation in the nuclear area: In recent years there has been much talk that Israel and South Africa have been co-operating in this field. But there has been no substantiation.

Israelis who oppose apartheid and the present level of relations between Israel and South Africa do not necessarily want a total cessation of relations between the two countries. This is neither realistic nor in Israel's interests.

The goal for many is to eliminate the stigma of a "special" relationship and to bring the relations to a level similar to that of Pretoria's relationship with the West.

In this respect, one has to mention the hypocrisy of those who attack Israeli/South African relations. Pretoria has close relations, trade and military contacts with over 100 countries. Israel features very near the bottom of the list.

I cannot see Israel changing her policy towards South Africa until the major Western powers do so.

- Dan Sagir wrote for the Israeli newspaper, "Ha'Aretz" and Israeli radio. While in South Africa, he was also researching a PhD thesis on South African politics for the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He was expelled three weeks ago.

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NEW MEMBER OF TRANSVAAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SPELLS OUT VIEWS

Durban POST NATAL in English 6-9 Aug 86 p 8

[Interview with Ismail Fakir Hassen Mayet, member of the Transvaal Executive Committee by Ameen Akhalwaya; date and place not given]

[Text]

QUESTION: Why do you think you were nominated to the Transvaal Executive Committee?

MR MAYET: I don't know why. What I do know is that I was made a special request by Mr Amichand Rajbansi (chairman of the House of Delegates Ministers' Council), saying they wanted to recommend someone with experience in this type of work, and they wanted to suggest my name.

The Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) has called on you to resign. What is your reaction?

They've said that at every election, since 1968, and that includes the SA Indian Council (SAIC). They have a right as a party to say that that's their policy of non-co-operation, non-involvement with Government-created institutions.

The only problem I have with the TIC is that it is an ethnic grouping body. It has been in existence for many years, it was dormant for a number of years and was then resuscitated.

In fact, I was the one to appeal to them to have a political body going instead of having anti-something going, which is of negative connotations.

But the TIC says it is a nonracial body with a group base.

I concede that. The same applies with me. I make use of the platforms made available to me and I can see movement in our government hierarchy.

I only hope that movement penetrates to the bottom. That to me is the biggest re-education on the go at the moment.

Re-education of the bureaucracy?

Yes. I notice this where I work.

A major criticism of nomination (to Government bodies) of people other than white is that they are not representative.

I would concede that, except how does one know what is representative? How does one know that the election of the TIC is representative? Did they go to the ballot box? Or is this the emotional thing of a meeting where someone says this is the chairman and we all say "aye"?

Even if that were true, there is a difference. The TIC is a political party, it's not a governing body. The people can accept or reject the TIC in whatever it does or says. In your case, you are not answerable to a constituency. That's correct. But I hope and pray that even though I'm not answerable in that sense to a constituency, I'd like to be told whenever and wherever I'm going wrong in my action.

But not in participation, because I want to try to get the best for the people who have been dealt a wrong all these years in the administration. I want to see that wrong righted.

You have been involved with the SAIC and other Government institutions for the past 20 years, yet we are no nearer to a political solution acceptable to the majority. What makes you think now that you are going in to help the process?

This new concept of "post-apartheid era" is going to become a fait accompli in the not too distant future. The townships that have been established under the Group Areas Act — for that matter all the other public amenities that have been established — have been more favourable to the ruling party, and that's the whites.

In the transition period, we must see to it that what we have lost out is regained — in the similarity of facilities, whether they be health service, welfare services or whatever.

You are looking more at the social and economic structures rather than the political structures. It can be argued that now that you are part of the Government, you are also part of enforcing the state of emergency and detention without trial.

People, such as TIC and Azapo leaders in Lenasia, have been locked up. Do you see yourself as part of that system, and if not, whether you could defend their detentions?

Even in the President's Council, on the aspect of the emergency and the two ("Le Grange") laws put through Parliament, I not only voted against them but I contributed to the debate by saying that if anything is wrong in your home, then only do you require a whip to try to bring discipline.

But if nothing is wrong in your home, the whip is unnecessary.

So I admit that there is something wrong not only with our administration but also with the policy of the Government.

In order to bring this to their attention, I find we must use some of the platforms that are available.

How much leverage would you as an individual have when they have rejected calls from the international community, from major black political organisations, even white organisations, such as the PFP? How are you going to make any difference? And if you don't make a difference, can you be morally justified in staying on in the Government?

I would not be morally justified if I am there for an ulterior motive, if I am there for my own personal reasons. If I am trying to impress on the public that I am Somebody. If I am, then naturally I pray to my Creator to guide me.

I am using a legal platform to bring problems to the attention of the Government, which up to now had been put there only by white.

I was guided into resigning (from the SAIC) when they did not concede on more group areas for us within the Johannesburg municipal boundary.

Because of that resignation I am satisfied that some action was taken and today our footing is still in the precincts of the Johannesburg central area.

Yet the Group Areas Act is intact?

That's correct.

It may have been eased to some extent for so-called coloureds and Indians, but for Africans, where the major problem is, there is no such concession.

Sure, but I believe that when we ask for this we are not asking just for one section alone. We ask for all people.

Even though the CBD, which is open to all and which is of course a sort of a local option thing, is not working correctly because the Group Areas Act was formulated as a policy of the central government.

I believe that it should be for the central government to say to local authorities: "Look, now you open up your central businesses to all members of the society."

This is one of the delays in not getting these things done.

In your dealing with the Government over the past 22 years, have you noticed any changes in its approach or policy, from Mr Vorster to Mr Botha?

My feeling is that white politics is controlled by one section of the white community, which is the Afrikaner community, because they are the ruling party. The pity is that the other groups in the white community have taken advantage of the benefits they have received and made the excuse that it is the Afrikaner who is doing this, we are the goodie-goodie people.

I am inclined to believe that they did have the opportunity at the polls to show to the Government that it is doing wrong. I believe that was not done because it suited them at that time not to do it.

As far as comparisons are concerned, I would say that if the thinking of some of the senior Cabinet members that I have come to know goes right down to the bottom bureaucracy, the administration would be in a different set up.

But what is this thinking? We heard from the Americans that there is a hidden agenda, from the British that the Government is on the right road, Rabbansi says there's lots of things going on in committees, and everybody, including yourself, seem to have confidence in the Government. Yet the public to whom it is supposed to be responsible is not taken into confidence. Just what is its bottom line?

You must realise that the constituencies of the white MPs have had elections for many many years. There is a lot of division within the Afrikaner community particularly who have divided themselves politically.

There are family members who have gone to the left of the present Nationalist policy, who are more liberal, there are members who are the present NP. You have people of the Dr Treurnicht group, and of course Jaap Marais's group. That is the set up in one word.

And it is with our families. Some of my family members are office bearers and very active members of the TIC. And I say they have a right to be there. Certain members of my family are in another group.

So the point is that with this free thinking — which is a good thing — I am inclined to believe that the Government is extremely cautious in not expressing itself so openly and open-heartedly in order not to lose the swell support of the constituency it is supposed to represent.

I think it doesn't wish to find itself in the position where the feeling of the ruling party goes more towards the right of centre instead of going from the left of centre — and the centre I am using as an example is the NP.

This is the reason I believe everything is not being opened up to the public as one should. Even at the congress of the ruling party we only hear little bits.

Some of the actions administratively are taken a bit further than for example the resolutions taken at the Bloemfontein conference of the NP. And the actions that have been taken since then have gone beyond that.

You talked earlier (on the operation of the new provincial Exco) about striving for consensus, yet Parliament has given us an example of what we've said all along: consensus is only acceptable to the Nats so long as their will is reflected and that was shown in the case of the Le Grange Bills. What do you think is going to make them change their minds?

Aren't they just going through the motions in getting people other than white into the system and asking them to rubber stamp it?

I believe particularly that in the exercise that we went through in Parliament — which was a very sad episode — we might have jumped the gun for the white community and they wanted to show their strength, otherwise they would go on to the Right side.

I'm inclined to believe that in the not too distant future the decisions will be joint decisions.

What type of solution can there be minus the acknowledged popular people's organisations, such as the ANC, PAC and their leaders? What would your view be of their

being unbanned or continuing to be banned?

It is no secret, I have even said this in the President's Council: Nelson Mandela should not only be released unconditionally but he should be given the opportunity to get his constituency going because he has been away from the constituency for very many years.

Incidentally, I don't know if you are aware that the fees for the last year of his studies at the University of the Witwatersrand were paid by me.

I made him the secretary of the international Club in Kort Street. We were aware of his ability even then when he was completing his studies.

Without condoning violence, the argument is that the Government itself is perpetrating violence in enforcing the system, or if not violence at least coercion. So what justification does the Government have in asking only others to renounce violence? Wouldn't you be party to such a violent or coercive government?

If my view is the same as the Cabinet with the NP ruling presently, then your question would be correct. But I abhor violence.

I say it with my Creator's guidance, and they know where I stand. I do not say it because I fear violence. I have received lots of anonymous threats.

From people on the left?

I do not know who they are, but I still go around without carrying any weapon or without carrying a pin because I believe in Him.

If I've hurt anybody's feelings, I say: My door is open. Please, whoever you are, I stay here. Why don't you come and speak to me?

I don't mind — and I'd appreciate it particularly if people like you who are journalists, who have the pulse of the people with you, would also bring to my attention and to the attention of the province or the Government points that are hurting the people.

Each has his own strategy. My ultimate goal is to obtain a just and equitable dispensation for all South Africans.

MILLENARIAN THEOLOGY SEEN INFLAMING BLACK, WHITE RADICALISM

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (BILDER UND ZEITEN supplement) in German 14 Jun 86 [unnumbered]

[Article by Andreas Graf Razumovsky: "The New Middle Ages in South Africa: Black Children's Crusades, Mass Hysteria, Violence and the Longing for Paradise on Earth"]

[Text] Early in this century many intellectuals, especially the Russians around Berdjajev, were already talking enthusiastically about the "New Middle Ages." By this they understood two interlocking ideas in a mostly positive way: the return of religion and the end of enlightenment. If the latter is supposed to mean the end of reason, the elimination of reasonable minds from decision-making bodies, then the prophets of the new darkness have predicted correctly that dervishes, ayatollahs and wandering preachers would reach ever increasing influence and would cause ever greater harm. All this applies particularly to the Third World. A good example is South Africa, which sometimes is seen as a mixture of first and third worlds. After the most recent, terrible developments, one can say that all three of such "world categories" are present in a tightly intertwined pattern. With the socialist revolution and its radical demands at the doorstep, many participants and observers are convinced of the dawning of the Second World.

When I use the image of the "New Middle Ages" to explain this development, I do so mainly to use European categories to depict events which, in Africa and in quite a few other places, seem strange only at first glance. Political scientists are already talking of the "Cargo Cult" when they describe the frantic gathering of children and adolescents in the townships of South Africa, where they defy the apartheid state by throwing stones, singing, marauding, screeching, dancing, burning and killing beyond all appeal to reason until the day their Messiah, Nelson Mandela--the leader of the ANC and prisoner of the whites--appears. (They are opposed, as we will later see, by increasingly blood-thirsty, conservative Boer organizations.)

This development of the last years and months seems on the verge of successfully jeopardizing every reform by the apartheid state; it is also part of the tradition of all slave rebellions in history and is based on the revolutionary experiences of Europe, Asia and, for example, Russia. The agitators of the South African revolution proceed with the same logic as those of the

Narodnaja Wolja in 19th-century Russia ("Not reform, but revolution!"--this is why reformers like Alexander II had to be done away with). The masses, the malleable material shaped by the agitators follow a much older pattern, however, a pattern which conforms to the cultural genes of homo sapiens, the prehistoric ancestor of us all. In South Africa though, we often meet a characteristically African variation. To us this variation may seem medieval when we compare it with the erratic sequence of messianic revolutionaries, eschatological "millenarians" and European anarchists between the 11th and 17th centuries. The phenomenon of mass paranoia with its roots in ignorance, fear and religious-mystical seduction has been with us from the beginning of history. The historian Norman Cohn, who is one of the most knowledgeable persons about these phenomena, concludes his research with a look at the present, doubtlessly with reference to a specific type of millenarian. He says, "the old religious idiom has been replaced by a secular one that has the effect of obscuring what otherwise could not be overlooked. It is simply true that revolutionary millenarianism and mystical anarchism are still with us, although it is now devoid of its original supernatural sanctions."

Bloody Retribution

The Brockhaus Encyclopedia defines millenarianism somewhat narrowly as "the belief in the coming of a realm which is to last a thousand years" and it refers specifically to the Apostles. Messianism has been its basis for thousands of years. This tradition of mass hysteria had fallen on fertile soil in Africa a long time ago, even before its roundabout acquaintance with "secularized approval." The "spiritual hunger," "the religious yearning for healing, holiness, prophecy and vision," as the Nigerian theologian Appiah-Kubi has defined it, is a characteristic of all Africans and has found fulfillment in Christian teaching only through the developments in "black theology."

Among the first women prophets was Kimpa Vita, a girl from the Kongo who in 1700 had led a protest movement against the Catholic church. Inspired by God and ancestral spirits, she taught what white missionaries had deceptively concealed, namely that God and all his Apostles are African. "God identifies himself with all Africans and takes their side in all their misery against their white exploiters. Consequently, she prophesied that Christ would reconstitute the ancient Congolese kingdom and create an earthly paradise that would last a thousand years...."

The Zulu prophets of the late 19th and early 20th centuries had evolved from similar Christian, eschatological-revolutionary and traditionally African, magical patterns. They are the immediate predecessors of the "black theologians" of today. The Swedish ethnologist Bengt Sundker observed that "most Zulu prophets are revered as demi-gods by their followers. The prophet becomes a black Christ and this becomes the foundation for his tremendous influence over his adherents." Hundreds of prophets existed then, just as there are now hundreds of sects in Soweto alone.

The most famous of these prophets was Isajah Shembe (1870-1935). He secretly announced himself to his followers as the "promised one," the true "successor and vicar of Christ." What Christ had once done for the whites and their

salvation, he was now going to do for his people, the Zulus, and for their salvation. He announced he would soon stand at the gate of the Heavenly Jerusalem to turn back those who were not his followers, by which he meant all whites and all those following their churches instead of his. Norman Cohn has noted that, as far as the works and pilgrimages of this peculiar saint--to mention only one among many--are concerned, they are similar in all essential traits to those of the many messiahs in medieval Central and Western Europe. Such savior-prophets pop up in times when the masses experience a loss of order and a sense of disorientation; "not so much among the poor and exploited in particular, but rather among those poor and exploited who have lost their traditional way of life and with it their faith in traditional values." The history of mass hysteria in Europe, beginning in the 11th century, is a history of the anguish of impoverished and uprooted masses. This is when the prophets of eschatological anarchism find the opportunity to announce the millennium. As Cohn says, the conditions under which this happens are always similar and recurrent. It happens "when population increases, industrialization progresses, traditional social ties tire and eventually snap, and when the rift between rich and poor becomes an abyss." Such was the case with the first crusade in 1096, which simultaneously triggered the first wide-reaching, systematic and mass-hysteria-inspired persecution of Jews. It took place in May and June 1096 in Speyer, Worms, Mainz, Regensburg and Cologne. The death count ranged between 4,000 and 8,000. This occurrence continued with the same symptoms, reminiscent of mass murder, in other crusades and children's crusades and with the atrocities perpetrated by the "Pastoureaux" or "shepherds", eschatologically inspired hoards roaming northern France in the 13th century. ("Before long thieves, prostitutes, bandits, renegade monks and murderers joined up and from this pool leaders were recruited.") The picture remains essentially the same with the actions of heretical movements (and the way state and church rubbed them out, such as the Waldensians, Flagellants, Anabaptists, Amaraotics, Free Masons, the followers of John Ball in England and of Konrad Schmid in Thuringia (who was called "The Drummer of Niklashausen"), of Johann von Leyden in Muenster, of Thomas Muenzer, and of the Hussites in Bohemia--to bring only a few examples to mind. One can say that they and their followers have turned "this collective sense of powerlessness and anguish into an all-consuming mass impulse to destroy godlessness... and to create out of all this endless suffering the ultimate kingdom where saints huddle around the powerful, shelter-providing figure of the Messiah to enjoy well-being, wealth, security and power from now on to all eternity" (Cohn).

It is also characteristic of all these eschatological-revolutionary-anarchistic movements which have often attracted thousands and thousands of followers, that they have claimed thousands of lives, not unlike natural catastrophes, and that they have with repeated regularity been drowned in oceans of blood or suffocated by forests of smoking pyres. Death by burning, either as an act of mob law or, more commonly, as an act of lawful punishment based on the customs of the time, was for about 900 years the obvious and undisputed punishment for anyone who had become a nuisance to church and state.

The most eccentric and successful of all the saintly fools in English history is John Ball, the legendary organizer and spiritual leader of the peasant

uprising of 1381. He succeeded in uniting peasants suffering under serfdom and the exploited proletariat of London in a joint revolutionary action of spectacular atrocity. He felt a calling as king and messiah of the uprooted peasantry and the urban underworld to take on a power which consisted expressly in "killing the aristocracy and the entire clergy." Ball has been surpassed in his explosive radicalism and the murderous application of his teachings, objectives and methods only by the Hussite-Taborites who came only a few years later and shared the same anabaptist roots. They put the torch to all of Central Europe after the Defenestration of Prague in 1419 (sic).

We are specifically interested in John Ball because South Africa's most important and in the long run most influential "black" liberation theologian, Allan Boesak, discovered him to be a shining example and uses him as such in his sermons: "John Ball was truly a prophet, because the vision of the prophet is always coupled with the anguished outcry of the poor and oppressed--an outcry which moves the heart of the Lord." Boesak sees himself as a new John Ball, a prophet of the disoriented, the disenfranchised, the oppressed. He says, "people under severe stress can develop a destructive loss of self-esteem. That has been the fate of blacks. Slavery, oppression, total dependence, lack of civil rights, the status of an alien inside and outside of one's own country, humiliation and disgrace--all this has had a devastating effect on the spiritual life of blacks." Boesak concludes that South Africa's blacks will "simply refuse the kind of brotherliness extended by the white Boer masters which requires the black brother to be slave to the white brother."

The primary driving force behind our concept of the "New Middle Ages" is the kind of "black theology" which wants to be a "liberation theology." Another prominent South African fighter in a cassock is Lebamong Sebidi. His formula is shorter and says, "as long as blacks have to suffer from double serfdom in their own country, from racial oppression and from economic exploitation, black theology will also attack along those lines; it will attack racist capitalism. Racist capitalism is the sin which has to be unmasked and exterminated in God's own name." Another black pastor and theologian who is one of many agitators giving direction to South Africa's academic youth puts it even simpler. Mokgeti Mothlabi welcomes "the introduction of Marxist analysis...as a result of a dialogue with South American theologians and as the introduction of a methodological element. Depending on how widely Marxist analysis has been introduced and on how far black theological reflections have progressed, we can talk about the beginning of the second phase of theology in this country."

Revolutionary Mobs

Such words lead to the investigation of the second element in eschatological anarchism that is present in South African development, namely "revolutionary socialism," the most primitive form of popular Marxism. Its ideology doubtlessly haunts the minds of black suburban students and serves as a framework to give direction to the much-feared "comrade" committed. The undeniable fact that soviet-inspired and soviet-paid organizations propagate Marxist-Leninism leads to a stereotypical justification for everything the Pretoria government does, prevents or omits with regard to black youth. Much has been

said about this soviet-communist-revolutionary element, and the reason we are describing its influence as somewhat limited is because the waning of soviet influence in Africa is irretrievably under way and because even the ANC, as the representative of Moscow's colonial communism in this part of the country, has recently argued that it needs not stoop to a discussion of the future of South Africa with Botha's government because control over the revolutionary mobs of the townships has already been lost.

It is not surprising that the "progressive" phraseology which appeals to illiterates everywhere has left its mark on the eschatological anarchism of Alexandra, Soweto, Langa and similar places. Leadership there is tightly organized and belongs to the "comrades" or, in some places, to their leaders who keep strict discipline. Such cadres are often inspired by an enthusiastic idealism in their efforts to create and control--with the help of "salut publique" committees which consist of children and adolescents--a "new and just order of society," something that surely has been missing in the slave state until now. After a closer look, though, one realizes that they are more likely representatives of the third and much more problematic archaic-atavistic element which is beginning to scare the ayatollahs of all religions. They are turning, after a period of fanatical, anti-white agitation, to a "meditative recollection" of "the true African tradition." This is an unavoidable occurrence and enough cases prove this point. Winnie Mandela appeals to these traditions when she addresses the screeching, dancing mob of her followers with the words, "we will free this country with our match boxes and our necklaces!" The necklaces are car tires filled with gasoline; they are used to burn political victims and enemies alive--those who have collaborated with the white exploiters. Christian executors of death by fire have justified their method for nine hundred years by arguing that they at least could promise eternal life because the soul had been purified of its sins by fire. Africans in contrast burn and neutralize the "spirit" of the victim so it cannot seek revenge on its lynchers. Winnie Mandela, always the semi-ultra chic "Queen of Africa" is half avenging angel for the injustice committed against her people and half the millenarian prophetess of relentlessly approaching developments, and as such she gives free reign to her emotions (or to quote Willy Brandt, "she drops her mask"), when she says, "we (African women) are working for the whites in their kitchens, we are raising their children, why then should we not kill them too?"

The third, and in the long run most permanent, element of the eschatological anarchism of South Africa is the revival of the cases of traditional African tribal rites. This element becomes by necessity stronger and more influential as the longing for a withdrawal of white culture grows. The black population, which as a whole, fears the emerging variant of rule by the comrades even more than that of their current white masters, calls the comrades, their revolutionary committees and the adolescents who are abused for childrens' crusades "Tutu's children," a designation which bodes ill for its name-sake and Nobel Peace Prize winner. During the last 18 months, those children have, while singing and dancing, burned an incredible number of "collaborators" (according to conservative estimates between 500 and 1,000). Whatever reforms the government had planned, they all come too late for these children, a whole generation, as the psychologist T. Thomas of the University of Port Elizabeth explains. Their bodies and souls have been deprived, they have been neglected

from childhood on and also physically malnourished; thus they have grown to become "brutal, emotionally disturbed and aggressive teenagers. Because they expect hardly anything of life any more, they are ready to die for a just cause."

How far the paranoia of the Tutu children has gone has already been demonstrated by the key event of Lebowa, where all the elements of the "New Middle Ages" in their particular, mostly African variation came into focus. It happened on 9 April in the tiny neighboring villages of Pasha and Apel. Within 24 hours, 32 villagers--mostly sick, old women--were pushed into hastily dug ditches and burned alive after the ditches had been filled with tires and set aflame with gasoline. All this had taken place "in a ritual frenzy" as later described by a black reporter of a Johannesburg newspaper. The perpetrators were 180 students and children who had followed the example of their township age groups. Nobody has been able to come up with a satisfying and rational explanation for these ritual killings. But the chief responsible for this region gave an explanation which came very close to that of one of his European colleagues in 1212, the year of the Children's Crusade: "The old generation of my village has lost control. Our children have taken over and we are running scared. They have heard what goes on in the cities. Sometimes they read something about unrest and insurrection. I don't believe they know what is at stake, but they have become restless...." An old woman who had managed to escape the necklace murders said, "We get to hear such big city words like 'comrades' or 'necklaces' from our children. We don't understand them, but we are terribly afraid."

After these witch burnings of 9 April, the police of the homeland of Lebowa have arrested 200 children and other suspects. They also arrested the cousin of the chief, Peter Nchabeleng. He knew how to read and write and seemed a likely ideological agitator or even a ringleader. While he was being "interrogated," they (meaning the black policemen) simply beat him to death. This circumstance might at first cloud the picture expected by the average consumer of horror news. It does not matter whether he has the romantic "leftist" idea of a "progressive" revolution which is hindered by the counter-revolutionary, racist-fascist reaction (the conceptually related cargo cult would say it this way: the white devils prevent the bounty sent by the gods or ancestral spirit from reaching the better part of mankind, or whether he is more familiar with the phraseology of traditional African propaganda and mythology, which offers a drama no less tinged with eschatological notions (Boers are depicted as bright figures and noble fighters in league with God who incessantly win against the dark and coal-black powers of communism). The roles in the reality of our New Middle Ages (*mutatis mutandis*, supplying Third World figures), are inescapably determined. The fight caused by eschatologically-motivated mass hysteria has two arenas: the slave revolt of black against white, which is no longer interested in reform; and the defensive struggle of white against black, which sometimes takes on a panic fear of perdition and still awaits its mass victims. And there are also, no less ominously established, the side shows of fratricidal warfare: black against black and white against white.

The old bit of wisdom that the less legitimate and more arbitrary a government is, the more resemblance it bears to rule by a paranoid master applies

to the rule of the white Africaners in South Africa. Day and night, this master sees himself surrounded by enemies and behaves in an aggressive, unpredictable and stubbornly violent manner. This behavior increases by degrees as the nightmare becomes reality and as the master perceives himself to be an outcast in the eyes of the world. It is everyone's duty then to rally around the fatherland in its hour of desperate need and each action--even the most infamous--receives its justification by virtue of this state of emergency. Then everyone becomes a patriot, well-meaning, upright men and women who fight for the good against the bad, and when it is the government which incorporates all evil, the eschatological anarchism turns against the government.

The rule of the Boers in South Africa has contained qualities of messianic millenarianism from the very beginning. Ever since the battle of the "River of Blood" on 16 December 1838, the Boers have claimed to be in league with God himself, and they view themselves as executing the role of his new "chosen people." Whoever still has doubts about the true determination for reform of P W Botha's presidential era--especially after the 1983 referendum which was held specifically in order to approve and sanction coming reforms--should read the preamble to the newly amended reformed constitution. It still maintains the outrageous idea that the Lord himself handpicked the ancestors of the Boers from many different countries. He furthermore has called all of them together to bestow upon them this entire country "as their very own." In addition, he has protected them "in miraculous ways" from impending dangers (such as the black natives).

Countless observations by the great Boer prophet Paul Krueger show that he also thought in messianic-millenarian terms. His great adversary and arch-enemy Cecil Rhodes, the co-founder of the South African slave state, also thought in gigantic millenarian dimensions of historic proportions, compared with the fantasy of the architects of our Third Reich fades pitifully. When asked by his closest friend and supreme commander Jameson how long he expected "to be remembered by history," he answered modestly (and, as Jameson put it, "in no way conceitful and simply stating an historical fact"): "I would say about 4,000 years." In a recent interview, the South African police chief Theuns Swanepoel, who led the massacre of Soweto on 16 June 1976, answered the question of a reporter, who wanted to know how he would solve the present crisis, with absolute consistency by saying: "Violence can only be stopped by greater violence." He further called such weapons as tear gas, water canons, rubber pellets and bird shot, the knickknacks and toys of sentimental reformers. He continued to say, in the best Boer fashion, that these days one needs live ammunition. And the police should decide, unhindered, when to use it. "If one only would finally let the police do again as they please, then South Africa would last for a thousand years," he said.

Part of the development of the last weeks in South Africa are battles between blacks, such as in the notorious Crossroads "squatter" camp near Cape Town. "Progressive comrades" and "conservative fathers" were killing each other and burning each other's houses down. Of an estimated 60,000 inhabitants, 20,000 lost their homes. At the same time "vigilantes," black watchmen, are taking terrible revenge on the "comrades" of Alexandra. White secret societies, reminiscent of the Ku Klux Klan, sneak around townships such as Kagiso near

Kruegersdorp in the middle of the night in order to start wild shooting parties to "kill blacks." Most often the police cannot be moved to take care of these criminals and the suspicion is justified that the police force works hand in hand with the secret societies and the "vigilantes."

In the long run, though, it is the polarization between white and white which is the most dangerous. Up to now, there were only a few precursory battles, but the fanaticism involved leads to the conclusion that very soon the main battleground of the "Holy War" is here: a nevira by the Boer fundamentalists against reform. Since the vigor of reformers has decreased noticeably, since answers to all the Rubicon speeches consist of increasingly louder screams for international sanctions, since the decline of the economy and because of the intimidating presence of the ANC, the Afrikaner youth with its Boer sons and daughters is turning in droves to the right-wing radicals who dream of re-erecting, in shining white of course and with the express order of the Lord, the old Boer republics (Transvaal, Orange Free State and North Natal) which had been put there by the Lord himself in the previous century.

The three reformed Afrikaans churches of various sizes have remained true to themselves and have turned away from the "Nationals" either openly or behind closed doors. They are tied to apartheid until its last breath because they are its true creators and untiring defenders. Those churches are probably already part and parcel of the patriotic right-wing extremist alliance. Its overall shape is still a bit fuzzy, but a few outlines are recognizable. First there is the "conservative" party of the theologian Treurnicht. It split from the "Nationals" in 1982-1983 and is well represented in parliament and in the business sector. Then there is the "Volkswacht," a "cultural organization" which is spreading among teachers, students, lower level civil servants and the village intelligentsia. It champions the purity of language and race and cultivates national-socialist concepts such as anti-capitalism and also emotional anti-semitism. Last but not least is the "Afrikaaner Resistance Movement," a homeguard organization patterned after the German NSDAP [Nazi Party]. This group lead by Eugene Terreblanche, which up to now has mostly produced brawlers, screamers and guards of secret arms depots, has recently spawned militant offspring who are unmistakably patterned after organizations such as "Storm Falcon" and "Boer Fireguard" (which is the successor organization to the uncomfortable memories caused during the thirties by the "Oxcart Fireguard."

All these groups and a few others, including groups for Boer ladies and girls, confess without much ado to the goal of "driving out the government of traitors around Botha with all possible means and of taking over themselves." In this regard, the word was that had the Rubicon crosser Pieter Willem Botha only wanted to shoot blacks in his efforts to promote his reform program, he would not have had to ask in the referendum of 1983 for advance laurels and more extensive imperial power, because he already had the power to shoot blacks at will. More importantly, what he needed and what was a power much harder to justify for the reformer, was the power to shoot whites in an already dawning fratricidal war.

13196

CSO: 3420/45

LOCAL FAMILIES OPPOSED TO NEW TOWNSHIP

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Aug 86 p 12

[Article by Andrew Thomson]

[Text]

ABOUT 30 families living at Hiltondale, south of Pretoria, are to hold a meeting this weekend to discuss the Government's proposal to build a Black township to the north and east of the Diepsloot nature reserve.

Hiltondale, a collection of small farms, falls within the area earmarked for development by the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning.

One of the residents, Mrs Louise Balfour, is opposed to the development and has submitted representations to the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Mr Chris Heunis.

Mrs Balfour's opposition is based on the fact that the Diepsloot area comprises a valuable green belt between Pretoria and the Witwaters-

rand metropolis, and is extremely rich in fauna and flora. She and her family are also reluctant to sacrifice 15 years of investment in their 20-hectare farm, both in terms of money and labour.

Mrs Balfour claims that she and her husband were assured there would be no future development in the area when they bought property there in 1971.

"Moreover, no-one canvassed the opinion of the local residents before formulating the proposals," she told The Citizen yesterday.

"We can never be compensated for what our farms mean to us. We love this place, every stone and every khakibos. There are 90 different species of birds on our farm alone, and these will all disappear if the area is developed. Our schools and our friends are here — the security of home

life is everything to us.

"We're not opposed to the township because it will be for Blacks — we're opposed to any development whatsoever. This is an area with plenty of water and a wide variety of trees and shrubs. It would be such a waste to destroy it all.

"Our meeting on Saturday will also be attended by the Black people living in the area. They are also opposed to the development because it will deprive them of their livelihood. Most of them are cattle herders."

The proposal to build a township for 250 000 people in the area was made by the Guide Plan Committee for the Central Witwatersrand last week. Representations in connection with the proposal have been invited, and must be submitted by early October.

/9317

CSO: 3400/401

FARM FAMILY ON NORTHERN BORDER LIVES IN STATE OF SIEGE

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 25-31 Jul 86 p 7

[Article by Vivienne Walt]

[Text]

It is breakfast time at Overvlakte, the northernmost farm in South Africa.

At the head of the table, Willie Esterhuysen says a prayer. His wife, Elene, and their children bow their heads and clasp their hands in a moment of quiet thanks. While they eat, the ever-present handgun and the Bible — the two items which allow the family to live in relative peace — are close at hand.

The front yard of the farm runs down to a dirt track, hemmed in by two metres of fencing and topped with thick coils of barbed wire. Just beyond lies the sandy, parched Limpopo — the Zimbabwe border and one of the conduits for insurgents coming back to lay mines on the farmers' land.

In the past six months, the Dongola area has been transformed. The community that has been led by attractive government incentives to farm this isolated, thorny scrubland has been bound together by fear and the determination to defeat the guerrillas.

Armed by the SA Defence Force with semi-automatic rifles, the 20 farmers and their wives living along this section of the Limpopo have one simple aim: to keep their land free of insurgents, no matter what the cost.

"We have to follow every spoor now, because it could be the ANC," says Esterhuysen. "Until three years ago, we crossed the border all the time. We used to drive across the river every Sunday during winter, when there is no water in the

Limpopo, and visit the farmer on the other side. Those days are gone."

Growing up here, children get to know their enemy at a young age. At 11, Marzanne Esterhuysen has a simple explanation for the tight security on the farm. "My father's told us why it's happening. Everybody knows it's because the ANC wants our land. They are terrorists. They want us to move away from the river, so they can come into the country."

Long before last December, when a landmine placed on a nearby farm road killed six members of a family, the Esterhuysens had begun preparing for a life of partial siege.

Since July last year, regional army officers have regularly travelled the 55km to the border farms, to train the women to shoot. The farmers, connected by radio to each other and to military headquarters, have formed a civil defense commando.

But the December blast, less than 8km from the Esterhuysens' gate, shook the conservative frontier communities. The first blast was followed by a series of landmine attacks on South Africa's border farms.

"I didn't sleep for three nights after the attack last December," says Elene Esterhuysen. "We expected an attack on the house. What really worries me are all the new weapons, like mortars. They could stand on the Zimbabwe side of the river, and shoot into our house."

The 1981-82 season, a period of government supporters, the issue which has sparked nationwide rebellion by blacks for nearly two years is not a struggle for political power. It is the land. In the six short years since they moved here, the family has carved out their cotton and wheat fields, hectare by hectare, from the bush.

In that time, they have taken off a total of two weekends.

Some years, rainfall drops to a meagre 15cm and the pumping of water from deep under the Limpopo's sands is a complex and tenuous affair. "We've put our lives into this, our sweat. Everything. We'll never give it up," says Ellen Esterhuyse.

Instead, she is resigned to the possibility that one day she will have to fight for their survival. "I teach my children to load the magazines. So if we are attacked, they can help us load the ammunition, while my husband and I shoot. They must feel they are part of the whole thing."

Since the December attack, Marzanne and her eight-year-old brother, Piet have ridden half-way to school in an armoured personnel vehicle, joining other farm children in a large military truck on the main road to travel the rest of the way.

At their school in the border town of Messina, "The army come to show us what landmines and grenades look like," says Marzanne. "So if we see them on the farm, we know they are dangerous and we won't pick them up. They teach us at school what to do if the ANC attacks. We have to fall down and pretend we're dead."

The scenario is more than an abstract school lesson for those who live here. On July 10, police and suspected ANC guerrillas fought an armed battle on a farm at Alldays, in the district next to Dongola, in which six insurgents were killed. In the past year alone, there have been seven such shootouts on the borders.

But for many would-be farmers like Willie Esterhuyse, accepting such risks has meant their only chance to buy land.

"I always wanted a farm," he says. Then, while working in a cotton research station in a nearby town, "I heard the government was offering a good deal for farmers to move here. I bought the land for R130 000, and got to work."

"It's unbelievable how different this area is now. I think the government really needs us here for security."

Indeed, the border farmers, with their political loyalty to President PW Botha's administration and their protection of the land, form one of the most efficient para-military forces available to the government.

"We're ready for anything," says Esterhuyse. "If there's direct fighting, we'll sort them out chop-chop, that's for sure."

Aside from being able to call on the help of his own family, Esterhuyse claims to have learned a crucial lesson from the white Rhodesians, who found themselves dangerously isolated by hostile farmworkers, and easy targets for guerrillas, in the blacks' battle for independence before 1980.

"The way I protect my labourers," he says, "they'll never protect the ANC. They ask me, 'Who are these people who put down the landmines? We must kill them.'" And, says Esterhuyse, "if the local people don't help and support them, they'll never win."

Besides, he says, the farmworkers need only look across the river to discover "what freedom means. It means hunger," he says.

Last Sunday, 10 Zimbabweans crossed the border as illegal immigrants, looking for work on the South African side. "We handed them over to the police, to be sent back. But they always return," says Esterhuyse.

So sure are the local farmers of their workers' trust that they plan to arm them in the near future. "We'll select very carefully who we give arms to," says Esterhuyse. "But they have to be part of the whole security thing."

Still, his own farmworkers live in a pitiful compound of mud huts and small brick houses, and their pay

offers only bare subsistence, although it is average for the district. Women earn R1,50 a day shifting the irrigation pipes. The highest-paid man on the farm earns R250 a month.

And yet for now, Esterhuyse, who says "the government should have moved faster with its reforms," appears to have the loyalty of his workforce. "They are just as scared of the ANC as we are," he says. "The good thing about landmines is that they can kill anybody. Not just white people."

In the opinion of many political observers, the Esterhuyses and their neighbours are buying time, hoping for a solution, but facing a

deteriorating security situation.

The government has begun surveying the border track to tar it, making landmine attacks on it impossible. Last month they offered to give the Dongola farmers mine-proof vehicles in which to travel around their farms. And the women have been supplied by the SADF with Israeli-made Uzi rifles.

But despite the increasing danger of attacks on its land, the community lives with a quiet confidence. The children play under the giant moshatu trees, and ride in their father's open pickup truck along the border fence.

"There are lots of dangers here," says 11-year-old Marzanne, "but we know the Lord is with us."

/9317

CSO: 3400/399

VIEWS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN'S DEPUTY CHAIRMAN ON NATIONAL ISSUES

Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Vol 5, No 3, 1986 pp 33, 34, 37, 39

[Interview with Julian Ogilvie Thompson, deputy chairman of the Anglo American Corporation, by Hugh Murray; date and place not given]

[Text]

Julian Ogilvie Thompson, chairman of De Beers and deputy chairman of the Anglo American Corporation, has been named by AAC chairman Gavin Relly as his likely successor.

Relly's disclosure more or less confirms what has been commonly accepted in SA's business community: that the brilliant career of Ogilvie Thompson should culminate in the country's top private sector appointment.

Ogilvie Thompson was educated at the Diocesan College (Bishops), and was the school's Rhodes Scholar for 1953. He proceeded to Worcester College, Oxford, to read politics, philosophy and economics.

The son of a Chief Justice of South Africa, law was obviously a possibility, but Ogilvie Thompson was instead attracted by business.

The decision seems to have been a mature one. At 32, he was appointed to the board of De Beers, and to the board of Anglo American four years later.

Should Relly have his wish and Ogilvie Thompson succeeds him when he retires - the new chairman will be faced with piloting Anglo American through difficult times, mainly in the political sphere.

Hugh Murray talked to Ogilvie Thompson about national affairs, and the role of the Anglo American.

Murray: Mr Gavin Relly indicated in a television interview the other evening that as deputy chairman of the Anglo American and chairman of De Beers you were his natural successor. Is that now your official status?

Ogilvie Thompson: I think Gavin has

probably said as much as can be said. First of all there are no plans for him to retire. I don't think any of us would like to see him retire. On the contrary, we hope he will go on a good long time. So I think he was expressing an opinion as to what might happen at some stage in the future. Certainly the board has taken no decision, nor would it have been appropriate for the matter to be discussed by the board. So I don't think there is any more to be said at this stage.

Murray: What strikes one about the Anglo American is that people who gravitate towards the upper echelons tend to be men who are not purely industrialists, or businessmen. They tend to be people who are politically and classically schooled. There is a very discernible culture which appears to be quite different from anywhere else. What goes into the making of a top "Anglo-man"?

Ogilvie Thompson: The people that run the centre of Anglo have come from different roots. But I would think that there is one unifying, important factor - a sort of ethos. There is an ethos that runs through any school. Certainly there could be an ethos that runs through an organisation. To my mind it was best summed up by Sir Ernest Oppenheimer. He said: "The purpose of this corporation is to make profits for shareholders but to do so in such a way as to make a lasting contribution to the countries in which it operates." Apart from having what is hopefully an exciting and worthwhile

business career, I think we have all felt that in some small way we can help to create a better situation, certainly in Southern Africa. It has been easier for this group to see things in a more international way. A large proportion of the people who come to the centre have had spells in non-South African offices, looking in at South Africa from the outside, and to my mind this is a great advantage. Then, everyone agrees Harry Oppenheimer is a particularly remarkable man and it is amazing how the spirit of his actions and general approach to life has permeated through the group.

Murray: It seems that the Anglo American is destined (in the way things are developing at the moment) to find itself with a much higher political profile than it has in the past. Is it desirable that businessmen should now be so engrossed in politics or is it purely a consequence of our situation?

Ogilvie Thompson: I think it has to be like that. It is fair to say that in any Western country there is a distinct interplay between business and government and indeed between government and other sections of the community. No business can ignore general developments in the country, and this means no business can ignore political developments. But business in South Africa may have had less influence on government or on politics because of the political system and the special composition of the electorate.

Murray: It is increasingly becoming apparent that business is going to have to take much more of a lead than it has in the past – a much tougher, direct line with government – particularly if it wants to retain international credibility. Yet I wonder whether businessmen really are aware of the onus that is going to be on them to keep the country's economy in a state of relative normality?

Ogilvie Thompson: However hard anyone tries you aren't going to get this economy going soundly until you restore confidence, which means that people have got to have more faith in a satisfactory political outcome. I think everyone is going to do what he can to bring that about. Certainly businessmen have been taking a more active interest in politics and trying to influence government. But no government is going to go faster than its electorate, or than it thinks it can lead its electorate. So businessmen are now saying that the time has come to modernise the electorate in a way which would encourage

and allow government to press ahead faster and further with its reform programme.

Murray: Do you mean that the very nature of the electorate itself should change and the constituency to which the government addresses itself could be fundamentally different?

Ogilvie Thompson: Yes, you probably will have a more broadly-based government. I think that is what the country needs. Indeed, when the government talks about the national statutory council, I believe it sees it as a means of moving towards government by a broader spectrum of people.

Murray: To accept that one has to accept the bona fides of the government. Hasn't this become increasingly difficult to do?

Ogilvie Thompson: The business community is made up of a broad spectrum of people with a broad spectrum of opinions. So I think one can't so easily just say that business thinks this or that should be done. It is the case that business over the last few years has become more co-ordinated in its views. To some extent this is why you have been able to get various business organisations to make important statements. Some of us feel that the government moves too slowly and not far enough. But the fact is that the government has changed this country enormously over the last five or seven years

– in many ways it is unrecognisable. If you add these things up they do amount to a significant though inadequate process. There is a doubt in the country and outside over what the government actually means about sharing

power. There are some people who suspect that what the government means is that it will share power but will hope to keep a veto for the white man or the white electorate. I personally don't think that that will be practical. I think you may be able to negotiate a constitution which has a number of checks and balances. It may be able to operate by consensus, and you may be able to have a number of groups or units, geographic or otherwise, with veto powers. But I don't think you can expect a veto for the white man. Now the government has not said that this is what it is going for, but there are people who speculate about that. The

government says it does want to negotiate with people. I personally think it is all the more important, in view of the emergency, that the government should reiterate their commitment and their desire to negotiate with authentic representatives of all groups.

Murray: Can South Africa change its mood of recrimination to one of constructive development?

Ogilvie Thompson: A great deal of apartheid legislation has been or is being abolished. There are certain key laws – the Group Areas Act and the Land Act, for example, that one would hope could be abolished before too long. First of all that will enable and further encourage all people to participate in the free enterprise system and see the benefits of this. It seems to me that government's facilitating the availability of land for housing is probably the crucial thing in letting private enterprise and individuals get on with it. This would lead people to feel that they were participating in society and had economic opportunity and from that we would hope to be able to go further on negotiating some political participation.

Murray: There seems to me, however, to be an anomalous situation developing where the accent is on the redistribution of wealth, and the creation of wealth is being ignored.

Ogilvie Thompson: There is a whole heap of incontrovertible evidence that if you concentrate on redistribution only you actually land up with a lower gross domestic product, quite apart from lower per capita income. What one needs to do is to facilitate and encourage a redistribution of greater wealth. I think one ought to facilitate share ownership of businesses by staff and workers at different levels and I think industry is applying its mind to try and work out satisfactory schemes for that. These points were touched on in Project Free Enterprise. The other thing I think we ought to embark upon is a programme of educating our workers at all levels in exactly how business works. It is extraordinary where people believe our profits go.

Murray: That also seems to be a problem with the ANC.

Ogilvie Thompson: Indeed. What one has got to do is to get the ANC to realise that this commitment to nationalisation, which is fundamental to the Freedom Charter, may

have been the conventional wisdom in the mid-Fifties when that was what the world was doing. But in the Eighties everybody is going in the opposite direction. So one has got to encourage and make it easier for them to change that particular view. Of course I doubt whether the Communist Party element would facilitate such change but the others must see it that way.

Murray: Are you basically sanguine about the future? If things continue to decline at the rate they are, I would suggest that even something like the mighty Anglo American Corporation could by the turn of the century cease to exist in the form it takes today.

Ogilvie Thompson: Well I can't but agree with you that things look very bad at the moment. Any country that has to declare a state of emergency is obviously in a very difficult situation. There are those that argue this is largely due to years of inadequate, misguided Nationalist Party rule. Others will argue it is entirely the fault of the extremists. But I can't help feeling that maybe we are in the darkest hours before the dawn. It seems to me that things look so bad and the dangers on the horizon are so strong and potent that maybe people are now really going to get down to working out a more stable future. It is extremely difficult to assess exactly what is happening in the townships during a state of emergency, and one hopes that the government is going to use this to press ahead with reform and its commitment to negotiate a political solution. One hopes, too, that the seriousness of the situation will impress itself on the electorate and this will encourage the government to feel that it can take bolder steps that the electorate will go along with. It is difficult to judge. There is no doubt that the way we are at the moment we are going to get a measure of sanctions this year and unless things change substantially by next year, we are going to get more sanctions. We are also going to get an extremely difficult renegotiation of our debt in the middle of next year unless substantial steps are made toward negotiating political reform. The government must understand this.

Murray: Yes. But the fact at the moment is that there are elements in the government that have decided, for better or for worse, to pull down the shutters.

Ogilvie Thompson: There is a concern that there is an element in the government that

welcomes the idea of a siege economy and isolation. To my mind this is the gravest error of judgement. No doubt the security forces can maintain the situation for a longish time but it will be extremely nasty and I don't believe anyone in the country will have a happy and a prosperous life on that basis. That seems to me a disastrous road to go down. The other road is certainly a dangerous one, and it is not going to be easy. But if you have to choose between danger and disaster there is no choice.

Murray: How will sanctions directly affect the Anglo American Corporation?

Ogilvie Thompson: One simply doesn't know what sort of sanctions we are going to get. There has already been some effect in the coal industry. The coal exporters from South Africa are finding that buyers of coal want to diversify a bit away from South Africa and they have also used the general situations as a lever to keep prices down. There have been specific views taken in one or two countries.

Murray: Do you anticipate any extreme form of sanctions – major trade boycotts and so on?

Ogilvie Thompson: It may come to that. At the moment President Reagan and Mrs Thatcher are opposed to greatly strengthened trade sanctions or boycotts. I suspect they are going to have to agree on certain measures. But it seems to me that unless there is progress, and negotiation with representatives of all races in South Africa, they will find it that much harder to maintain the line they are apparently taking now. That increases the chance of governmental sanctions from important countries. In the meantime, I would have thought you would see a certain number of smaller countries going ahead with this, and a certain amount of private sanctions in particular industries or groups.

Murray: Has life become discernibly different, perhaps more unpleasant for you in your dealings around the world?

Ogilvie Thompson: Certainly it is more difficult at the moment. It is well-nigh impossible to cement South African and international business links while this situation continues and that is obviously not helpful for our group and bad for the country.

There may be people in this country to whom it would appeal if others simply washed their hands of South Africa, put us in limbo and said

we were past redemption, refusing to have anything to do with us. That would be very bad for South Africa because I don't think we can realise the potential of this country, or meet the aspirations of all the people, except as a full member of the Western community.

Murray: Does your common sense tell you that a return to acceptable international status is a possibility?

Ogilvie Thompson: I think it is a possibility. It needs determined leadership, and far-sightedness on behalf of the government. It needs to take its electorate with it. Personally I would have thought it would be easier to form a broader base instead of relying only on an Afrikaans-speaking base. I believe there is a majority of the South African electorate willing to take the apparently dangerous course of releasing Mandela and unbanning political organisations so that people can express themselves freely. You have to continue to take a firm line about violence, but with a view to getting all the different groups to participate in a single body.

Murray: A government of national unity?

Ogilvie Thompson: Indeed. To my mind this might well be the sensible way to do it, to have a government of national unity. One has often thought of that. I think that if we can achieve this we might be able to get some financial help from abroad in order to do the sort of things the country would like to do in development, growth and then redistribution of wealth. A government of national unity would have other things that go along with it. If we are going to have evolutionary change, it must take place through the electorate, whoever that may be. So you must convince the electorate that it is going to have a place in the sun – maybe it won't be as sunny as it has been for the last 76 years but it will be more sunny than if we don't go down this road. Certainly voters will be sharing a place in the sun with others who haven't had as much of the sun as they ought to have had. This is pretty obvious. But one of the things that worries me about the attitude of some of the people abroad, including the

'G, is that they don't seem to understand that the electorate must make the changes. And they keep shifting in their demands. They move the goalposts. You don't know what the people abroad really want and to that extent they make it easier for elements in the government to say there is no point in doing anything.

Murray: What can the outside world do to help?

Ogilvie Thompson: At this stage, I think, it could help in two important respects. One – going back to my point about moving the goalposts – is that the responsible Western governments should make it clear that if negotiations among the real representatives of all groups were to result in the type of constitution I outlined earlier, it would be accepted – as indeed it would have to be accepted. Many white South Africans are fearful that the rest of the world will accept nothing less than outright majority rule – in other words that they are expected to commit political suicide. The other point concerns the ANC and others who assume that if the price of political victory is a South African economy in ruins, it will still come right because the West will pour in the funds necessary to rebuild our economic machine.

Looking at the record of investment in independent Africa, that I think is an illusion. But a government here born out of evolutionary change and representative of all racial groups would I am sure attract considerable international investment. If the West would consistently make these points, I believe it could help to bring white and black to the negotiating table.

Murray: How much longer can the business community foot the bill for developments under the general heading of social responsibility? How much further can you, on a prudent basis, dip in?

Ogilvie Thompson: We don't have a welfare safety net in South Africa, so when you have major unemployment there is much more likelihood of violence or socio-economic unrest, as it is euphemistically called. I think that business is trying to give its black employees the same facilities that it has for years given whites. You simply must have a situation where you have a completely colour-blind job remuneration system. Many industries have done that, the gold and coal mining industries haven't yet achieved that. It seems to me the only way to keep orderly and reasonable industrial relations.

Murray: What about a sensible sharing of wealth, and a general acceptance of the need for a mixed economy? Pure capitalism seems to have taken on very unsatisfactory connotations.

Ogilvie Thompson: There is an inadequate welfare system and certainly there is a need for equal education. There is going to have to be a massive amount of work and effort on this front. That is why it is important to get money from abroad. But as far as nationalisation of industry is concerned, I remain convinced that this is not the most productive way to run a country and it will not actually help the people it is designed to help.

Murray: What about the diamond industry, and the difficult times you have had there?

Ogilvie Thompson: We are not entirely out of the woods but we think we are very near to normal conditions. Throughout the Eighties, we have been encouraged by the steadily rising retail sales of diamond jewellery to the mass market, which is the basic market we have always supported and advertised and helped promote. All indications are that the stocks in the cutting centres and in the pipeline beyond the cutting centres to the retail jewellers are back to normal levels. We have already sold more diamonds than last year and we believe that we are back to or very nearly at normal, satisfactory profit conditions for ourselves. When things got bad we withheld those diamonds the market didn't want, we changed our assortments, and as the market started to broaden a year or two ago we gradually made more available. We are at last selling all categories of diamonds. The industry is still naturally nervous because of the bad depression, the worst since the Thirties that it has been through, but I would hope that we are near normality. But the last thing we would like to see is a repetition of the inordinate speculation we had at the end of the Seventies.

Incidentally, we will be announcing satisfactory results on sales for the first six months of this year.

Murray: You have moved to the upper stratosphere of the Anglo operation at a very interesting time, at a time when you are very aware of the limited life of gold, the need for diversification, the need for expansion of opportunities and so on. All this must stretch you considerably?

Ogilvie Thompson: We hope there are further opportunities of opening new gold

mines or new areas of existing mines, new shafts and so on. Some of these developments could be described as very large mines on their own, though this tends to be lost on the media. We would hope there will be more of these so that we can both extend the life of the mines and continue to employ people.

Murray: How are things going with the gold reclamation projects?

Ogilvie Thompson: Those have gone rather well. In some cases they are already putting the slimes through for the second or third

time and one would hope that with improved technology in the recovery process, there would be further scope.

On the De Beers front we hope that prices and costs will be such that the new Venetia prospect will become payable. And I would hope that De Beers will continue to find other mines, perhaps in South Africa, perhaps abroad.

Murray: What about regional development, particularly the Southern African sub-continent? How important is that?

Ogilvie Thompson: From a mining point of view we prospect generally in Southern Africa and would hope to find other mines here, including South West Africa, which we think is important for us. It is also important for those countries, for employment and job opportunities. From another point of view,

obviously strong economies can only help the South African market. Take Amcar, our car manufacturing company. If we had bigger and better markets around us, it would obviously help make Amcar viable sooner.

Murray: There would also be the general opening up of trade links?

Ogilvie Thompson: Quite. If South Africa could only get its politics right it really could act as the locomotive for industrial development in Southern Africa. Indeed, this is of course how Sir Ernest always saw it.

Murray: What is needed in South Africa to put leadership back in the hands of bona fide leaders? At the moment there is enormous despondency. People feel leaderless, and are looking more to the business community than ever.

Ogilvie Thompson: Don't you think there have been many signs that P W Botha and the government see the need for closer business and government co-operation? I wonder, too, if our politicians aren't seeing more the opportunities for employment, the opportunities that will flow from urbanisation, not to mention deregulation.

Aren't these encouraging signs? I am encouraged by the sort of things on this score which are said by Afrikaans businessmen who in the nature of things have more access to and more influence on the government. And I personally believe there are some reasons for hoping that we may see a breakthrough in housing and business development.

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EMPLOYER GROUPS SUBMIT MEMO ON PRIVATIZATION

MB191036 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1035 GMT 19 Aug 86

[Text] Johannesburg, Aug 19, SAPA--Four employer organisations have submitted a joint memorandum on privatisation and deregulation of the economy to the government in which they stress that the overall pace of any privatisation and deregulation programme must be dictated by the ability of the economy to fund and absorb it.

The four are: the Association of Chamber of Commerce (ASSOCOM), the Federated Chamber of Industries (BCI), Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut [Afrikaans Trade Institute] (AHI), and the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU).

The four have set up a permanent task force on privatisation and deregulation to establish the proper liaison base with government to draw up a strategic plan for privatisation and deregulation, identifying priorities and target areas and setting a timetable.

In the current chamber bulletin of the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, it is stated that early in the document, the four employer bodies express their support for a programme of privatisation and deregulation saying "the country must recognise that there is a great need to redress serious structural deficiencies which have been built into the economy over a number of decades."

The deficiencies are slow growth, inadequate investment in the private sector and the problem of poverty and inadequate economic opportunity.

"Privatisation and deregulation can be used as important vehicles to redress these problems," they say in the memorandum.

A pre-condition for successful privatisation is that it should be accompanied by planned deregulation, namely the partial or total scrapping or rewriting of laws or regulations "inhibiting the effective operation of the private sector in the production of goods and services previously supplied by the state--e.g., the deregulation of transport."

A coherent strategy for privatisation implies a deliberate decision to change the role of government in the economy and to redefine the relationships between the public and private sectors, they say.

It can result in spreading economic ownership more widely among the population and creating new economic opportunities in the private sector.

The key objective for privatisation and deregulation, as the four bodies see it, are:

--To reduce and eventually reverse the upward trend in government spending and public sector involvement in the economy to the order of 20 per cent by the year 2000.

--To reduce the cost of services to the taxpayer, and consequently to help reduce the tax burden, and especially the marginal rate of tax, to broaden the tax base and to increase revenue collections as economic activity is consequently stimulated.

--To boost the economy by increasing economic opportunities and individual entrepreneurship and to spread economic ownership.

--To benefit consumers by way of increased competition which will boost efficiency and which will eventually lead to more innovation.

--To permit the market to satisfy the needs of individuals and communities with the least intervention from the political and regulatory process.

The four organisations believe that the economic opportunities arising from privatisation and deregulation should be spread as widely as possible, and especially to small investors and entrepreneurs to avoid an unacceptable degree of economic power concentration.

They say that there are a number of alternative criteria for determining the most effective targets to prioritise a programme for privatisation and deregulation.

These include, in order of priority: the greatest economic impact to revitalise the economy and to stimulate the job and entrepreneurship creation potential of the country; areas of highest demand escalation which the state cannot meet, such as health care, education and low income housing; and most easily saleable assets and services.

The four bodies recommend the establishment of a permanent and independent advisory council on privatisation and deregulation consisting of representatives of the government, the private sector, consumer organisations and trade unions.

The council should be charged with the responsibility of assessing which assets of the state or para-statal organisations should be leased to the public and to recommend in each specific case, the procedures to be followed.

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CSO: 3400/411

BRIEFS

FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES SYSTEM--House of Assembly Aug 19 SAPA--The Reserve Bank would continue to use the system of floating exchange rates to exert a stabilizing influence on the foreign exchange market, the deputy minister of finance, Mr Kent Durr, said today. Replying on behalf of the minister, Mr Barend du Plessis, to questions by Mr Louis Stofbert (HNP [Reformed National Party] Sasolburg), Mr Durr said measures taken by the state to strengthen the rand exchange rate had had the desired effect. No further measures were planned. "The Reserve Bank will continually seek, through the existing system of managed floating, to exert a stabilising influence on the foreign exchange market." Mr Durr said it was possible that one of the main reasons for the sharp fall in the rand exchange rate in the first half of June was expectations of a possible increase in unrest around June 16. Once it became clear "that the level of unrest had started to decline," market sentiment changed and the rand recovered and had been "relatively stable" since. Asked by Mr Harry Schwarz (PFP [Progressive Federal Party] Yeoville) whether it was the government's policy not to strengthen the rand, Mr Durr said: "That is correct." [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1637 GMT 19 Aug 86 MB] /6662

FUNDS TO ISRAEL MONITORED--House of Assembly, Aug 19, SAPA--There was no abnormal flow of funds from South Africa to Israel between June 10 and June 17, the deputy minister of finance, Mr Kent Durr, said today. Replying to a question from Mr Louis Stofberg (HNP [Reformed National Party] Sasolburg), Mr Durr said this information had been obtained from the Reserve Bank after radio and newspaper reports that investments in Israel by South African Jews had increased considerably during that week. Mr Durr added that applications by South African residents to transfer funds to Israel and other countries were being strictly monitored in accordance with stringent measures to limit the outflow of capital from South Africa. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1614 GMT 19 Aug 86 MB] /6662

ENERGY OFFICIAL SPEAKS ON SANCTIONS--The director of energy planning in the department of mineral and energy affairs, Dr (R. Scott), has given the assurance that economic sanctions against South Africa would not have an immediate effect on the country's energy supplies. Speaking at a conference on the consequences of sanctions being held in Pretoria, Dr (Scott) said it is unlikely that a crude oil boycott could ever be 100 percent effective, particularly with the prevailing weak world oil market. It was therefore

reasonably unlikely that strict measures would be introduced immediately to limit the use of petrol and diesel in the event of sanctions being imposed. Dr (Scott) said if the present oil boycott became more effective, it would become necessary to introduce measures limiting the use of liquid fuels. This could involve a program of rationing. He said electricity could become more expensive, because unit production costs would rise. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in Afrikaans 1400 GMT 15 Aug 86 MB] /6662

BUSINESS PROFESSOR: NATION PROFITABLE MARKET--A professor at the School of Business Leadership at the University of South Africa, Professor (Jan Houpkies), says South Africa remains a very profitable market to the outside world and the country still has the power to assert itself. Addressing a seminar on punitive economic measures in Pretoria he said that, apart from the influence South Africa could exert on neighboring countries, South African imports of goods and services exceeded her exports by 8.7 million rands. He said that South Africa could have a considerable influence on some markets. Prof (Houpkies) said South Africa could transfer her purchases from European countries to the East. This would be a telling blow for Europe. He said that the South African public could also take part in such a boycott or sanctions campaign by letting important products rot and gather dust on the shelves of shops. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1100 GMT 15 Aug 86 MB] /6662

GST MAY BE ABOLISHED--Sales tax could soon be abolished. As Carmel Rickard reports, the government has indicated that it might do away with the taxation. [Rickard] The hint the General Sales Tax [GST] could be scrapped or substantially cut comes from Finance Minister Barend du Plessis. He told the NATAL MERCURY that GST was a wrong tax. Too many exemptions had led to it being raised to unacceptably high levels. Mr Du Plessis said that if GST was retained at all, his department believes there should no longer be any exceptions made in its application. On this issue, he also said it was only fair that people who didn't earn enough to pay personal tax should contribute something through indirect taxation. Mr Du Plessis seemed to indicate there wasn't much chance of separate taxation for married couples. Both issues are expected to be dealt with by the Margo Commission which (?reviews) the whole tax system, and Mr Du Plessis said the commission was due to finish its reports within days. [Text] [Umtata Capital Radio in English 0600 GMT 15 Aug 86 MB] /6662

PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC POWERS AMENDMENT--House of Representatives, Aug 19, SAPA--The powers conferred on the state president to remove restriction from economic activities would be temporary, however the rights, privileges and liabilities that followed would be permanent, the minister of administration and economic advisory services, Mr Eli Louw, said today. He introduced an amendment during the committee stage of the temporary removal of restriction of economic activities bill which he said would do away with the uncertainty over the legal implications of the bill because they were permanent while the powers that the state president would enjoy were limited. The amendment was accepted. Mr Godfrew Leeuw (LP [Labor Party] Southern Free State) said

during the third reading debate the effect that sanctions would have on the country would be to render many people jobless. He supported the bill because it allowed for job creation which was needed to keep hunger and unrest at bay. In reply Mr Louw said the object of the bill was to encourage "small" participation in the economy. The bill was read a third time. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1515 GMT 19 Aug 86 MB] /6662

SURVEY: BUSINESS COMMITTED TO REFORM--A nationwide survey conducted in South Africa has (?revealed) the private sector's commitment to political change. A survey on manpower development conducted among 100 major businesses found that 14 percent of employers were prepared to become actively involved in promoting political change. Although the majority say they are prepared to put pressure on the government through employer bodies like the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, only 11 percent say that would not be involved at all. [Words indistinct] contacts with trade unions are important than with the government, although they believed that both were essential to improving the political situation in South Africa. The survey also identified a [word indistinct] widespread backlash among white workers against (?political) policies. It said white workers objected to making up for production lost during stayaways by blacks. The results have been [words indistinct] by white workers towards right-wing trade unions. [Text] [Johannesburg International Service in English 1100 GMT 16 Aug 86 MB] /6662

DE KOCK: LOAN INSTALLMENT--The governor of the Reserve Bank, Dr Gerhard de Kock, has told our economics news staff that all dollars obtained from the sale of gold are being placed in the market. He said that last week South Africa had repaid the third of eight installments on an IMF loan which amounted to 215 million rand. The next payment was due in November and South Africa had every intention of meeting this and other commitments. Dr De Kock said that if gold held above \$380 and market sentiment was positive the rand could be expected to rise in the near future. He said the higher gold price made the forecast of the surplus on the balance of payments of 46 billion rand secure. If the price of bullion held the figure could be even bigger. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1100 GMT 12 Aug 86 MB] /6662

OFFICIAL: COUNTRY SELF-SUFFICIENT--The deputy minister of finance and of trade and industry, Mr Kent Durr, says South Africa has enough natural resources, technological expertise, and human resources to meet its own needs if the sanctions campaign against South Africa increases. Mr Durr said in Port Alfred that if the country was isolated through external pressure, it would create opportunities for the development of import replacement industries, technological breakthroughs, and self-sufficiency in agriculture and food processing. He said it was of the utmost importance that new export and employment opportunities be created and that existing markets be retained at all costs since it was very difficult to reestablish markets which have been lost. Mr Durr said the country was ripe for economic growth and pointed out that there was no better counter to sanctions than a growing and successful South African economy for the dynamic social and political structure increasingly mirroring the inclusion of all South Africans. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 16 Aug 86 MB] /6662

CSO: 3400/411

EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON COAL, STEEL, IRON ORE INDUSTRIES NOTED

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 6 Aug 86 pp 1, 2

[Text]

CONCERTED action by Europe, Japan and the US to ban imports of SA steel, coal and iron ore could cost more than R3bn in foreign earnings and throw 50 000 people, mostly blacks, out of work.

Some industry sources, however, believe contingency plans are available to lessen the blow.

Worst-hit by sanctions would be the coal sector. Nearly all coal exports are bought by Japan and the European Community (EC).

Japan is by far the biggest customer, taking 8.5-million tons of SA's total export of 44-million tons in 1985. EC nations took up almost all the rest, with the US, Korea, Taiwan and black Africa taking minor tonnages.

There is disagreement on the exact value of SA's coal exports. Official Japanese trade statistics say Tokyo spent R1,31bn in 1985 on SA coal. Local analysts say the total value of exports, based on world market prices of between \$22 and \$24 a ton, is about R2,5bn.

Exports make up about one-third of SA coal production. The Chamber of Mines warned last month that, in the face of total sanctions, 33% of the workforce would be laid off.

More likely, according to industry sources, is that SA could continue to export 30-million tons a year by offering an average 30% discount, resulting in a 50% drop in export income.

Exports of iron ore, totalling R312m in 1984, would probably be eliminated completely under sanctions, say analysts. The worldwide glut in pig iron production means that exports of that commodity, worth R42m in 1984, would also be wiped out.

The steel industry stands to lose about R300m a year as a result of sanctions. However, industry spokesmen say they are already laying plans to expand into other markets.

If they fail, say observers, at least 10 000 jobs could be at risk in the iron and steel sectors.

"Losing Britain as a window for SA steel is worrying, especially in a buyer's market. But we intend to sell these tonnages elsewhere," says an Iscor spokesman.

Steel exports, making up more than 40% of total steel production because of reduced local demand, are budgeted to earn Iscor and its competitors more than R1,5bn this year.

Much of that will remain safe in traditional south-east Asian and Middle East markets. However, SA stands to lose 70 000 tons of steel exports to Britain and more than 600 000 tons as its 0,42% share of US steel consumption.

Middelburg Steel & Alloys marketing director Leo Melvill says the loss of Britain and Commonwealth markets would cost the stainless and speciality steel-

maker R15m — and a further R25m from an EC boycott.

He declines to comment on export prospects for the company's 3CR12 alloy, but analysts say the company will almost certainly maintain overseas sales through manufacturing licensing agreements in other countries.

Exports of coal and mineral fuels in 1985, including those from Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia, totalled R3,22bn, SA trade data show. Iron and steel exports were R2,26bn, Sapa-Reuter reports.

Japan imported R317m of ferro-chromium and R710m of non-monetary gold lumps, Japanese statistics show. Total imports from SA in 1985 were worth R5,86bn.

Japan, SA's second-largest trading partner, will almost certainly observe sanctions agreed to by the West, diplomatic sources surmise.

Japanese policy is to co-ordinate with the US and the EC on sanctions, they say.

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BRIEFS

RICHARDS BAY NOT TO CLOSE--A ban on imports of coal from South Africa was unlikely to cause the Richards Bay harbour and coal railway line to become a "white elephant," said Leon Els, a spokesman for Minister of Transport Services, Hendrik Schoeman. Approached yesterday for comment on the possible affects of such a ban on South African Transport Services (Sats) workers in Richards Bay, Els said all plans were going ahead as normal. "The Richards Bay facilities, and improvements to the coal railway line are going ahead as planned and no change will be made in spite of the speculation. "The coal exporting companies still have a certain tonnage that must be exported and as such, work procedures will be going ahead as normal." Els emphasised that coal exports only formed part of the job done by port workers and that the railway line, and facilities, could easily be adapted for other purposes. The department had also noted that the large corporations which were the major coal exporters had said they were looking into alternative markets and that Sats workers would still be needed to rail and ship the coal, he said. A spokesman for Iscor has denied that an overseas ban on South African coal exports would have any affect on their already hard-hit Newcastle plant. "We are not involved in the coal export market in any way," he said. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 7 Aug 86 p 4] /9317

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